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Abstract
Currently, our society has at its disposal an uncountable number of services able
to support the global economy and also our current way of life. Services such as
power distribution, water, gas, transport networks, telecommunications, the Inter-
net, among others, are now an integral part of the citizens’ lives and businesses.
These services play such a big role in our lives that their importance is only appre-
ciated when they are unavailable. These types of services, that our lives so heavily
depend on, are provided by Critical Infrastructures. They are referred to as “Crit-
ical” due to the fact that in case of failure or breakdown in providing quality of
service, the impact on society and the economy of a country can be enormous. Be-
yond the phenomena of nature and risks inherent to the infrastructure operation,
the risks faced by these infrastructures have continuously increasing, by attracting
interest from groups of hackers and terrorist groups. Primarily due to the strong
visibility and consequences that may result even from a small successful attack.
Among the problems inherent to the operation of Critical Infrastructures, it is pos-
sible to emphasise the existence of dependencies and interdependencies among in-
frastructures. For example, a telecommunications service is inherently dependent
on the electricity supply or, for instance, banking services are dependent on both
telecommunications and energy supply services. However, is it not the service that
provides power supply actually dependent on telecommunications services and also
on information systems? Based on these examples it becomes apparent that in ad-
dition to the (inter)dependence that may exist, it is also necessary to examine the
cascading effects that may arise after the failure of a Critical Infrastructure.
Critical Infrastructures security has been the subject of discussion by numerous
governments with the support of the academia by promoting research efforts in these
areas, in particular in areas such as power distribution and telecommunications.
Furthermore, within the European Union, there is determination to promote projects
in these areas, in particular the promotion of projects that foster the exchange of
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information, in the form of warnings, among infrastructures. These warnings allow
the Critical Infrastructure to be informed and aware of the increasing risk of loss or
reduction in quality of the service received. This exchange allows the infrastructure
to timely implement their contingency and recovery plans to minimise any service
breaks and consequently minimise the unwanted effect of a cascading failure. The
motivation for the work presented in this thesis arose from the identification of the
main open issues relating to the exchange and management of risk warnings among
Critical Infrastructures.
Many of the existing approaches to security in Critical Infrastructures are focused
on obtaining risk levels through the use of models based on the infrastructure. Al-
though these models allow a solid foundation for risk monitoring, they do not have
mechanisms for exchange, management and assessment of its quality. This work ad-
dresses the problem related to trust, reputation and risk alerts management within
Critical Infrastructures. Accordingly, it is proposed to introduce mechanisms to
manage and measure at each instant, the degree of confidence assigned to each of
the alerts received or computed internally. Allowing improvement of their accuracy
and consequently improving the resilience of Critical Infrastructures when faced with
inaccurate or inconsistent risk alerts.
This thesis addresses the problem of interdependent Critical Infrastructure security
and identifies the main problems related to risk information sharing. In particu-
lar, how to allow information sharing in a secure manner, the management of that
sharing and how to assess the reliability of such information.
This thesis proposes the application of Policy Based Management mechanisms for the
management of the risk alert information shared among Critical Infrastructures. In
order to improve the information sharing management and the further interpretation
of the risk alerts, it is proposed to evaluate Trust and Reputation in order to assess
the shared information and also to consider the behaviour of the entities involved.
The proposals presented in this thesis are discussed and applied in the context of
the European Project MICIE (Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation
of data exchanged across linked CI information infrastructures). In particular with
regard to the proposed solution for the management of shared risk alerts, which
uses the Policy Based Management paradigm. By incorporating the proposed Trust
and Reputation indicators it allows to improve the Critical Infrastructure protection
considering the use of untrustworthy or inconsistent information. It is also proposed
the adaptation of the presented concepts to the CI Security Model, a model for real
x
time risk analysis evaluation, in which the identified shortcomings are addressed
with the integration of the Trust and Reputation approach proposed in this thesis.
The results of the proposals evaluation are discussed based on simulation scenarios
as well as through real data of a Critical Infrastructure.
The achieved results indicate that the proposed mechanisms meet the objectives
such as, by contributing to the increase in confidence that a Critical Infrastructure
has on the information received about the services on which it depends. To allow
improvement in management of such information as well as contribution to increased
reliability of results obtained from the risk models applied to the infrastructure.
xi
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Resumo
Atualmente a sociedade contemporaˆnea tem ao seu dispor um sem numero de
servic¸os que suportam toda a economia globalizada em que vivemos bem como o
nosso modo de vida. Servic¸os como distribuic¸a˜o de energia, a´gua, ga´s, redes de trans-
portes, telecomunicac¸o˜es, a Internet, entre outros, sa˜o atualmente parte integrante
da vida dos cidada˜os e das empresas. Estes servic¸os esta˜o de tal forma presentes
nas nossas vidas que a sua relevaˆncia e o grau de dependeˆncia aos servic¸os, apenas e´
sentido aquando da sua indisponibilidade. Este tipo de servic¸o dos quais depende o
nosso modo de vida, sa˜o fornecidos por infraestruturas cr´ıticas, assim referidas pois
a sua falha ou quebra da qualidade do servic¸o prestado pode ter um grande impacto
na sociedade ou economia de um Pa´ıs. Para ale´m dos feno´menos da natureza e dos
riscos inerentes a` sua pro´pria explorac¸a˜o, os riscos que estas infraestruturas correm
teˆm vindo a aumentar ao atrair cada vez mais o interesse de grupos de hackers e
terroristas, principalmente pela forte visibilidade e consequeˆncias que mesmo um
pequeno ataque pode acarretar.
De entre os problemas inerentes ao funcionamento das infraestruturas cr´ıticas destaca-
se o fato da existeˆncia de dependeˆncias ou interdependeˆncias entre infraestruturas.
Veja-se o exemplo do servic¸o de telecomunicac¸o˜es que esta´ por natureza dependente
do fornecimento de energia ele´trica ou dos servic¸os banca´rios que esta˜o dependentes
de ambos. Mas na˜o esta´ atualmente o fornecimento de energia dependente dos
servic¸os de telecomunicac¸o˜es e dos seus sistemas de informac¸a˜o? Destes exemplos
torna-se vis´ıvel que, para ale´m da (inter)dependeˆncia que possa existir, e´ necessa´rio
analisar tambe´m os efeitos em cascata que podem surgir apo´s a falha de uma in-
fraestrutura.
Com o objetivo de promover a seguranc¸a em infraestruturas cr´ıticas, va´rios gover-
nos, em conjunto com a comunidade cient´ıfica, promovem esforc¸os de investigac¸a˜o
nesta a´rea. Em particular, nas a´reas da distribuic¸a˜o de energia e das telecomu-
nicac¸o˜es. Ao n´ıvel da Unia˜o Europeia, existe grande determinac¸a˜o para promover
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projetos nesta a´rea, em particular, projetos que promovem a troca de informac¸a˜o
entre infraestruturas, na forma de alertas de risco, prevenindo os Operadores das
infraestruturas relativamente a um aumento de risco de perda ou quebra de quali-
dade do servic¸o fornecido. Esta troca permite que as infraestruturas possam aplicar
atempadamente os seus planos de contingeˆncia ou recuperac¸a˜o, minimizando even-
tuais quebras de servic¸o e consequentemente reduzindo o indesejado efeito de falha
em cascata. A motivac¸a˜o para o trabalho apresentado nesta tese, surgiu da iden-
tificac¸a˜o dos principais aspectos em aberto relativos a` troca e gesta˜o de alertas de
risco entre infraestruturas cr´ıticas.
Muitas das abordagens existentes relativas a` seguranc¸a em infraestruturas cr´ıticas
focam-se na obtenc¸a˜o de n´ıveis de risco atrave´s do uso de modelos mais ou menos
complexos das infraestruturas. Apesar de estes modelos permitirem uma base so´lida
para a monitorizac¸a˜o do risco, na˜o apresentam mecanismos para a sua troca, gesta˜o
e avaliac¸a˜o de qualidade. Este trabalho aborda o problema relacionado com a con-
fianc¸a, reputac¸a˜o e gesta˜o de alertas de risco no seio das infraestruturas cr´ıticas.
Nesse sentido e´ proposta a introduc¸a˜o de mecanismos que permitam gerir e aferir
em cada instante, o grau de confianc¸a atribu´ıdo a cada um dos alertas de risco rece-
bidos ou calculados internamente, permitindo melhorar a sua precisa˜o e consequente-
mente melhorar tambe´m a resilieˆncia da infraestrutura critica quando confrontada
com alertas de riscos imprecisos ou inconsistentes.
Na tese e´ abordado o problema da seguranc¸a em infraestruturas cr´ıticas interde-
pendentes e identificados os principais problemas inerentes a` troca de informac¸a˜o
de risco, em particular, a forma de efetuar a partilha de informac¸a˜o de uma forma
segura, a gesta˜o dessa mesma partilha e a avaliac¸a˜o da fiabilidade da informac¸a˜o
envolvida na partilha.
Propo˜e-se nesta tese, a aplicac¸a˜o de mecanismos de gesta˜o baseados no paradigma de
gesta˜o por politicas para a gesta˜o da partilha de alertas de risco entre infraestruturas
cr´ıticas. Com o objetivo de melhorar a gesta˜o da partilha e posterior interpretac¸a˜o
dos alertas de risco, e´ proposta a introduc¸a˜o da ana´lise de confianc¸a e reputac¸a˜o
na avaliac¸a˜o da fiabilidade da informac¸a˜o envolvida na partilha e na avaliac¸a˜o do
comportamento das entidades envolvidas.
As propostas apresentadas nesta tese sa˜o discutidas e aplicadas no aˆmbito do pro-
jeto Europeu MICIE (Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation of data
exchanged across linked CI information infrastructures), em particular, no que se
refere a` soluc¸a˜o proposta para a gesta˜o da partilha de alertas de risco, que em con-
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junto com os indicadores de confianc¸a e reputac¸a˜o propostos, permitem melhorar a
protec¸a˜o de cada infraestrutura relativamente ao uso de informac¸a˜o menos confia´vel
ou inconsistente. Apresenta-se tambe´m a adaptac¸a˜o dos conceitos propostos ao CI
Security Model, um modelo de ana´lise de risco em tempo real, no qual as falhas
identificadas sa˜o atenuadas com a introduc¸a˜o da ana´lise de confianc¸a e reputac¸a˜o
proposta nesta tese. Os resultados da avaliac¸a˜o das propostas apresentadas sa˜o dis-
cutidos com base em cena´rios de simulac¸a˜o bem como atrave´s de dados reais de uma
infraestrutura cr´ıtica.
Os resultados obtidos indicam que as propostas apresentadas satisfazem os objec-
tivos definidos, nomeadamente, ao contribuir para o aumento da confianc¸a que uma
infraestrutura cr´ıtica tem relativamente a` informac¸a˜o recebida em tempo real ac-
erca dos servic¸os dos quais depende, ao permitir uma melhor gesta˜o dessa mesma
informac¸a˜o e tambe´m ao contribuir para o aumento da fiabilidade dos resultados
provenientes dos modelos de risco em uso na infraestrutura.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis aims to address problems that might arise within Critical Infrastructures,
while evaluating real time risk levels that will allow to visualise the probability of a
future service loss or service degradation. This information is intended to be shared
and used among multiple (inter)dependent Critical Infrastructures (CIs) in order
to reduce the possibility of service failure on dependent services thus minimising
the expansion of cascading effects that might take place. In this first chapter the
motivation behind this work is presented in Section 1.1 and the objectives and
contributions of the work are described in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 concludes the
chapter by presenting the structure of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Critical Infrastructures provide services that support our society and economy.
Telecommunication infrastructures allow us to communicate with people and busi-
nesses at local or remote locations. Transport and air traffic infrastructures allow
us to travel for leisure or business activities and make the global commerce flow.
Internet access is widely available even in places where we think it would be impos-
sible to be connected to the rest of the world. The electricity infrastructure enables
a variety of services and applications that we take for granted. Can we take it for
granted?
Natural disasters as, for example, hurricane Katrina in 2005, the earthquake followed
by the tsunami that affected Fukushima nuclear reactor in Japan that took place
in March 2011, and more recently, in 2012, the hurricane Sandy show us that some
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essential services can become unavailable causing chaos and difficulties for citizens
and the economy. Those examples show that Critical Infrastructures are one of the
most important technical or industrial systems that have a strong impact on peoples’
lives and the operation of economy worldwide. Those types of infrastructures, such
as facilities/utilities, provide services that are essential to the actual society as the
services they provide are usually basic inputs to other simple or complex systems.
This dependency on services provided by CIs can, in case of an improper operation
of the CI, lead to the disruption of other dependent services.
Nowadays, the media is paying special attention to this type of Infrastructures
while the risk of “traditional” or cyberterrorism attacks increases. Citizens are also
becoming aware and concerned about those risks due to, e.g., to a recent television
series, ‘24 – season seven’, where the fictional character Jack Bauer fights a terrorist
group intending to destroy some Critical Infrastructures in the United States of
America. Putting the fiction aside, this TV series, one of the first of this kind,
clearly helped to demonstrate how important those infrastructures are and how
weak they can be.
Governments from many countries around the world are already aware of the im-
portance of their Critical Infrastructures not only for the well-being of their Citizens
but also for the survivability of their nations in terms of economy and defence.
The relevance of the area was first defined by the Administration of the United
States of America as,
“Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems es-
sential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. These
systems are so vital, that their incapacity or destruction would have a de-
bilitating impact on the defence or economic security” (Clinton, 1996).
More recently, on the 13th of February 2013, the President of the United States
of America, Barack Obama, issued the Executive Order 13636 “Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity” (Obama, 2013). In this document, the most relevant
policy is highlighted in the first section as:
“Repeated cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure demonstrate the
need for improved cybersecurity. The cyber threat to critical infrastruc-
ture continues to grow and represents one of the most serious national
security challenges we must confront. The national and economic se-
curity of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of the
2
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Nation’s critical infrastructure in the face of such threats. It is the policy
of the United States to enhance the security and resilience of the Na-
tion’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that
encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while promot-
ing safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties.
We can achieve these goals through a partnership with the Owners and
Operators of critical infrastructure to improve cybersecurity information
sharing and collaboratively develop and implement risk-based standards.”
(Obama, 2013)
One important aspect of President Obama’s Executive Order on “Improving Crit-
ical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” (Obama, 2013) is identified in Section 4 of that
document. Where it is proposed that the Policy of the United States Government
should help improve the cyber threat information sharing among private sector en-
tities that control CIs, so that those entities can improve the weapons available in
the fight against cyber threats.
Legislation or encouraging policies that aim to improve the information sharing
among Critical Infrastructure owners has already been issued in other regions such
as the European Union and Australia. In the United States of America, these type
of policies have special relevance as most of the CIs are privately owned. Apart
from this “novelty”, the Executive Order (Obama, 2013) proposes the development
of a “Baseline Framework to Reduce Cyber Risk to Critical Infrastructure” that can
help to improve, for example, the regulations ISO 27001 (widely used in industry)
(ISO/IEC, 2005), 800-53 (used within the USA government) (NIST, 2009) or NERC
CIP (used in energy sectors) (NERC, 2009). An aspect that can call a drawback is
stated in Section 8 of the Executive Order (Obama, 2013), defining that the adoption
of the framework can be done on a voluntary basis. For instance, the information
sharing among CIs has higher relevance with the increase in the number of CIs that
are willing to exchange threats and risks.
Although, the U.S.A. Executive Order 13636 (Obama, 2013) can be seen as a step
to improve the Critical Infrastructure Protection area, it is the author’s opinion
that the foreseen deadlines for implementation and the voluntary adoption of the
framework, can quickly transform this action in just one more attempt to achieve
regulation among heterogeneous and private managed CIs. Apart from this opinion,
those initiatives are needed and encourage information sharing initiatives among
Critical Infrastructures.
3
INTRODUCTION
Australian Federal Government also considers Critical Infrastructures as essential for
contemporary society existence and defines it as “...those physical facilities, supply
chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed,
degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact
on the social or economic well-being of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to
conduct national defence and ensure national security.” McClelland (2010).
As presented by McClelland (McClelland, 2010), former Attorney-General of Aus-
tralia (from 2007 to 2011), the Australian Government has created a National strat-
egy in order to enhance the security and resilience of the Critical Infrastructures in
the Country. Critical Infrastructures relevance to modern society can also be high-
lighted quoting McClelland where he highlightes possible risks that can damage CIs
and then states “... Those risks - from natural disasters, to equipment failure and
crime - can damage or destroy critical infrastructure as well as disrupt the essential
services that are provided by these assets, networks and supply chains.”. The same
document also states similar concerns as other Nations, for instance he refers to “ ...
Such an incident could significantly affect all Australians because of our reliance on
critical infrastructure, which is of major importance to businesses, governments and
communities. A resilience based approach to critical infrastructure is vital so we can
better adapt to change, reduce our exposure to risk and learn from incidents when
they occur. The responsibility for the continuity of critical infrastructure is shared by
all governments and by owners and operators.”. In the same document, McClelland
continues to emphasize CIs relevance in Australia and the Government’s support to
initiatives aiming to improve the security and resilience of Australians CIs.
Australia has created an agency named Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN)
for Critical Infrastructure Resilience aiming to provide an environment “where busi-
ness and government can share vital information on security issues relevant to the
protection of our critical infrastructure and the continuity of essential services in the
face of all hazards” (TISN, 2011). This agency aims to bring together CI Owners
and Operators from multiple sectors including also two Expert Advisory Groups able
to provide advice on aspects of Critical Infrastructures requiring expert knowledge.
The European Commission is also committed to enhancing security on Critical In-
frastructures. The Directorate-General of the European Commission in charge of
the policy area known as “Home Affairs” define CIs as - “Critical infrastructure is
an essential asset for the maintenance of vital societal functions. Damage to the
critical infrastructure, its destruction or disruption by natural disasters, terrorism,
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criminal activity or malicious behaviour, may have negative consequences for the
security of the EU and the well-being of its citizens” (European Commission, 2012).
This Directorate-general also states that “Reducing the vulnerabilities of critical in-
frastructure is one of the major objectives of the EU. An adequate level of protection
must be ensured and the detrimental effects of disruptions on the society and citizens
must be limited as far as possible.” (European Commission, 2012).
The European Council that took place on the 17th and 18th of June 2004, asked the
European Commission to prepare a strategy in order to improve the protection of
Critical Infrastructures. In response, on the 20th of October 2004, the Commission
published the communication “Critical Infrastructure protection in the fight against
terrorism” (European Commission, 2004).
In the scope of the European Program for the Protection of Critical Infrastruc-
ture (EPCIP), eleven sectors were identified as CIs in the publication of a green
paper (European Commission, 2005) and reinforced by the communication from
the European Commission in the year 2006 (European Commission, 2006). Those
sectors are further described in Section 2.1.
An important element of the EPCIP program is a Directive on European Criti-
cal Infrastructures (European Commission, 2008) as it establishes a procedure for
identifying and designating European Critical Infrastructures (ECI) and a common
approach to improve the protection of such infrastructures. Currently, the Direc-
tive’s scope is limited to the energy and transport sectors. In EPCIP the initial
responsibility for the protection of CI is a National responsibility, however, a dis-
tinction is made among National CIs and European CIs (an infrastructure that is
considered critical for more than one Member State of the Union). The dependency
that exists among Critical Infrastructures is also under the European Commission’s
attention.
Understanding the importance of the role, that the exchange of information about
threats and vulnerabilities plays in protecting CIs, an information network has been
created for that role - Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN)
(European Commission, 2008). CIWIN has two main objectives: the establishment
of an electronic forum for the purpose of exchanging information on the protection
of CIs; and the development of a rapid alert system for the delivery of early warnings
for Member States to inform the Commission regarding risks and threats.
Beyond the measures adopted by the European Union, Portugal also demonstrates
a strong interest in the field of Critical Infrastructures protection. One example of
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this interests is the development of the Innovation Network on Security and Critical
Infrastructure Protection (NET-SCIP) by the Portuguese Fundation for Science and
Technology under the Carnegie Mellon – Portugal Program. The main goal being
to develop comparative advantages for Portugal in new security technologies and
services for the protection of Critical Infrastructures (NET-SCIP, 2011). Sharing
strong similarities with other International initiatives, NET-SCIP “is currently gath-
ering the scientific community, the private sector and the main government agen-
cies with the goal of developing comparative advantages for Portugal in new security
technologies and services for the protection of critical infrastructures.” (NET-SCIP,
2011).
Considering the above, it is clear that CIs are one of the most Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) dependent areas of contemporary societies where
we should ensure the highest security levels.
It is also important to mention that, with time, Critical Infrastructures have grown
not only in importance but also in complexity. One key aspect of that growth is that
CIs have now become dependent on each others outputs (interdependency). From
the field of fault tolerant computing we know that a complex system that depends
on multiple interacting components is exposed to a high risk of failure mainly due
to the risk of failure of each individual and to some other side effects that a single
failure can cause.
The efforts made in the Critical Infrastructure Protection in ICT area increased,
especially after “Stuxnet” attack. “Stuxnet” is a computer worm and, as reported
in 2010, it was the first malware specifically targeting control systems as the ones
used in many existing Critical Infrastructures. In a similar way as viruses and
worms,“Stuxnet” exploited some vulnerabilities that were unknown at the time of
the attack in order to replicate and spread itself among the exploitable equipments.
However, the main goal of this worm was to attack the industrial control systems,
by introducing changes (not visible to the system operator) in the Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs), modifying their normal behaviour, to make them work as
the attacker intended (Falliere et al., 2011).
“Stuxnet” is harmless when it is spreading and when it is in the latent state in
the infected equipment. At the time of the attack “Stuxnet” was not detectable
by any anti-virus software since no one can hardly see abnormal behaviours on
the infected equipment. The actual impact of the worm started when it targeted
the control system and started to make changes in the PLCs. The media and
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some published work (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011), (Miyachi et al., 2011), (Sheng
et al., 2011) reported attacks in the Islamic Republic of Iran where it is said that
more than sixty thousand computers were infected. It is also mentioned that this
work damaged centrifuges used to enrich uranium at Iran’s nuclear plant. It is also
mentioned that the attack had affected the centrifuges causing them to switch back
and forth between high and low speeds at intervals, for which the machines were not
designed (Falliere et al., 2011). None of these events were confirmed by the Iranian
government who only admitted to the presence of infection but if the media can be
considered reliable, “Stuxnet” has managed to achieve a successful attack.
Attacks like “Stuxnet” are causing the need to different approaches to protect CIs
as some have thought that those infrastructures were not vulnerable. Several works
are being developed to improve CIs security.
The work described in this thesis originated during the development of the MICIE
FP7 project (MICIE Consortium, 2008). This project aimed at the development
of an alerting system that identifies, in real time, the risk level induced on a given
Critical Infrastructure caused by undesired events or malicious attacks happening
in the reference CI or in other dependent CIs. The author of this thesis worked
actively on several work packages within the MICIE project and in particular, in
the analysis and development of the MICIE Secure Mediation Gateway (SMGW).
This component of the MICIE architecture is mainly responsible for the information
exchange among CIs, and among other aspects, for the prevention of the occurrence
of cascading effects.
The MICIE project was able to gather risk information from CIs and also adequately
integrate risk information received from dependent CIs. As an improvement to the
SMGW, the author has proposed the integration of a Policy Based Management
System (PBMS) allowing the SMGW Operator to manage the system in a simple
way by the use of policies. Those policies, apart from the common conditions used
in access control systems (IP Address, user, date, time, etc.) that are able to help
take system management decisions, are also able to use risk information in order
to improve those same decisions. With this approach it is possible to use risk
information allowing system management. From this point it started to become
clear, that in addition to the risk exchange information from dependent CIs and
integration of this information in the risk evaluation, it should also be possible to
infer on the exchanged information in order to try to minimise the use of incorrect
information.
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As it was not foreseen by the MICIE system, to infer on the exchanged information,
this gap was identified and a framework for Trust and Reputation Management has
been proposed. This framework, not planned at the beginning of the project, has
been implemented and tested as an add-on to the project - the Trust and Reputation
System (TRS).
Since the results of the application of the Trust and Reputation System on the
MICIE project were promising, an independent architecture has been defined and
validated by using also different CI risk models and risk evaluation tools.
The scope of the work of this thesis was motivated by the identification of the
main issues concerning risk gathering and risk information exchanged among Critical
Infrastructures and its applicability to improve interdependency models that are able
to help protecting those Infrastructures.
1.2 Objectives and Contributions
The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to the improvement of Critical
Infrastructures security by addressing, in an integrated manner, problems that result
from a scenario were it is planned to evaluate risk levels of Critical Infrastructure
and share those risk levels among multiple (inter)dependent CIs in order to help
them in their own risk evaluation. The main contributions of this thesis can be
summarised as the following:
Analysis of problems resulting from CI risk exchange
The first contribution was a Policy Management Architecture to manage the MICIE
Secure Mediation Gateway, responsible for implementing the risk exchange mecha-
nisms. This contribution was integrated in the MICIE project architecture, namely,
into the SMGW Manager for which it was developed a Policy Management Tool,
integrated and delivered by the MICIE project. The developed tool is also able to
integrate information gathered by the Trust and Reputation System (Caldeira et al.,
2010a,c,d; Castrucci et al., 2010a,b, 2012; Ciancamerla et al., 2009; Inzerilli et al.,
2009; Lev et al., 2009, 2011, 2010b; Neri, 2010; Panzieri et al., 2010).
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Introduction of Trust and Reputation approaches in CI risk exchange
The second contribution was the conception and development of a Trust and Rep-
utation framework able to infer trust information from the exchanged information
in the MICIE system. The proposed framework is able to help the CI Operator to
reason about the exchanged information and also to dynamically include the risk
assessment in the defined management policies. This allows to improve the security
of the existent MICIE Secure Mediation Gateway through, for instance, denying
sending or receiving information from untrusted peers. A prototype was developed
as an add-on to the MICIE project, allowing to be integrated within the Secure
Mediation Gateway from where the necessary data for the evaluation is gathered. It
is also able to receive stored data for simulation purposes (Bertoni et al., 2010a,b;
Caldeira et al., 2010b,c,d; Castrucci et al., 2010b; Inzerilli et al., 2009; Lev et al.,
2011, 2010b).
Integrate the trust model approach in CI risk models
The third contribution resulted from a joint work with Thomas Schaberreiter and
consisted in the development of models aiming to build a trust relationship among
CIs. This relationship is based on the common abstract information that CIs share,
describing how trust can be used in the model to dynamically re-evaluate the impact
a risk level received, from a dependency, has on the modelled risk in a CI.
Specifically, the trust model is now part of the CI Security Model (proposed by
Thomas Schaberreiter) and can be used to reason on the exchanged information
and internally in one CI to reason about the information gathered from the field.
A modelling tool able to model CIs as represented by the CI Security Model existent
entities, as been developed. This tool allows evaluating risk and trust indicators in
real time, with data coming from the CI or by receiving previously prepared data
in order to simulate a specific scenario (Caldeira et al., 2011, 2013; Schaberreiter
et al., 2011b).
The methodology used during this thesis was the study of the state of the art in the
Critical Infrastructure security, CI modelling and Trust and Reputation System.
Then, the Policy Based Management architecture and the Trust and Reputation
framework were studied and developed taking into consideration the analysis of
related work. The evaluation of the proposed schemes and the validation of the
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relevance of their contribution were done in part within the MICIE project (the
Policy Based Management) and by simulation with data generated from simple
statistical distributions and also with data gathered from a CI during approximately
one year.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organised in six chapters, including this one, according to the structure
bellow:
Chapter 2 presents a contextualized characterisation of the current practice in CI
Protection, identifying the main CIs characteristics, risk assessment and modelling
methodologies applied to CIs. Three selected European Projects aiming to improve
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) are also presented. The use of ontologies
and Policy Based Management are also discussed throughout the chapter in the
context of Critical Infrastructures. Furthermore, the main aspects related to Trust
and Reputation are presented, including the description and comparison of some
existent Trust and Reputation frameworks.
Chapter 3 describes the MICIE project, including the MICIE Alerting System, the
MICIE Secure Mediation Gateway, and the solutions to specifically incorporate CIs
interdependencies in the online risk assessment framework. In this chapter the
author’s contributions within the MICIE project are highlighted.
Chapter 4 identifies the main issues related to the risk information exchange and de-
scribes the proposed approach to evaluate Trust and Reputation indicators. Simple
validation scenarios are also shown in this chapter.
The integration of the Trust Model in the CI Security Model is presented in Chap-
ter 5 by describing three application scenarios, presenting each of them, the used
approach for the integration of both models, the validation results and discussing
the obtained results.
Chapter 6 completes this thesis by presenting the conclusions drawn from this work,
including also a summary of the main achieved results and contributions. As the
experience gained from this work allowed to identify some open issues, they are
presented in the chapter in order to be addressed in future work.
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Chapter 2
Trust and Reputation
Management for Critical
Infrastructure Protection
The research problems associated with Critical Infrastructure security and protec-
tion are described in this chapter by first describing Critical Infrastructures, the
problems that may arise from the existent CI (inter)dependencies among them and
by describing how these problems are being currently addressed by the research
community. This chapter briefly presents a review of some of the most representa-
tive research work done in Critical Infrastructure modelling, simulation techniques
and risk assessment, discussing their main characteristics and limitations. Open
issues and challenges associated with them will also be covered. Selected European
Projects that deal with CI protection are described. This chapter also addresses
issues related to Policy Based Management. An overview is made of some existent
Trust and Reputation Models focusing on their applicability to the context of Critical
Infrastructures protection and information exchange among Critical Infrastructures.
This chapter is structured as follows: Critical Infrastructures are defined and pre-
sented in Section 2.1 which also includes dependency and interdependency aspects,
modelling techniques and CI risk assessment. Section 2.2 describes three repre-
sentative European projects in the area of CI protection. The CI Security Model
(proposed by Thomas Schaberreiter) is presented with more detail in Section 2.3
as this model has been used to validate one of the contributions proposed in this
thesis. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss, respectively, the use of ontologies and Policy
Based Management tools in the context of Critical Infrastructures.
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Section 2.6 discusses the main aspects related to Trust and Reputation including
the description and comparison of some available Trust and Reputation frameworks.
The chapter’s last section presents a summary of the issues discussed throughout
the chapter.
2.1 Critical Infrastructures
As already defined, CIs provide vital services for the normal functioning of a com-
munity or a country. As the academics become more aware of the impact that a
disruption in those services can have, Critical Infrastructure Protection has become
an important research topic in the last years.
In the previous chapter, some definitions of Critical Infrastructure were presented.
One question that can still arise is “How can one know if an infrastructure is in
fact critical?”. Despite the fact that an answer to this question appears rather
easy, there is no definite answer. For example, Moteff et al. reported to the U.S.
Congress (Moteff et al., 2003) that they should not consider the definitions that were
given over the years of what makes a Critical Infrastructure rigorous, while referring
to the following definition - “Critical Infrastructures were originally considered to
be those whose prolonged disruptions could cause significant military and economic
dislocation”.
Moteff et al. also states that all definitions leave space for new interpretations
regarding whether infrastructure can meet the definitions. Definitions and list of
sectors considered critical should be considered as examples and not as exhaustive
and closed lists. For instance, Moteff et al. in addition to the infrastructures whose
failure can have impact to the national defence, economy, public health and safety,
also refers assets that, if destroyed, can have impact to the national morale in a
country (Moteff et al., 2003).
Although one can realise that there are no closed lists and rigid means of defining
Critical Infrastructures, it is important to define and use some criteria as guidelines
in order to classify infrastructures as critical.
Within the European Union, experts from multiple European Countries have defined
sectors and organisations in order to classify them as critical. According to the
European Commission, Critical Infrastructure encompasses the sectors and related
sub sectors described in Table 2.1 (European Commission, 2005).
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Table 2.1: Critical Sectors (European Commission, 2005)
Sector Sub-sector
Energy
- Oil and gas production, refining, treatment, storage and distribution
by pipelines
- Electricity generation and transmission
Nuclear industry - Production and storage/processing of nuclear substances
ICT
- Information system and network protection
- Instrumentation automation and control systems (SCADA etc.)
- Internet
- Provision of fixed telecommunications
- Provision of mobile telecommunications
- Radio communication and navigation
- Satellite communication
- Broadcasting
Water
- Provision of drinking water
- Control of water quality
- Stemming and control of water quantity
Food - Provision of food and safeguarding food safety and security
Health
- Medical and hospital care
- Medicines, serums, vaccines and pharmaceuticals
- Bio-laboratories and bio-agents
Financial
- Payment and securities clearing and settlement infrastructures and
systems
- Regulated markets
Transport
- Road transport
- Rail transport
- Air transport
- Inland waterways transport
- Ocean and short-sea shipping
Chemical industry
- Production and storage/processing of chemical substances
- Pipelines of dangerous goods (chemical substances)
Space - Space
Research facilities - Research facilities
Among the different sectors of activity that encompasses Critical Infrastructures, the
electricity facilities and telecommunications providers are the sectors that are getting
more attention from researchers. Nowadays, the power grids are vital to the society
causing major losses when they are not available. Power grids usually cover a wide
geographical area producing energy from large central power generation stations to
small home generation systems and deliver it to consumers via transmission grids.
Power grids are large complex systems composed by multiple components, such as
power substation using transformers to convert electricity from high voltage to low
voltage, transmission networks used to transport the energy from the generation
plants to the substations, distribution networks that distribute energy from the
substations to the consumers and control systems able to manage all the power grid
components. Figure 2.1 represents a simple Power Grid CI, including some of the
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main components that usually are in use in those systems. This system encompasses
a control room, transmission networks and control devices.
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Figure 2.1: Power Grid example
Just like the other Critical Infrastructures, Power Grids are generally managed by In-
dustrial Control Systems (ICSs) that usually include Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control System (DCS), PLC, among
other systems typically used in industrial contexts such as utilities (electricity dis-
tribution and production, water supply, etc.).
Using a simplified view, it is possible to say that a SCADA system comprises a set
of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) able to collect data from the field equipment and
to send this data to a master station using an available communication system. The
master station can display individual or aggregated data allowing an overview of
the controlled system. Also, it is possible for the CI Operator to remotely control
some equipment and perform control tasks. In such a system as SCADA, the data
accuracy and is timely reception (real-time) allow the CI Operator to have more
reliable information thus allowing a more efficient and safer operation.
From the above, it is clear that also telecommunication networks, apart from the
fact that they provide vital services for final consumers and on which actual society
depends for business or leisure, most of the actual CIs also depend on the services
they provide. For instance, Internet access, mobile phone and data networks, pri-
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vate data links, among others, provide essential services that are vital for the ICSs
objectives within a CI.
SCADA systems are frequently used to control dispersed assets using centralised
data acquisition and supervisory control. In order to achieve their goals, these
systems now rely, for instance, on proper communication availability, in the quality
of the information gathered by the field instrumentation and control devices and also
on the quality and reliability of the ICT systems that support those activities. For
years, ICS and SCADA systems were generally isolated inside the CI ICT systems
mostly relying on internal services thus ensuring security by obscurity and systems
isolation.
The evolution of the Industrial Control Systems used in CIs is occurring by passing
from proprietary and closed architectures to open standard based solutions. These
new solutions are designed to simplify the interoperability with other platforms, sys-
tems and different devices. As usual while dealing with security, it is important to
balance Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. In this case, ICS systems are be-
coming more available within the CI and even among partner CIs. While improving
availability it is important to focus also on maintaining ICS data confidential and
reliable. Currently, ICSs are considered a critical and strategic asset that produces
information about all the CI. The failure or just the existence of false or inadequate
information in the ICSs has a huge potential for catastrophic consequences within
the CI.
As ICS systems as SCADA move from an isolated environment to an open and
interconnected environment, the identified vulnerabilities grow in number and also
in the danger they represent to the CIs. For instance, Ryu et al. presents a list of
vulnerabilities that can affect SCADA systems and suggests some ideas to minimise
those vulnerabilities (Ryu et al., 2009). The vulnerability list contains among others,
references to problems that may arise due to the multiplicity of vendors, the size and
complexity of the networks, the equipment age, the use of widely available operating
systems, the insider attacks, etc. Although it is not intended in this thesis to directly
indorse this problem, it is important to create mechanisms that can help to verify
the information quality inside such a potential vulnerable environment.
As already stated, CIs can suffer damages or could even potentially be destroyed
due to numerous threats. Those threats include natural disasters, negligent com-
portments, terrorist acts, hacking, robbery and criminal behaviours, among others.
From this small list it is clear that there are several threats hanging over this type of
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infrastructures. Problems that may arise from existing threats should be reduced.
According to several documents from the European Union, for instance (European
Commission, 2005, 2006, 2008) it is important that any Critical Infrastructure dis-
ruptions or manipulations should, within possibility, be brief, infrequent, manage-
able, geographically isolated and minimally harmful to the welfare of the affected
country and their citizens.
Using the European Union as an example, the European Commission also highlights
the fact that a damage or loss of critical services in one Member State may cause
adverse effects on several others and on the European economy as a whole. This risk
is gradually increasing due to the globalisation (at European or Worldwide level)
supported by the introduction of communication technologies (e.g. the Internet)
allowing that some of the infrastructures control systems to become part of a larger
interconnected network. It needs to be emphasised that actual infrastructure sectors
do not exist isolated but interact among each other as represented in Figure 2.2.
Such a situation means that CI protection must be addressed across sectors and
across borders. Interdependencies between CIs imply that an impact (e.g. an un-
desired event) occurring on one infrastructure results also in an impact on one or
more interdependent infrastructures (Figure 2.2 shows a typical CI interdependency
tree).
Information and 
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Energy (Gas, Oil, Nuclear, 
etc)
Food
Health
Finantial
Chemical industry
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Research
Transport
Figure 2.2: Critical Infrastructure interdependency example (Rinaldi et al., 2001)
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2.1.1 Critical infrastructure (inter)dependency
One major study in the area of Critical Infrastructure (inter)dependency was carried
by Rinaldi et al.. In this work (Rinaldi et al., 2001) a Critical Infrastructure is
defined as an agent in a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) due to the complex
and continuously changing set of interacting components. Rinaldi et al. intends
to clarify and discuss the existing dependencies or interdependencies among CIs,
in particular analysing those (inter)dependencies from six dimensions, namely, the
infrastructure characteristics, the types of interdependencies, the environment where
the CI operates, the state of operation, the type of possible existing failures and the
coupling and response behaviour (Rinaldi et al., 2001).
According to Rinaldi et al. each CI can be either dependent or interdependent to
other CI determined by whether it is a supporting or supported CI. Rinaldi et al.
defines dependency and interdependency as follows:
• Interdependency: “A bidirectional relationship between two infrastructures
through which the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to
the state of the other. More generally, two infrastructures are interdependent
when each is dependent on the other.” (Rinaldi et al., 2001)
• Dependency: “A linkage or connection between two infrastructures, through
which the state of one infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of
the other.” (Rinaldi et al., 2001)
Rinaldi et al. also defined four categories allowing to group the existing different
interdependency types (Rinaldi et al., 2001). The defined classes are: physical (the
CI state is dependent on the physical output of another CI), cyber (the state of
one infrastructure depends on information conveyed using an ICT infrastructure),
geographic (when a local environmental change could origin a state change in one or
more geographically interdependent infrastructures) and logical (dependency that is
not physical, cyber or geographic, for instance human decisions that impact on one
infrastructure can cause a state change in a dependent infrastructure).
According to Rinaldi et al., the current state of operation of an infrastructure has a
direct impact on the state of operation of interdependent infrastructure. The states
of operation can range from normal to stressed/disrupted and repair/restoration
(Rinaldi et al., 2001). In this thesis, the cyber interdependency type will be ad-
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dressed with the objective of minimising the effects that this type of dependency
can have on the state change of an infrastructure.
An additional key characteristic of interdependencies is the failure that can occur
in an infrastructure and how it may spread to other interdependent infrastructures.
As CIs become more interconnected, it is possible to compare them to different
components of a single network where a failure in a node of this complex network
of interdependent infrastructures, can results in disastrous failures including some
that are not yet foreseen. These type of failures result from the propagation of
some small failure through other interdependent systems. This propagation effect is
known as the cascading effect and has been the subject of multiple research works
(Rinaldi, 2004).
The research that has been carried out for studying the structure and behaviour of
Critical Infrastructures is frequently divided in two main distinct but interrelated
groups. The first one is involved with the study and analysis of the infrastructures
while the second focuses on the understanding of the CIs dynamic behaviour
Actual research in these areas aims to identify and to develop techniques and tools
in order to describe the current status of an infrastructure. This is an important
aspect, as the cascading effect can be minimised if one knows the actual or predicted
state of an infrastructure on which one depends. In order to gather detailed infor-
mation from CIs, researchers exploit multiple CI vulnerability, risks and threats.
These processes aim to reveal the potential points of failure and to describe the ex-
pected consequences of each failure. One of the breakdowns of this approach, that
is commonly cited, is that although the main points of failure can be detected, it is
not easy to extrapolate all the possible consequences maintaining a situation where
not all consequences are visibly perceived and understood.
Some publications address the problem of how to identify the various kinds of depen-
dencies that can occur among CIs. Rinaldi et al. specifies an overview on the multi-
ple dimensions in which (inter)dependencies can occur (Rinaldi et al., 2001). Rinaldi
(Rinaldi, 2004), discusses and analyses different modelling techniques (discussed in
Section 2.1.3) applied to CI (inter)dependencies. Another important publication,
among others, that proposes CI models based on various different modelling tech-
niques was presented by Sokolowski et al.. This publication (Sokolowski et al., 2008)
describes a conceptual modeling method for CIs that aims to create an abstract and
simplified view of a CI.
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It is noticeable that most of the published work dealing with CI models and CI risk
models is very heterogeneous with respect to their purpose and the extent to which
they might be implemented. The majority of the models usually allow modelling to
be too high level and consequently difficult to apply. In some cases, the proposed
frameworks are focused on one specific CI or CI type and therefore it is difficult to
use them in different CIs.
A significant work is also been carried out by Panzieri et al.. In this work (Panzieri
et al., 2005), the Complex Adaptive System approach is used in order to allow CI
modelling. In this work it is proposed to model interdependencies by studying a set
of mutually dependent systems (agents), each of them able to represent a macro-
component of a given infrastructure, in order to achieve the global CI model. In
particular, this approach is focused on analysing performance degradation and fault
propagation that can occur after one or more failures, not including recovery or
repair procedures that may take place after one failure (Panzieri et al., 2005).
De Porcellinis et al. described the Mixed Holistic Reductionist (MHR) approach as
a methodology able to model Critical Infrastructures including the existent inter-
dependencies, considering the predefined level of Quality-of-Service that should be
provided to customers or other dependent CIs (De Porcellinis et al., 2009). A reduc-
tionist approach aims to model systems into small parts while the holistic method
looks globally at systems including the existing interactions. In the MHR perspec-
tive, the high level interdependencies are modelled following a holistic paradigm,
while interdependencies between components are modelled with reductionistic tech-
niques. This aspect is considered by De Porcellinis et al. as positive as it combines
the advantages of both approaches (De Porcellinis et al., 2009).
One interesting aspect of the MHR approach is, as stated (De Porcellinis et al.,
2009), that holistic blocks are able to represent the holistic perspective of the in-
frastructures, and are able to interact with other existing holistic blocks in order
to inform of their status (De Porcellinis et al., 2009). For example (Simo˜es et al.,
2009), the failure block allows modelling social events (e.g. strike, panic) that are
difficult to model on a more focused abstract level. Holistic blocks have the pos-
sibility to impact the operative conditions of a service, based on feedback received
from reductionistic elements (Simo˜es et al., 2009).
Also, major work, able to use CI models to infer risk information in CIs, was also
proposed by some authors. For instance, Haslum and Arnes describe the use of
continuous-time hidden Markov models for real-time risk calculation and estimation
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(Haslum and Arnes, 2006). Baiardi et al. presents a risk management strategy based
on a hyper-graph model in order to detect complex attacks while also supporting
risk mitigation (Baiardi et al., 2009).
The recently described CI security model, presented by Schaberreiter et al. is,
as stated by the author, based on a different approach that differs greatly from
the models previously published (Schaberreiter et al., 2011a). It tries to establish
abstract models of CIs that can be compared with each other, while maintaining
generality by enabling it to be applied to all kinds of CI sectors. As some of the
validation work carried out by the author of this thesis was based on this model,
the presentation of this methodology is detailed in Section 2.3.
2.1.2 Assessing Risk in Critical Infrastructures
It is possible to find many definition for risk, for example, the Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Hansson, 2012) states that the word “risk” refers to situations in
which it is possible for some undesirable event to occur. Apart from the fact that
the word “risk” can have more specific uses and meanings in different contexts, the
Encyclopedia defines five definitions stated to be widely used across disciplines, as
the following:
• risk = an unwanted event which may or may not occur.
• risk = the cause of an unwanted event which may or may not occur.
• risk = the probability of an unwanted event which may or may not occur.
• risk = the statistical expectation value of an unwanted event which may or may
not occur. The expectation value of a possible negative event is the product of
its probability and some measure of its severity.
• risk = the fact that a decision is made under conditions of known probabilities
(“decision under risk” as opposed to “decision under uncertainty”)
Risk management is becoming more commonly used when dealing with ICT security.
As the security threats increase, companies are adopting risk management strate-
gies in order to better defend their assets. ICT infrastructures are becoming more
complex thus more difficult to manage and secure. Risk management consists of a
process aiming to identify a set of security measurements in order to achieve the
required security level.
20
TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT FOR CI PROTECTION
As stated by Adar and Wuchner, “A risk can be defined as any event that may
result in a missed business objective” (Adar and Wuchner, 2005). When dealing
with risk management, one relevant assumption is that not every existing risk can
be prevented but prior knowledge about the possible risk helps the manager in taking
informed decisions.
Being part of the company security program, risk management should be evaluated
in multiple steps in order to identify and classify the existing risks (risk assessment).
The results should then give origin to a set of balanced security measures able to
reduce or minimise those risks. Figure 2.3 describes the risk management life cycle
proposed by Adar and Wuchner.
Risks Analysis
(Plan)
Threats
Vulnerabilities
Assets
Policy and 
Regulations
Audit Mitigate Risks
Implement
(Follow-up)
Risk and 
Countermesures
Security 
Measures
Security 
Measures
Risk Report
Figure 2.3: Risk management life cycle (Adar and Wuchner, 2005)
Risk management plays an important role in terms of compliance to National or
International regulations and it is also relevant to justify the investment in ICT
security allowing to facilitate and to explain the potential loses that we can avoid.
Critical Infrastructures pose new challenges to risk management mainly due to the
following factors (Adar and Wuchner, 2005):
• The Nature of Critical Infrastructure Protection - It is fundamental to identify
the key processes involved in each Critical Infrastructure and also their unique
vulnerabilities.
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• Organisational Complexity - Usually, Critical Infrastructures are of a big di-
mension and complexity usually with multiple interdependencies to external
services. Risk management should be able to focus and follow the entire pro-
duction process.
• Dynamic Aspects of Risk - Actual business is continuously changing and this
is particularly true in Critical Infrastructures that keep evolving and creating
new services for custumers.
• Need for Compliance - Usually, Critical Infrastructures are under supervision
of governmental agencies and need to comply with National or International
rules. Those rules can have a relevant impact on the way risk should be
managed.
• Efficiency and Cost Effectiveness - In the real life economic scenario, efficiency
and cost control are of highest priority for management decisions. Securing an
infrastructure should be efficient but also cost effective.
• Human Factors - One of the major aspects of security relates to Human Fac-
tors. It is well know that human resources related to security need highly
skilled specialisation in their work area. Also sensitive processes should not
be kept in the hands of just a few individuals as this fact can, solely, become
a new risk.
Risk assessment in Critical Infrastructures usually has a tight relation with the model
used to gather CI information along with multiple methods, tools and frameworks.
As several methodologies are described in the literature, some representative work
will be discussed.
Haslum and Arnes describe a methodology for real-time risk assessment considering
the measurements received from system’s sensors (as for example Intrusion Detec-
tion System (IDS)). Both Hidden Markov models and weighted sums are used in
considering the sensors input by assuming that some sensors are statistically more
reliable and significant than others. The state of each represented asset is modeled
using a Markov model with three different states: Good, Under Attack and Com-
promised. Hidden Markov model exist for each sensor in order to describe the state
transition of the asset (probability that the asset passes from one state to another).
In order to derive the risk for the complete system, the risks of each asset/sensor
are summed and weighed according to their assumed reliability (Haslum and Arnes,
2006).
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The risk management strategy described by Baiardi et al. is based on multiple mod-
els each one describing dependencies among infrastructure components and repre-
senting one CI specific level of detail. This set of models composes a hyper-graph
model of infrastructures. The main objectives of this work are the detection of com-
plex attacks as well as a support for risk mitigation. In this work, Baiardi et al.
states that a dependency exists when a security-related attribute of a component
depends on the attributes of other components. Each of the considered components
has identified three security attributes (confidentiality, integrity and availability)
evaluated from the components internal information and from the existent depen-
dencies. One interesting aspect that is considered in this model is that each of the
component’s parameters can have influence to the same or different parameter in
another component. For instance, low integrity in one component can affect the
availability of another component (Baiardi et al., 2009).
Baiardi et al. perceives a complex attack as being carried out by a set of successive
simple attacks affecting different components. It is proposed to build an evolution
graph representing the states that can exist in a CI as a consequence of those simple
attacks. The evolution graphs can then represent complex attacks describing a path
from the first simple attack to the last simple attack. Risk analysis is then achieved
by assigning probabilities, supported by historical data, to complex attacks. The
proposal presented by Baiardi et al. aims to mitigate risks. The author assumes
that a set of countermeasures can stop or mitigate simple attacks reducing the
possible existent paths to form a complex attack. To support the described work
tools were implemented to compute strategies to stop evolutions through a graph
by eliminating a subgroup of simple attacks (Baiardi et al., 2009).
A framework for large-scale systems, able to identify, prioritise, assess and man-
age risk scenarios, was proposed by Haimes et al.. This framework is structured in
eight steps. The first step, scenario identification, uses a hierarchical holographic
model composed by multiple, complementary decompositions in order to better de-
scribe the system scenario. The second step, scenario filtering, aims to identify risks
in the defined scenarios. Step three, bi-criteria filtering and ranking, is based on
the risk filtering process considering different types of information: Likelihood and
consequences. The fourth step, multi-criteria evaluation, the scenario is evaluated
against it’s ability to improve the resilience, robustness and redundancy of the un-
derlying system. In the quantitative ranking process, fifth step, the probability of
each scenario is computed using Bayes theorem. In the sixth step, risk management,
an evaluation is made to the scenarios aiming to reduce the identified risks. In the
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safeguarding against missing critical items step the proposed risk mitigation strat-
egy is evaluated against the previously filtered scenarios in order to be sure that the
final implementation will hold against the unfiltered risk scenarios. The operational
feedback step considers the fact that risk is not static and will evolve over time.
Therefore, feedback and re-evaluation of the proposed method is applied to refine
the scenario filtering process (Haimes et al., 2002).
2.1.3 Critical Infrastructure Modelling and Simulation
In order to better understand Critical Infrastructures and their dependencies, mod-
elling and simulation techniques are seen as a key element for sucess. The main
benefits that can be obtained using this techniques are described in detail by Ri-
naldi and can be summarised as being able to (Rinaldi, 2004):
• Help to identify the potential national and economic security implications
following a catastrophic infrastructure failure;
• Improve the ability to perceive clearly the infrastructure operation when af-
fected by extreme and rare events (for example natural disasters or terrorist
attacks);
• Provide valuable information that helps to understand the recovery process
after rare or extreme events that have led to catastrophic failures. Considering
the rarity of these events, it is stated that modelling and simulation may
provide the only guidance available as the historical records may be inexistent
or in such a small number that they are useless in understanding the failure;
• Improve the process of infrastructure risk analysis (vulnerability assessment,
consequence analysis, threat assessment);
• Use the obtained results in order to improve the development, testing, imple-
mentation and validation of the infrastructure protection policies. It is possible
to incorporate policies into certain types of models allowing to simulate the
effect that those policies have on the infrastructure behaviour and operation;
• Be used along with decision support tools that enable situational awareness
(for example monitoring and visualisation). Modelling and simulation can be
used for what-if analysis and for example simulating the consequences of a
decision;
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• Help deploying exercises and training related to CI protection in a similar way
as is done by military personal using simulations in its war-games and training.
In this context, simulations could be used to develop realistic instructional
scenarios that better represent the effects of disruptions. These simulations
are particularly relevant if encompassing extreme or rare events for which there
is little information available.
In his work, Rinaldi defines different types of Critical Infrastructure interdependency
models categorised in the following six different types (Rinaldi, 2004):
• Aggregate Supply and Demand Tools - These types of tools would be able
to evaluate the demand of Critical Infrastructure services in a region and the
ability to provide those services. The capacity an infrastructure has to meet
the actual or future demands on its services can provide accurate references of
its actual health and on potential problems acting as a early warning system;
• Dynamic Simulations - Allows to analyse the flow of commodities and services
provided by Critical Infrastructures in order to model it’s dynamics including
also the interdependency among multiple infrastructures. Dynamic simula-
tions can also be used to inspect the effects of policies, regulations and laws
related to the Critical Infrastructures;
• Agent-Based Models - These types of models use agents in order to model
the behaviour of Critical Infrastructures and the interdependencies among
them. In order to better understand the CI, it is possible to model the CI’s
physical elements as agents allowing a better perception of its operational
characteristics. Policy and decision makers can also be modelled as agents
that allow us to examine its applicability and correctness;
• Physics-Based Models - Use engineering techniques (for example power flow
and stability analysis on electric power grids) in order to provide a detailed
model representing the physical behaviour of a Critical Infrastructure;
• Population Mobility Models - Aims to model the movements of entities (gener-
ating and consuming CI commodities) across urban regions. Modelling those
movements or routines allows a better development of strategies for optimised
planning. These models are often used to model transportation infrastructure
scenarios;
• Leontief Input-Output Models - These models of economic flows, used to rep-
resent the interdependencies between economic sectors, represent a simplified
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view of an economy and are able to predict the proper level of production for
each of the several types of goods or services. These models can also be applied
to Critical Infrastructures using a linear, aggregated and time-independent
analysis of the flow of commodities among CIs.
At the moment, a growing number of modelling and simulation approaches already
exists or is under development. The majority of the available approaches are aiming
to address interdependencies among CIs and to offer a considerable insight into the
operational and behavioural characteristics of CIs. The main drawback identified
among the existent approaches is the lack of comprehensive models, able to be easily
adopted, according to the particularities of each CI.
2.2 Critical Infrastructure Protection Projects
As already stated, the European Union is highly concerned with the security level
of European CIs. In order to address those concerns, in the past years the Euro-
pean Commission, in the scope of community research and development strategies,
promoted some research projects related to CI Protection. The next section briefly
describes three of those projects presenting their main achievements.
2.2.1 IRRIIS (Integrated Risk Reduction of Information-
based Infrastructure Systems)
According to Klein et al., the Integrated Risk Reduction of Information-based In-
frastructure Systems (IRRIIS) project aimed to enhance the dependability of large
complex Critical Infrastructures. This was achieved by developing and applying
appropriate modelling and simulation techniques and developing proper middleware
based communication technologies (MIT) among CIs (Klein et al., 2009).
Authors have defined two application scenarios for the project. Those scenarios
represent, respectively, one electrical power infrastructure and one telecommunica-
tion infrastructure that supports the first. For each of those scenarios the authors
analyse the way CIs are connected to the exterior by the use of networks such as
Internet (IRRIIS, 2008).
One main challenge addressed by IRRIIS is the different type and comportment of
different Critical Infrastructures. IRRIIS approach to this was to build information
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models able to model physical aspects, as well as information and control aspects
of CIs. Simultaneously, the project addressed the variety of existing CIs. Including
the dependencies that may exist to other CIs while trying to maintain the model
able to be generally used by multiple CI types.
As described by Klein et al., IRRIIS information model introduces three general-
ization models: (1) The generic information model intended to be used at the top
level of the abstraction level, described as assuming that all Critical Infrastructures
have a common core information model that can be used to instantiate more spe-
cific models. (2) The domain specific model that allows to extend the generic model
integrating domain specific information related to specific components in each area
(e.g. electricity network, or transportation network). (3) The instance level models,
the top-down layer, that is intended to a specific CI, as instances of the domain
specific model (e.g. electricity network of Provider A and transportation network of
area A) (Klein, 2010; Klein et al., 2009).
The generic model has special relevance, as is used to allow generalisation and also is
the place where interdependencies are considered. The IRRIIS generic information
model is organised in three layers, namely, the static model, the behaviour model
and the problem solving model.
The static model allows modelling the infrastructure according to services they pro-
vide and receive. In this model, components and systems are used to describe the
CI structure and topology. Each system or component is represented by the ser-
vices provided and by the existing connections among services. It also describes
the services provided to another system and the services consumed and provided
by other system. The static model provides the foundations that allow building the
behaviour model on which ,states and their transitions are the key elements. As this
model deals with system or service states and state transitions. The state of a single
entity (e.g., system, connection, or service) is described. In the following step, the
described states can be propagated to other interdependent systems, components or
services. The problem solving model encompasses a mechanism not only to trigger
existing state changes in the behaviour model (events) but also to react to state
changes in the behaviour model (actions).
Project IRRIIS has developed a set of applications called Middleware Improved
Technology (MIT). Those applications allow the communication among different
heterogeneous CIs that usually have incompatible applications. MIT’s main objec-
tive is to permit a simple, fast and reliable information exchange among CIs, thus
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reducing response time to incidents that may occur within the CIs, by maintaining
network managers well informed about the CI state (IRRIIS, 2008).
Each MIT is composed of two main components: the communication and add-on
components. Communication components are used to exchange information related
to events occurring in the CI and are also used to send negotiation messages related
to QoS in the CIs. The add-on components were developed with multiples objectives
in mind. The main add-ons are namely: a tool to extract the CI functional status;
a risk estimator based on expert systems that is able to make predictions regarding
expected risks according to the information gathered; an incident knowledge analyser
tool used to send information about accidents that occurred in the CI to a database;
a knowledge based tool that allows for the knowledge management, considering the
existing rules and lastly a tool able to reason on the functional state of the system
and recommend actions to be applied to it (Schembri, 2008).
According to Klein et al., the IRRIIS information model provides an important
framework for CI interdependencies simulation, risk estimation and decision support
within CIs. The validation approach for the project is based on federated simulation.
A special purpose simulation tool - Simulation for Critical Infrastructure Protection
(SimCIP) – is used to simulate different CIs while the IRRIIS information model is
used to deal with interdependencies among the infrastructures on top of the special
purpose simulations (IRRIIS, 2008; Klein et al., 2009).
2.2.2 CRUTIAL (CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience)
CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience (CRUTIAL) project (CRUTIAL, 2008)
aimed to improve the resilience of Critical Infrastructures in order to avoid or min-
imise problems that may occur due to the large and complex CI ICT systems and
also to the increasing number of interconnections among CIs (CRUTIAL, 2008).
According to Verissimo et al., the CRUTIAL project provides an architecture in-
cluding multiple tools and algorithms aimed at improving resilience on global critical
information infrastructures, taking into account computer-borne attacks and faults
(Verissimo et al., 2008b). Although the CRUTIAL architecture is focused on the
computer systems that support an electrical utility infrastructure, Verissimo et al.
describes it as a useful reference for all types of Critical Infrastructures. In actual
fact, the CRUTIAL architecture is used as a reference to various studies and in
particular to multiple European projects.
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The existing interdependencies among CIs are analysed and the need of an archi-
tecture that considers the global view on those interconnected infrastructures is
identified by the CRUTIAL approach which provides a global view on the intercon-
nected infrastructures. It is also discussed that conventional security mechanisms
are not able to be directly applied to CI protection (Bessani et al., 2007; Verissimo
et al., 2008a,b).
According to Verissimo et al., CRUTIAL architecture is composed of four main ar-
eas: (1) Architectural configurations - placing trusted components in key places; (2)
Middleware devices - supply trusted services out of non-trustworthy components;
(3) Trustworthiness monitoring - detection of non predicted situations, providing
adaptation mechanisms to survive those situations; (4) Definition and application
of organization-level security policies and access control models for securing infor-
mation existent in the CIs (Verissimo et al., 2008b).
CRUTIAL architecture is established with an intrusion tolerant design in mind on
which the resilience of infrastructures is achieved by deploying a trustworthy op-
eration supported by secure and trusted hardware. It uses a similar approach to
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) (TCG, 2013), being able to support intrusion
tolerance for the rest of the system and by transparent intrusion tolerance achieved
without changing the legacy structure of the existing components (for instance, ex-
istent SCADA systems and technologies used in the corporate network are basically
unchanged) (Verissimo et al., 2008b).
Despite the possible existence of faults and intrusions, the non-stop CI operation
is enabled by the developed methodologies (proactive-resilience). The components
behaviour is monitored over time in order to detect deviations (components that
have a behaviour different from the expected). This information is analysed by a
state diagnosis component (that guesses the internal state of a component based
on the deviation detection) in order to reason whether some individual components
may or may not affect the rest of the system. This detection is particularly useful
to lower the risk of spreading cascading events (Verissimo et al., 2008b).
CRUTIAL infrastructure is described as a Wide Area Network (WAN) composed
by several Local Area Networks allowing a secure communication among compo-
nents and also within infrastructures. This WAN-of-Local Area Networks (LANs)
interconnects the local communication components (LAN) within a part of the CI
as, for instance, a substation or a corporate office. The LAN collection is intercon-
nected via a global connection network WAN using, for instance, dedicated lines or
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the Internet. All the application level firewalls and IDSs are connected using this
approach (Bessani et al., 2007).
The communication security is assured by employing communication devices that are
built as trusted components projected to be also intrusion tolerant. This last aspect
is achieved by introducing redundant components and by employing a voting system
(majority voting) on the components outputs. The fact that local components are
built in order to be trustworthy helps to assure secure communications on a global
level (WAN) (Bessani et al., 2007).
CRUTIAL architecture also includes solutions for access control allowing to enforce
global-level security policies defined in each Critical Infrastructure. Global com-
munication devices check the local security policies according to the global defined
policies. The access control model Organization-Based Access Control (OrBAC) is
used to achieve the proposed approach allowing to model the organization as a reg-
ulated group of entities in which each participant can have a specific role (Verissimo
et al., 2008a).
In order to improve the security in a context of collaboration among multiple Critical
Infrastructures, CRUTIAL uses PolyOrBAC in order to publish and negotiate access
control rules in a intra-organizational context. In adittion, allowing it to support an
Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) architecture to deploy control
access for runtime access to remote services (Verissimo et al., 2008a).
The main purpose of the CRUTIAL project was to enable the collection of improved
knowledge about Critical Infrastructures, permitting the development of more re-
silient infrastructures. The validated results obtained within the CRUTIAL project
are considered a major contribution to the development of the state of the art in
CI protection (Bessani et al., 2007; CRUTIAL, 2008; Dondossola et al., 2008; Veris-
simo et al., 2008a,b). The CRUTIAL developed methodologies and tools are highly
focused on ICT and the Electricity Power Systems thus the applicability in different
areas becomes more difficult. As the main goal of CRUTIAL is to develop more
resilient infrastructures, it does not considers the existence of alerting systems or
risk information exchange among CIs.
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2.2.3 INSPIRE (INcreasing Security and Protection through
Infrastructure REsilience)
As described by D’Antonio et al., the INcreasing Security and Protection through
Infrastructure REsilience (INSPIRE) project aimed to enhance the European po-
tential in the field of security by ensuring the protection of Critical Infrastructures
through the identification of their vulnerabilities and the development of innovative
techniques for securing networked process control systems (D’Antonio et al., 2009).
The core idea of the INSPIRE project is to protect Critical Infrastructures by ap-
propriately configuring, managing, and securing the communication network which
interconnects the distributed control systems. A working prototype has been imple-
mented as a final demonstrator of selected scenarios.
The main research objectives addressed by the INSPIRE project were: the design
and implementation of traffic engineering algorithms to provide SCADA traffic with
quantitative guarantees, thus increasing SCADA resilience to attacks or malfunc-
tions; the use of peer-to-peer overlay routing mechanisms for improving the resilience
of SCADA systems; the design of an architectural framework for SCADA systems
monitoring, diagnosis and reconfiguration and also the development of diagnosis and
recovery techniques for SCADA systems (INSPIRE, 2010).
2.3 The CI Security Model
Considering that the operation of complex systems such as Critical Infrastructures
is a challenging task, CI providers place substantial efforts into maintaining CIs
running while trying to reduce risks of any kind, particularly, the risk of failure,
the risk of intrusion or the risk of incorrect operation. With these problems in
mind, a novel approach for security modelling and CI risk evaluation and monitoring
was presented by Schaberreiter et al. – the CI Security Model (Aubert et al.,
2010a,b; Schaberreiter et al., 2011a). Aubert et al. states that current risk analysis
methodologies do not provide a simple framework to share risk information among
Critical Infrastructures. Essentially, the main identified problem that leads to the
development of this model is the fact that CIs owners are not enthusiastic about
exchanging risk information, mainly due to confidentiality reasons and also because
they do not intend to publicise the details regarding their systems.
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In a more recent work, Schaberreiter et al. defends that the main idea behind
this work is to be able to estimate, in real-time, the existent risk in CI services.
The CI security modelling approach addresses the challenge of on-line monitoring
of the state of CI services taking into account the services they depend on. In this
work, the types of risks considered are, respectively, a breach of confidentiality, a
breach of integrity and a degradation of availability (Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability) of a service. To be able to estimate these risks, the necessary evidence
is gathered from measurements retrieved from the existent CI components (base
measurements). One important aspect included in the CI Security Model is the
ability to consider risk information available from dependent CI services in the risk
calculation of a CI service (Schaberreiter et al., 2011a).
By applying the CI Security Model, Schaberreiter et al. aims to simplify the infras-
tructure complexity in the model through the use of security properties in order to
create an abstraction layer over the physical implementation of the services. Aubert
et al. suggests that this abstraction can be applied to a wider range of systems
(e.g. energy, telecommunication, air traffic) as they share the same security objec-
tives. Another major benefit of this model is that the information exchanged among
CIs is specifically related to the security belonging to shared services, thus keeping
confidential information inside each CI. As providers usually hesitate to share the
information that would enhance the security of their CIs, it is assumed that the
abstraction to a small set of common parameters will encourage service providers to
share them with (inter)dependent providers (Aubert et al., 2010b).
As illustrated in Figure 2.4 the aim of the approach is to transform real-world CI
information to abstract risk related information (in this case CIA - confidentiality,
integrity and availability). Aubert et al. denotes that this approach fills a gap
in Critical Infrastructure modelling by presenting a more complete view on CIs,
whereas the existing previous models are more focused on modelling system failures
in order to deal with the consequences of those failures. In the CI Security Model,
system failure is only one of the three aspects the model pretends to represent as it
is directly related to availability (Aubert et al., 2010b).
The information obtained by applying the CI Security Model can then be used to (1)
monitor the state of the Critical Infrastructure and (2) share it with (inter)dependent
CIs in order to be able to evaluate the current infrastructure risk by incorporating
the risk related to the existent dependencies.
The CI Security Model’s underlying methodology approach is composed of three
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Figure 2.4: CI Security Model approach (Aubert et al., 2010a)
steps, namely, the off-line risk assessment, the measurement aggregation and an
on-line monitoring step as represented in Figure 2.4.
Off-line risk assessment
The off-line risk assessment step is of special importance in the CI Security Model
since risk estimation and monitoring can only be precise if the structure of the
systems is amply understood and captured. The off-line risk assessment, the first
step in the CI Security Model, is intended to adequately analyse CIs in order to
recognise the entities that must be represented in the model, namely, the critical
services, critical service (inter)dependencies and the base measurements.
To successfully complete the first step, proper information should be gathered from
multiple sources, for example from various social (e.g. management, technical per-
sonal) and technical (e.g. documentation, manuals, vulnerability feeds) sources.
According to these information, the critical services that compose a CI can be prop-
erly identified and described. To deal with the expected complexity in CIs, the
CI Security Model allows to decompose each identified service into a set of more
fine-grained sub-services.
In order to have an expressive representation of the risk in a complex CI, it is
proposed to decompose the CI into smaller and simpler parts. For example in
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Figure 2.5, CI A is decomposed into a set of services provided by the CI. Depending
on the size and complexity of a CI, each of the identified services can be further
decomposed into sub-services used to provide the higher level service (super service),
which results in a hierarchical, tree like representation.
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Figure 2.5: Weighted infrastructure decomposition graph
In general, each identified service can be divided into components that provide base
measurements for risk aggregation or sub-services. The lowest level of each path
through the decomposition tree should contain components that are used in order
to provide the service. Logically, each sub-service can be seen as a dependency of
its super service. Service dependencies are also taken into account. Dependencies
can exist either to one of the other services identified during the decomposition (like
Service A and Service B in Figure 2.5) or to a service provided by another CI. The
arrow direction in the example represented in Figure 2.5 highlights that Service A
depends on Service B.
With a simple representation, each service can then easily be investigated separately
in order to identify specific base measurements within CI components that define the
state of the CI service and to identify dependencies to other internal or external CI
services. Logically, sub-services can be treated as dependencies of their super-service
(Schaberreiter et al., 2011a).
Following the risk assessment step, CIs are represented using a directed graph in-
cluding only three entities: the critical services, the dependencies among critical
services and all the base measurements associated with each critical service.
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One important aspect in the CI Security Model is the normalisation of the base
measurements. This normalisation is necessary due to the variety of existent CIs,
each one with multiple heterogeneous components providing measurements in dif-
ferent formats, ranges or quantities. In order to allow a continuous and accurate
measurement from the components, the model needs to be able to deal with, for
instance, different (physical) quantities and different value ranges.
The normalisation is achieved by estimating the measurement output during normal
operation and by defining ranges for the allowed deviation from normal operation.
For the CI Security Model, it is necessary for the base measurement outputs to be
changed to a discrete scale of 5 levels (1 meaning normal output and 5 indicating
the maximum deviation from normal output). As stated by Schaberreiter et al., a 5
levels scale was chosen as a compromise between granularity of risk representation
and an easiest understanding of the information by an operator within a stress
situation (Schaberreiter et al., 2011a).
Base measurements informing only boolean values can only take the discrete values 1
(reached) and 5 (not reached) in order to comply with the defined discrete scale. The
estimation of normal operation and the categories of allowed deviation from normal
operation is again done by taking into account all available social and technical
sources that can provide evidence for the identification of the correct values.
A key aspect of the off-line risk assessment step is to weigh the significance of each
dependency and each base measurement according to their relevance to, respectively,
the confidentiality, the integrity and the availability W (C, I, A) of the service. This
enables quantifying the influence that each base measurement or dependency has to
a service (Schaberreiter et al., 2011a).
In a scenario where a base measurement or dependency does not contribute to the
Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability (C,I,A) of a service, a weight of 0 is assigned.
Again, all concerned social and technical sources are employed to estimate accurate
values for the weights. Schaberreiter et al. refers that these weights are assigned
by CI experts and are only modified in case of a new iteration of the off-line risk
assessment if some inaccuracy is detected (Schaberreiter et al., 2011a).
Measurement aggregation
As a result of the previous step, all information needed to evaluate the service
risk (RS) is identified and properly normalised. The measurement aggregation step
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evaluates each service risk (RS) using an averaged weighted sum of the normalised
base measurements (µ) and dependent service risk (RDep) using the corresponding
weights (ω) assigned in the off-line risk assessment step. For each risk indicator
(CIA), the evaluation is achieved as presented in Equation 2.1 (Schaberreiter et al.,
2011a).:
RS =
⌊∑n
i=1 µi ∗ ωµi +
∑m
i=1RDepi ∗ ωDepi∑n
i=1 ωµi +
∑m
i=1 ωDepi
⌋
. (2.1)
Service risk (RS) indicators are evaluated for each identified service according to the
CI Security Model perspectives for risk indicators (CIA), each one characterising a
risk level between [1..5] (Schaberreiter et al., 2011a).
On-line risk monitoring
The on-line risk monitoring step is responsible for the risk information distribution
to the existent dependent services and also to provide aggregated risk indicators
to the CI Operator. A further particular aspect highlighted by Schaberreiter et al.
regarding the planned model simplicity and improved simplicity, refers to the im-
portance of representing the risk in an easy and comprehensible format. In this way
an Operator can react quickly to changing risk and be able to determine the source
of the increasing risk (Schaberreiter et al., 2011a).
Risk in this context can be seen as a situation where the CI behaviour is differ-
ent from the expected behaviour. This definition can be applied to virtually all
situations where a CI service behaves differently from normal operation. In this
approach, the changes in CI behaviour can be expressed numerically with the CIA
indicators.
It is assumed by Schaberreiter et al. that by following the presented CI decom-
position process, it is possible to represent a complex CI using the security model.
Since this approach allows to freely define logical entities as services, it is easy to
aggregate risk only for parts of the CI that an interdependent CI or CI services are
interested in. This provides a more accurate measure of interdependent service risk
while still hiding the complexity of a CI service behind risk parameters.
Recently, Schaberreiter et al. proposed an improvement to the CI Security Model
through the modification of the methodology employed to evaluate risks. The idea
is to represent the model as a Bayesian Networks (BN) where the nodes are used to
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represent CI services and system measurements, and the edges represent dependen-
cies between nodes. The BN Conditional Probability Table (CPT) have probabilities
that can be learned from data records and also assigned by CI experts based on their
experience (Schaberreiter et al., 2013).
According to Schaberreiter et al., using a Bayesian approach for the CI Security
Model allows for some improvements to the previous approach. Among others, it is
stated that the graphical representation of the model is easier to interpret and more
importantly, that risk prediction is improved as risk is estimated both immediately
after an incident and also estimated for the mid and long-term consequences of an
event (Schaberreiter et al., 2013).
2.4 Common ontologies for CIs management
New generation networks are becoming more independent from the services they
support, while the information that is needed for the management of those net-
works is becoming more dispersed and located in heterogeneous sources. The use
of ontologies to support event management in CIs is relevant, as it is possible to
take the management out of the physical infrastructures and focus on the functional
network components where the network manager or CI Operator can have a better
CI overview (Hochstatter et al., 2008). There are some projects with already good
results aiming to develop frameworks able to improve the way this type of infor-
mation is represented, including representation about events occurring in multiple
contexts.
Ontology is a formal representation for concepts regarding a domain that includes
the relations among these concepts. It can be used to gain knowledge of the prop-
erties of that domain, and also to define the domain. In order to model Critical
Infrastructures, the use of ontologies is commonly used.
The way information needed to manage Critical Infrastructures is represented has
become a very important question that has been studied in recent years. Due to the
development of new information systems and communication technologies, actual
systems are becoming more heterogeneous. This is particularly true in the Critical
Infrastructures context (Panzieri et al., 2010). Actually, an adequate integration of
all information produced inside an organisation is an important and complex issue as
interoperability among systems is becoming more complex. Existent scenarios have a
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vast diversity of systems and technologies with each one using different techniques of
sharing information. In some cases, for each scenario, a different modelling approach
is used in order to manage vital system information. These different modelling
approaches create difficulties when one intends to share information with users or
external systems (Serrano et al., 2007).
One actual challenge to develop best interoperability practices among Critical Infras-
tructures is the development or adoption of an information model with the capacity
to define all the existing concepts using a method that is technologically neutral.
By using such a method it is possible to develop information models that can be
shared and integrated with others. These models will be the “knowledge database”
of the system (Strassner, 2003, 2004).
In the actual state of the art, the use of Ontologies is proposed to represent critical
information. Ontology can be defined, in this context, as being “an explicit speci-
fication of a conceptualization” (Gruber, 1993). In this area, the use of ontologies
to manage knowledge must focus on building models that can represent CIs. The
adopted ontology must provide a vocabulary used to establish the model. To develop
and use an ontology is vital to have the consensus of almost all entities involved in
the infrastructure that is planned to model.
In this context, a well-defined Ontology for CI management must allow (Serrano
et al., 2007):
• the representation of knowledge without ambiguous interpretations or incon-
sistencies;
• the sharing of knowledge between heterogeneous sources of information;
• the provision of an accurate description of knowledge without the existence of
ambiguities;
• the expansion from generic domains to specific areas using hierarchical struc-
tures;
• the creation of a formal semantics easily understood by all participants in the
process that can be easily implemented in systems.
In Critical Infrastructure modelling context, it is important to identify and define the
common cross-domain semantic elements that can be used to describe the services
and the data of the heterogeneous CI information systems and their interdepen-
dencies. The use of ontologies simplifies the definition not only regarding tangible
38
TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT FOR CI PROTECTION
objects, but also abstract concepts and paradigms, relations, references, indicators
and dependencies. A semantic language defines an ontology, which is an extensi-
ble conceptual reference infrastructure that could be used by all the CIs to define
themselves and the interfaces they expose in a comprehensible way (Panzieri et al.,
2010).
Critical Infrastructures semantic must be described using standard ontology lan-
guages to minimise the overcoming of the heterogeneity and the ambiguity of ex-
isting syntaxes and also to obtain a common semantic. A common semantic is a
key aspect for a successful interoperation. It can be automatically processed by
a distributed system allowing different autonomous systems to communicate with
each other without ambiguity (MICIE Consortium, 2008).
As several languages and tools are available to represent and use ontologies, it was
chosen to describe among the ones analysed, two that are considered the most
representative.
Resource Description Framework (RDF)
The Resource Description Framework is a recommendation from the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C) for a graphical language originally defined for the represen-
tation of information related to existing resources on the World Wide Web (WWW)
that can also be considered as a basic language for ontology representation. Re-
sources are declared in the language through the properties and values associated
with those properties. Resource Description Framework (RDF) is supported on
XML and by the use of Unique Resource Identifiers (URIs) to identify each feature
(W3C, 2009). On the RDF’s definition it uses only binary properties, which is a
disadvantage when it is intended to use predicates with more than two arguments.
Another limitation of this language is related to the treatment of classes and prop-
erties management. The semantic extension of RDF - RDF Schema language allows
the representation of ontologies using basic classes, properties and fields, bringing
the possibility of building ontologies in a simple and formal way (Serrano et al.,
2006).
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Web Ontology Language (OWL)
Web Ontology Language (OWL) is defined by W3C as one of the standards applica-
ble to ontologies. Initially this language was designed to describe classes and was de-
rived from DAML+OIL (DAML, 2001) – Darpa Agent Markup Language (DAML)/
Ontology Interface Layer (OIL) – this language is based also on RDF. Classes are
the basic elements used to construct ontologies with OWL. This language also con-
tains a large number of constructors ready to use. OWL has three versions (Lite,
DL and Full) – OWL Lite supports those users primarily in need of a classification
hierarchy and simple constraints; OWL DL supports those users who want the maxi-
mum expressiveness while retaining computational completeness (all conclusions are
guaranteed to be computable) and decidability (all computations will finish in finite
time). OWL DL includes all OWL language constructs, but they can be used only
under certain restrictions (for example, while a class may be a subclass of many
classes, a class cannot be an instance of another class). OWL DL is so named due
to its correspondence with description logics; OWL Full is meant for users who want
maximum expressiveness and the syntactic freedom of RDF with no computational
guarantees. OWL Full allows an ontology to augment the meaning of the pre-defined
(RDF or OWL) vocabulary. Existing versions permit this language to be used in
various areas with different needs. Each OWL version is an expansion of the previ-
ous version. An ontology represented in one version is always valid using the next
version. The opposite may not happen (W3C, 2004). The use of OWL has left the
ambit of its initial specification (represent Semantic Web information) beginning to
have a wider use in other applications where the use of ontologies is needed. Con-
sidering the complexity of the Critical Infrastructures that one pretends to model,
OWL language has proven to be a strong candidate for the task (Uszok et al., 2008).
In order to use ontologies, several software tools are available. For this work two of
them were evaluated, namely Prote´ge´ and Swoop.
Prote´ge´
Prote´ge´ is developed and maintained by the Stanford Center for Biomedical Infor-
matics Research at the Stanford University School of Medicine as a free open-source
platform. It is composed of a group of tools able to construct domain models and
knowledge-based applications supported by ontologies. This platform implements a
set of knowledge modelling structures and actions and supports the creation, visual-
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isation and manipulation of ontologies in various formats. Prote´ge´ is highly adapt-
able and supports various application domains. In the actual version, this tool can
be extended by the use of a Java-based Application Programming Interface (API)
for building knowledge-based tools and applications that can take advantage of the
created ontologies. One of the advantages of using Prote´ge´ was the development
of Prote´ge´-OWL. This is an extension to Prote´ge´ that supplies support to the use
of OWL language. Prote´ge´ was developed under a flexible architecture based on
plug-ins development which resulted in an adaptable and easily expandable tool
(Prote´ge´, 2011).
Swoop
Specifically designed to support OWL language, Swoop tool has been initially built
to work as an ontology browser and editor. Developed by the MIND Laboratory
– Maryland University, it permits the creation, edition and ontology debugging
using OWL. This project has recently become an open-source project (Swoop,
2009). Swoop is based on the actual web browsers paradigm, having as its principal
characteristic the use of URIs to allow construction and understanding of OWL
based ontologies. The application was designed to have an interface similar to web
browsers including, for example, navigation buttons and address toolbar (Uszok
et al., 2008).
According to an enquiry made in the beginning of 2007 to ontology users in the field
of semantic web (Cardoso, 2007), the presented languages (OWL and RDF) are the
ones chosen by the majority of the users – 76% of the users have chosen OWL and
65% are using RDF. The same study has concluded that Prote´ge´ is the tool most
used by the users with a total of 68.2% against only 13.6% that use Swoop.
Taking into account the needs observed mainly for the MICIE project, the use of
OWL and Prote´ge´ was considered to construct the ontology and also to use these
tools to create a security ontology containing policies that will allow the implemen-
tation of security policies within the MICIE system.
2.5 Policy Based Management
Considering the important role that ICT plays in a Critical Infrastructure and in
particular when it is planned to share information among CIs, the problem of how
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to manage such a system needs to be addressed. In this case, policies can be used to
regulate the content and amount of information that should be shared among peers.
More specific policies allow supporting dynamic decisions based on the information
available at each moment regarding the participation of each peer in the communi-
cation. For instance, it should be possible to integrate indicators such as Trust and
Reputation while taking decisions. Also, as they are frequently used, policies must
be able to be used to enforce confidentiality, accountability, identity management
and access control among other aspects.
In a scenario where CIs are willing to exchange information, it is important to
deploy management strategies that address security aspects while permitting an
easy definition of security rules by the CI Operator or System Administrator.
Currently, a great effort is made to diminish the increasing complexity of networks
management, through the use of multiple paradigms. The Policy-Based Manage-
ment Model aims to be the result of the change from the actual configuration mech-
anisms to an integrated management system.
One interesting work has been published by Li et al. where authors describe a
framework that makes use of an holistic approach, based on the concepts of situa-
tion awareness for monitoring the state of a CI employing policies to manage the
proposed system. Although the authors refer to the system as being able to be used
in Critical Infrastructures security management, the application of the proposed
system is illustrated by using it to protect the traditional Internet backbone by au-
tomatically configuring Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) on router systems and the
application to help secure devices and information in mobile networks. This is an
interesting work in terms of Policy Based Network Management (PBNM) not only
for using the PBNM approach but also by incorporating some reasoning regarding
information trust on the decisions taken by policies (Li et al., 2012a).
Li et al. has recently presented another work that makes use of policies and trust in
order to improve security in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (Li et al., 2013). In this work,
Li et al. describes a framework able to use multiple existent contextual information
such as battery status, and weather condition, in order to determine whether some
misbehaviour is a result of malicious activity or not. The author also uses trust
information gathered from the devices in order to improve the Policy Management.
Network and systems management solutions based on the use of policies are not new.
The PBNM model has been adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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and the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF) for networks and distributed
systems (Yavatkar et al., 2000) with the following main objectives:
• Centralised network management;
• Support for abstract definition of rules and policies;
• Use of the same rules for different types of equipment and automation of
network management tasks.
In this concept, the system administrator must describe what the network or system
should do, instead of worrying about the way in which this will be implemented.
PBNM architecture is commonly composed of four main entities (Figure 2.6):
• Management console - allows the network manager interaction with the system
in order, for instance, to define, change or remove policies;
• Policy repository - the place or places where the defined policies are stored;
• Policy Decision Point (PDP)- responsible for taking decisions reasoning ac-
cording to the defined policies and the information available at each moment;
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) - the entity that enforces the actions decided
by the PDP.
The communication among these entities can be achieved by using different protocol,
namely,
• one protocol to access the repository (for example Lightweight Directory Ac-
cess Protocol (LDAP));
• a protocol for policy exchange (for example Common Open Policy Service
(COPS) or Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)).
The use of PBNM architecture permits reducing the volume of administrative tasks
and the amount of errors originated from user intervention when configuring devices
or applications and also an easier deployment of fine-grained policies.
It is possible to model and implement the proper behaviour of a network or a sys-
tem with the use of policies. Using policies, the desired behaviour of a system
can be formally modelled, providing support for distribution of tasks, automation
and adaptation of a controlled system, with scalability, flexibility and consistency
(Damianou, 2002).
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Figure 2.6: PBNM architecture components.
In the context of this thesis, the use of policies can support writing, verification
and deployment of security policies able to protect the information gathered by one
Critical Infrastructure. For example, defined policies can allow one to:
• define how and to whom each particular piece of information can be sent;
• define trust relations between different CIs;
• enforce different communications protocols/technologies in each particular con-
text;
• enforce Service Level Agreements (SLAs) or Service Level Specifications (SLSs)
between CIs;
• decide how received events will be managed by the CI.
In order to represent policies used in PBNM architecture, a language is needed
through which the network manager can describe system behaviour/configuration.
There are several proposals, each one concerning an area of application. The lan-
guage must supply a unique platform with support to concepts existent in PBNM
architecture. In this scenario, it is imperative to identify requirements that a policy
specification language should support.
A policy specification language must be simple and easily understandable by the
users. It must support multiple management activities, like security policies and
access control. The policies must be grouped and not treated individually in order
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to facilitate the policy specification related to complex networks. It also has to
permit the relation between multiple areas of network management.
The language must allow some type of policy composition, with the possibility to
analyse in terms of conflicts with other policies, as well as verifying the consistency
of global specification. The language must be expandable in order to allow new
policy types that will appear in the future. With the existence of diverse language
specification, each one with its proper syntax and semantics, one must choose a lan-
guage that is sufficiently extensible and with a great degree of scalability, permitting
it to add new functionalities without much additional effort. Examples of existent
languages are the Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) (OASIS,
2013), the Rei policy language (Kagal, 2005) and PONDER (Ponder, 2010).
XACML is supported by XML allowing it to express access policies. XACML allows
the user to manage actions and supports the resolution of possible existent conflicts
among policies (OASIS, 2013). Rei is a policy language designed for pervasive
computing applications and it is intended to deal with deontic concepts (obligation,
permission, and related concepts) while being based in a semantic language (Kagal
et al., 2003). PONDER, and his updated version PONDER2, focus on simplicity,
flexibility and extensibility in order to provide users with the ability to interact
easily with the managed system. PONDER2 is easily able to interact with multiple
software and hardware components and is being used in environments ranging from
single devices, to personal area networks, ad-hoc networks and distributed systems
(Twidle et al., 2009).
Regarding the flexibility allowed by PONDER, it was proposed within the MICIE
consortium to evaluate the PONDER and PONDER2 languages (Ponder, 2010)
developed at the Imperial College – London.
PONDER consists of a set of tools and services that were developed for the specifica-
tion, analysis and enforcement of policies - the name PONDER became associated
with the entire toolkit. PONDER2 has since been developed as a significant re-
design and re-implementation of PONDER.
PONDER2 is an extensible framework that can be used at different levels of scale
from small-embedded devices to complex services and Virtual Organisations. This
framework provides a means of specifying security policies onto access control im-
plementation mechanisms for firewalls, databases, shared ontologies, among others
(Twidle et al., 2009).
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In PONDER2 context, policies are seen as rules governing choices in the system
behaviour. Two types of policies are supported - authorisation and obligation poli-
cies. Authorisation policies define which actions are permitted under given circum-
stances and obligation policies define which actions should be performed in response
to an event occurring if specific conditions are satisfied. Policies can be dynamically
changed, loaded, enabled, and disabled without interrupting the system.
PONDER2 provides positive authorisation (auth+) and also negative authorisa-
tion (auth-). Only one type of obligation policy is specified, stating that a subject
is obliged to perform certain action on that target. An obligation policy can be
enforced only if the corresponding authorisation policy has been specified in the
system. An event field specifies the trigger of the obligation. Optional constraints
may apply, and in this case, they are evaluated against the state of the system.
In the actual development stage, PONDER2 comprises a self-contained, stand-alone,
general-purpose object management system with messages passing between objects.
It incorporates an awareness of events and policies and implements a policy execu-
tion framework. PONDER2 has a high-level configuration and control language –
PonderTalk - a high-level, object orientated language. It is also possible to expand
PONDER2 system with simple Java programming (Ponder, 2010).
As stated by the developers (Ponder, 2010), PONDER2 has been designed to achieve
the following goals:
• Simplicity: The design of the system must be as simple as possible;
• Extensibility: It is possible to dynamically extend the policy environment with
new functionalities;
• Self-containment: The policy environment does not depend on any-infrastructure
and contains everything necessary to apply policies to managed resources;
• Ease-of-use: Facilitates use of policies in new environments and in different
applications;
• Interactivity: Managers and developers can simply interact with the policy
environment, issue commands to the Managed Objects and create new policies;
• Scalability: Policy environment must be executable in almost any type of
resource.
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One important concept in PONDER2 is that of Managed Object. A Managed
Object is an entity capable of receiving and replying to PonderTalk messages. A
Managed Object is written in Java and uses Java annotations to create the links
between PonderTalk message keywords and Java methods. A Managed Object may
communicate with other Managed Objects, it may use Swing as part of a GUI,
it may act as an Adaptor and communicate with external entities, among other
possibilities of use (Ponder, 2010).
In PONDER2, three pre-defined types of Managed Objects exist: domains, event
templates and policies. Objects are addressed by name, (e.g. root/policy/temppol-
icy) and their basic value types which include Strings, Numbers, Arrays, Hashes,
XML. New Managed Objects are written in Java with simple annotations to manage
messages (Ponder, 2010).
One other important concept is the Self Managed Cell (SMC) that is defined as a
set of hardware and software components forming an administrative domain that is
able to function autonomously and is thus capable of self-management. This concept
is extremely important, as each SMC will be an autonomous system with regards
to management. Inside the SMC, existing management services interact with each
other through asynchronous events propagated through a content-based event bus.
Each SMC is able to interact with other SMCs and thus able to compose in larger
scale SMCs (Ponder, 2010).
PONDER2 concept of Domain is used to refer to a collection of objects explicitly
grouped for management purposes, for example to apply a common policy. Domains
can be nested and can overlap with others. It is possible to specify policies that will
apply to domains instead of single Managed Object. The use of domains can be very
useful to apply the same policies to the same type of Managed Objects (Ponder,
2010).
As already stated, PONDER2 uses PonderTalk language to specify Managed Objects
and the messages to be sent to them. PONDER2 version 1 uses XML for the
configuration and control language. PonderTalk is based on Smalltalk. It uses a
simple syntax in a sequence of statements. Statements are like sentences and they
are separated with a full-stop (period). A statement specifies a receiver (object) and
a message (command) to be sent to the receiver. The receiver then returns another
object (or itself) in response to a message (Ponder, 2010).
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2.6 Trust and Reputation
Along with the growing number of publications in the area, it is possible to find many
definitions of trust. The main concept appears in different areas such as sociology,
economics, law and computer science. The concept itself depends on the application
area, yet it is commonly used to assist decision processes such as, assisting a customer
when buying from an online store where he can find different opinions from previous
clients allowing to mentally create a notion of trust or distrust. One interesting
work was published by Miller et al. in which, authors begin by trying to understand
the concept of trust. One thought-provoking sentence allows one to understand
how ambiguous the term trust can be and also to realise how it should be used
- “Trust is less confident than know, but also more confident than hope.” (Miller
et al., 2010). Miller et al. also makes one think that trust also includes an element
of risk. That is, if someone knows some fact then to trust someone else about that
fact is unnecessary, but when someone does not have the means to know then it is
important to trust.
The difficulties to define and conceptualise trust are also realised by the essay writ-
ten by McLeod in the The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy McLeod. Until a
complete consensus is reached (if this is possible in such a widely applied concept),
different authors that make use of trust use different definitions leading to some
misunderstanding about their work. For example, Gambetta rationalises trust as
“if we trust someone, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an
action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to con-
sider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.” (Gambetta, 2000). Another
interesting definition has been given by Ruohomaa and Kutvonen, where trust is
“the extent to which one party is willing to participate in a given action with a given
partner, considering the risks and incentives involved” (Ruohomaa and Kutvonen,
2005).
For reference, in this thesis, the trust definition presented by Mui and Mohtashemi is
used - “Trust: a subjective expectation an agent has about another’s future behaviour
based on the history of their encounters.” (Mui and Mohtashemi, 2002). It is also
possible to state that trust is the opinion of one entity about another single entity,
while reputation is the community opinion about one entity. In this thesis, the
concept of reputation is slightly different. It is considered that the reputation of an
entity is an indication of how much one trusts that entity, taking into consideration
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the trust one has in a collection of multiple aspects regarding that entity. The trust
concept is an ancient one in human relations, however it is relatively new in the
computer science areas. Although in recent years it has become widely adopted to
help solve problems in multiple ICT areas, particularly in ICT security.
According to Artz and Gil, trust research is organised in four main areas (Artz and
Gil, 2007):
• Policy-based trust where trust is used within the use of policies in order to
manage and exchange credentials mostly used to enforce access policies. In
this scenario, a third-party trusted entity is usually used to help others in
creating trust relations;
• Reputation-based trust where trust based on past interactions with an entity
is used to assess future interactions. In this case, the history of an entity
regarding past actions and behaviour is used to compute trust. It is also
possible in this type of scenario to use third-party information (for instance
recommendations or the trust others may have in an entity) to compute trust;
• General models of trust where researchers pretend to model all the environ-
ment of trust, for instance, defining trust, the existent prerequisites, conditions
and consequences;
• Trust in information resources that is mostly focused in Web related research
in particular in areas such as Semantic Web.
Although Artz and Gil has organised the actual research in these four areas, it is
difficult to establish boundaries among them, as most of the work aiming to use
trust to help solve a specific problem usually requires contributions from more than
one area.
As stated, ICT areas have a growing interest in Trust and Reputation approaches,
in particular, current research is focusing on the development or refinement of trust
models. Trust models are usually developed for a specific application area like com-
merce web sites (e.g. Ebay, Amazon) or more generally for the use in distributed
environments where transactions occur between persons or computer systems. In
actual fact, the existent trust models tend to be very heterogeneous, possibly due
to the use of different definitions of trust that support the models making them
context-dependent. Latest research efforts are starting to focus on developing gen-
eral models to overcome the shortcoming of context-dependent approaches. For
instance, Moyano et al. presents a framework intended to help developers to imple-
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ment applications that might require information from Trust and Reputation Models
(Moyano et al., 2012).
From the past couple years, most of the research work in this area is focused on P2P
systems (Chen et al., 2009a,b; Spitz and Tuchelmann, 2009), Mobile Ad-hoc Net-
works (MANETs) (Li et al., 2013, 2012b), Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs)
(Go´mez Ma´rmol and Mart´ınez Pe´rez, 2012), Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
(Ganeriwal et al., 2008; Momani et al., 2008; Zahariadis et al., 2008), on-line personal
interactions, software agents and in evaluating generic models and formalisms for
Trust and Reputation systems (Jøsang et al., 2007; Malik and Bouguettaya, 2009;
Ray et al., 2009; Sabater and Sierra, 2005). Each of the models proposed has its
own way of evaluating trust but the majority makes use of statistical approaches.
The major differences that one may encounter among the available trust models
are related to the type of information and the information sources used to evaluate
trust. The most common information sources are direct experience that reflects
the experience that one entity has in the relation with another, thus reflecting this
experience in a trust indicator. Witness observation which uses one or many third-
party opinions to evaluate trust. Certified reputation that consists of the use of
certified references disclosed by third-party entities. Role-based trust that analyses
predefined role-based relationships between two entities to infer trust. This seems to
be the major issue in developing a kind of standard model for trust evaluation. One
aspect that can be inferred from the literature review is that it is commonly agreed
that, for now, existent Trust and Reputation Models are still context sensitive and
thus difficult to apply directly in multiple scenarios (Noorian and Ulieru, 2010).
While most of the previous work integrates observed trust with reputation infor-
mation received from a third-party entity, this thesis will focus on building trust
information based on observed comportments and deriving trust from evidences di-
rectly related to the entity whose trustworthiness is being evaluated. In this context,
most of the work reviewed evaluates trust using basically the amount of positive or
negative transaction experiences (Hussain et al., 2007; Jøsang et al., 2007; Ray et al.,
2009). Although it is possible to adapt these models in order to enable that observed
events use a value in a defined range (e.g. [0..100]) for each transaction.
Some existing models provide only a single value for trust. This value can be binary
(trustee or non trustee) or can also be represented by more than two discrete values
using either discrete or continuous numbers or labels. For this thesis it is considered
that a trust model should at least give the user a value of trust in a defined discrete
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range. Another aspect related to trust models of particular importance when it is
necessary to take decisions, is that they should provide measures to express uncer-
tainty, reliability or confidence associated with a trust value. Some authors propose
models that are able to express uncertainty (Huynh et al., 2006; Jøsang and Ismail,
2002; Teacy et al., 2006).
Trust may be quantified and computed in numerous ways. In particular, several
methods are proposed to derive trust from the collected evidence (Sabater and Sierra,
2005). Some authors propose simple probability use (Aime and Lioy, 2005), Fuzzy
approaches (Ludwig et al., 2009) or the use of Bayesian Networks (Momani et al.,
2008). There are substantial differences among proposed methods. These differences
are related to the information used to evaluate trust, use of reputation information,
the use of ageing parameters on observed values, use of inactivity periods (Spitz and
Tuchelmann, 2009), among others.
In this thesis the approaches described by both Aime and Lioy and Spitz and Tuchel-
mann are followed regarding the model used to evaluate trust from past experience
and the use of a statistical approach to evaluate trust values (Aime and Lioy, 2005;
Spitz and Tuchelmann, 2009). Since trust is evaluated as a simple probability and
according to the trust definition presented above, it is possible to infer that a trust
value expresses the probability that an entity will behave as expected.
2.7 Summary
The need to protect Critical Infrastructures has motivated the development or the
adjustment of several frameworks, techniques and mechanisms in order to increase
the resilience of such important infrastructure on which actual society depends. This
section first introduced the concept of Critical Infrastructure and the problems that
might arise in their operation. As the interdependencies existent among CIs pose a
serious risk in the CIs operation, this problem was discussed while describing some
relevant approaches that deal with this subject. Critical Infrastructure modelling,
simulation techniques and risk assessment frameworks have been addressed in order
to understand their main characteristics and the major problems they pretend to
solve. The CI Security Model is detailed in this chapter as an introduction to
Chapter 5 in which this model is used to validate the work.
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The relevance of the area is also highlighted by describing three selected European
projects that had major contributions in the area of CI security and protection.
More specific aspects are discussed in this chapter in order to locate the contribu-
tions presented in this thesis in the state of the art. In particular, some existent
work on Policy Based Management and methodologies to deal with Ontologies were
discussed.
An overview on Trust and Reputation Models focusing on their applicability to
the context of Critical Infrastructures protection and on the information exchange
among Critical Infrastructures concludes the chapter.
The following chapter describes the MICIE FP7 project with particular attention
to contributions achieved by the author of this thesis.
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MICIE FP7 Project
In this chapter, the Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation of data
exchanged across linked CI information infrastructures (MICIE) FP7-ICT project
(MICIE Consortium, 2008) is described, detailing the developed alerting system, the
MICIE Secure Mediation Gateway (SMGW) and the adopted solutions to specifi-
cally incorporate CI interdependencies into the online risk assessment framework.
Most of the research challenges that led to this thesis had their genesis in the scope
of the MICIE project. Although the author of this thesis has been involved in the
most part of the project, it is possible to highlight his involvement in the work
related to the MICIE work package 4000 (WP4000) - Mediation System Design - in
which he participated actively on the publication of all the deliverables issued as a
result of the work package.
In particular, during the execution of the WP4000, the author of this thesis played an
active role during the drafting and development of the Security Mediation Gateway
(SMGW). Besides the global participation, the author of this thesis proposed and
implemented a Policy Based Management framework for the SMGW, contributed
to the definition of the Ontology used in the MICIE data repository and proposed a
framework for Trust and Reputation Management, implemented as an add-on secu-
rity mechanism allowing to improve the security of the information exchange among
Critical Infrastructures, namely, the Trust and Reputation System (as described in
Chapter 4) to be applied to the MICIE Security Mediation Gateway.
The major achievements that resulted from this work are described in the following
publications: (Castrucci et al., 2009), (Castrucci et al., 2010a), (Inzerilli et al., 2009),
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(Castrucci et al., 2010b), (Caldeira et al., 2010d), (Caldeira et al., 2010a), (Caldeira
et al., 2010c) and also in (Castrucci et al., 2012), among others.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 presents an overview about the
MICIE project while Section 3.2 describes the MICIE system’s overall architecture.
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively describe how the MICIE project handled CI mod-
elling and risk prediction activities.
Section 3.5 presents the MICIE Secure Mediation Gateway architecture from which
the SMGW Management is described in detail in Section 3.6. The validation activ-
ities carried out within the MICIE project are briefly described in Section 3.7. To
conclude, Section 3.8 presents a summary of the main issues discussed throughout
the chapter.
3.1 MICIE Project overview
In accordance with the discussion found in the previous chapters, it is now commonly
agreed that Critical Infrastructures are one of the areas of contemporary societies
where it is vital to ensure the application of the highest security levels. In this
context, the European Commission launched the EPCIP whose main goal is to
improve the protection of CIs in the European Union (European Commission, 2006)
and where one primary objective is also defined, the implementation of the Critical
Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). CIWIN main objective is
to provide a platform for the exchange of rapid alerts among CIs in order to help
European Member States and CI Operators to share information on common threats
and vulnerabilities. The idea is quite ambitious, requiring the support of players
in the market, which need to have confidence in the proposed system in order to
participate.
As seen, the recent efforts to improve security and protection in Critical Infrastruc-
tures, are mostly focusing on each CI individually, launching the foundations for
more secure CIs with enhanced robustness, security and resilience. Introducing, for
instance, fault-tolerant architectures, redundant components and more resilient ICT
systems. An important aspect that needed to be addressed relates to the interdepen-
dency existent among CIs. This interdependency can lead, in an extreme situation,
to a global failure in an undefined number of CIs, started by a single trivial incident
in one CI (cascading effect).
54
MICIE FP7 PROJECT
Although the large resources that are being allocated on CI modelling, CI (in-
ter)dependency modelling studies and on evaluating CI risk information from those
models, most of this valuable information gathered from the CI models is still kept
and only used inside each CI, being not regularly shared among interdependent CIs.
One problem that has been identified within the presented context is the lack of
sharing mechanisms able to exchange risk information among interconnected CIs.
This sort of mechanism aims to allow CI Operators to have a real time view on
the risk level associated with services on which the modern society depends, such
as power, water supply, or communication lines. Sharing this type of information
is also important to increase the accuracy of the CI risk models, by introducing
risk information related to external failures on these models (Simo˜es et al., 2010).
Another problem that was identified is to what extent, CI Owners, are willing to
exchange this sensitive information without disclosing CI details that could endanger
their activities.
MICIE project suggests that the use of mechanisms able to share CIs risk infor-
mation can allow, besides more resilient CIs, increase the security level of multiple
(inter)dependent CIs. To achieve improved service levels, a robust, resilient and
inter-dependencies-aware alerting system was designed and implemented. This was
the main goal of MICIE (Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation of data
exchanged across linked CI information infrastructurees) FP7-ICT project, aiming
the design and implementation of a real-time risk level dissemination and alerting
system (MICIE Consortium, 2008).
Figure 3.1 represents a top level view of the MICIE system. In this Figure, four
CIs operating the system are represented. It is notable the existence of CIs that
depend on services provided by partner CI (dependency - one CI depends on one
or more services provided by another CI) and also CIs that are interdependent (CIs
dependent on services provided by each other). For instance, CI A depends on
services provided by CI C and provide s services to CI B. CI B depends on services
provided by CI A and CI B. CI C only depends on services provided by CI B. One
independent CI using the MICIE system (CI D) is also represented in Figure 3.1,
highlighting the fact that this system can also be used in a independent manner,
meaning that only local risk prediction is evaluated and used without information
being exchanged.
A distributed on-line Prediction Tool (PT) supported by the defined abstract CI
model is continuously evaluating the risk level indicators. The CI models are kept
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Figure 3.1: MICIE system overview.
constantly updated by receiving information coming from the field of each CI (ag-
gregated metadata that proper describe the CI status). As represented in Figure 3.1
by the existing independent CI, the defined models are also able to be used off-line
allowing the evaluation of risk levels considering only the information gathered in-
side the CI and also, to comprehend the level of (inter)dependency existent among
CIs. From this information it would be possible to improve the characterisation of
the most vulnerable elements existent in the (inter)dependent systems.
MICIE alerting system includes an appropriate communication infrastructure, namely
the Secure Mediation Gateway, which provides secure communication across the MI-
CIE system. The SMGW is designed to retrieve, from each CI, all the information
required for the real-time risk prediction. Additionally, the system implements the
information sharing mechanisms according to a highly available and secure frame-
work (Figure 3.2) (Capodieci et al., 2010).
The MICIE project was able to test the achieved results in the field, with the con-
tribution of the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC), that, among other contributions,
provided all the knowledge gathered from a portion of the electrical and telecommu-
nication infrastructures of Israel, both managed by the Israel Electric Corporation.
This knowledge allowed the MICIE consortium to use a part of two Critical Infras-
tructures (energy and communications) as well as the IEC ICT infrastructure as a
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test-bed for the MICIE on-line alerting system.
3.2 MICIE overall system architecture
The MICIE system is a distributed environment composed by multiple heteroge-
neous CIs that might depend on one or more services provided externally by other
CIs. Considering that the CIs are willing to cooperate in order to improve the pro-
vided quality-of-service, the MICIE system introduced mechanisms allowing CIs to
be able to predict and exchange risk information across trusted or untrusted network
infrastructures (e.g. Internet).
The information exchange among CIs is critical for the MICIE system as it supports
the risk analysis and prediction performed inside each CI by taking into account the
existent CI (inter)dependencies. It is clear that this sensitive information must be
kept within the system in a secure manner. It is commonly known that solely dis-
closing this type of information is considered a high security risk for all involved CIs.
The information exchange is achieved through a MICIE component, the local Se-
cure Mediation Gateways (SMGW), able to provide secure communication channels
across the MICIE system.
Figure 3.2 represents the MICIE’s system overall architecture. The Figure allows to
distinguish the main, following entities that compose the MICIE system (Caldeira
et al., 2010a; Castrucci et al., 2012):
• Critical Infrastructure: the infrastructure from which the MICIE system pre-
dicts the risk. Multiple CIs might participate in the MICIE system even if
they are heterogeneous and even if they are situated in remote locations.
• Prediction Tool (PT): the entity responsible for undertaking risk prediction
within a CIs. Each CI has at least one local Prediction Tool. However, in order
to achieve all the project benefits, it requires, in addition to local information,
information related to remote (inter)dependent CIs.
• CI Monitoring System: the local framework able to perform monitoring activ-
ities within an infrastructure. This system is able to detect failures, degrada-
tion of QoS, among others. As it is assumed that the participant CIs are or
can be heterogeneous, each CI can have its own specific monitoring system.
Due to the fact that monitoring systems are closely related to the CI physical
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components, it is assumed that this component is a legacy system completely
decoupled from the MICIE system.
• Adaptor: the entity employed for interconnecting each CI’s particular monitor-
ing system with the MICIE system. It is able to connect to the CI’s monitoring
system collecting information from it and providing the necessary translation
to a common data representation format. It also performs operations such as
filtering, aggregation, translation of information with the main goal to pro-
vide the MICIE system with all the information needed to accomplish risk
prediction.
• Secure Mediation Gateway (SMGW): the entity that provides to the PT, the
information needed for risk prediction. It is able to gather and compile lo-
cal information retrieved by the adaptor(s) and to receive remote information
from peer SMGWs. It has also the role of providing the necessary information
to remote peer SMGWs in order to assist them with performing their function-
alities with proper knowledge. Since the information treated by the SMGW is
sensitive, it fulfils a number of security requirements including also the secure
communication with remote peer SMGWs.
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Figure 3.2: MICIE overall system architecture.
In order to design and implement the complete MICIE system a reference scenario
has been defined, with the stakeholder accordance, and modelled including the dis-
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covered (inter)dependencies. Three new functional modules were fully designed and
implemented, namely the Adaptor, the SMGW and the PT. This section will focus
more on the SMGW as it was the area to which the author of this thesis most con-
tributed. Detailed information on the adaptors design and implementation can be
encountered in (Castrucci et al., 2010b). The MICIE reference scenario, the applied
interdependency modelling framework, indicators and models were part of MICIE
Work package 2000 (Bertoni et al., 2010a,b; Ciancamerla et al., 2009, 2010b; Lev
et al., 2009). The Prediction Tool is detailed in deliverables produced within MICIE
Work Package 3000 (Panzieri et al., 2009, 2010; Simo˜es et al., 2010, 2009), where
also the risk prediction algorithm is detailed.
3.3 MICIE - Critical Infrastructure Modelling
One of the main problems that the MICIE project had to overcome was related
to Critical Infrastructures modelling. Despite the existence of several proposals for
CI modelling this appeared to be one of the most difficult tasks to complete. The
difficulty was mainly due to the usual complexity and size that such an infrastruc-
ture entails. In order to build a representative and realistic model for the MICIE
project, a reference scenario has been defined within the project consortium sup-
ported by the expertise of the stakeholder, the Israel Electric Corporation. The
use of a reference scenario was a fundamental decision thus narrowing down what
should be in the model, and providing a concrete context of operation, focused on
CI (inter)dependencies.
A reference scenario should identify the services provided by the CI: the events
or sequences of events that are adverse and that could cause a relevant impact in
the quality of the identified services (for instance in terms of continuity or perfor-
mances); the interconnected networks that support the services (e.g. topologies,
essential systems, etc.); the interconnections existent among networks and systems;
the procedures defined by the Operator regarding the implementation and mainte-
nance of each service (Ciancamerla et al., 2010a).
The reference scenario is composed of the ICT systems and two distinct CIs (energy
and telecommunications). It has been established from one set of the Israel Electric
Company infrastructures, systems and their interconnections. The main components
of the reference scenario are (Ciancamerla et al., 2009, 2010b; Simo˜es et al., 2010):
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• a section of an electricity distribution network, including a Medium Voltage
(MV) power grid at 22 KV and a High Voltage (HV) power grid at 160 KV;
• a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system that remotely
monitors and controls the power distribution grid and Remote Terminal Units
for remote operations;
• a section of the IEC telecommunications network with fiber optics and radio
links used mainly to control the electricity distribution network;
• the interconnection of SCADA with the portion of IEC telecommunications
transmission network;
• the ICT infrastructure.
A top level view of the reference scenario is represented in Figure 3.3. On the left side
of the Figure, some examples of possible adverse events, that can eventually occur
and cause some impact in the normal operation of the services provided by the CIs,
are represented. The represented adverse events can be triggered due to multiple
causes, namely, natural causes, malicious attacks or simply due the malfunction
of some equipment. A simple event can affect just one of the represented CIs or
services, for instance the electrical CI or the telecommunications CI, and, as both
of the represented CIs are interdependent, the effect triggered by such a small event
may propagate and reach the customers of the medium voltage grid causing, for
instance, the interruption of power supply.
MICIE models were evaluated and tested based on multiple heterogeneous models
(stochastic versus deterministic, agent based, dynamic simulation, etc.) with the
main objective of evaluating a short-term estimate for the Quality-of-Service sup-
plied by the different Critical Infrastructures. The models were created based on
the underlying interconnected networks that collaborate for service delivery and, as
represented in Figure 3.3, according to multiple possible adverse events (for exam-
ple, attacks to critical elements, sequences of characteristic failures and congestions
or failure in communication networks).
One major aspect that has been addressed is the impact that the potential degrada-
tion of the QoS on the SCADA system (for instance, service connectivity, reliability,
rerouting, response time, operability level) might have on the quality of the power
supply provided by the power grid Operator to power grid customers (measured
in terms of duration and number of interruptions). In this scenario, the Power
Grid Fault Isolation and System Restoration Service (FISR), performed by SCADA
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Figure 3.3: High level view of the reference scenario (adapted from Ciancamerla
et al. (2010a)).
through its Operator, is also considered a particularly critical service (represented
in Figure 3.3) as FISR aims to detect and isolate grid outages, and to restore the
grid in order to provide service continuity to the customers (Capodieci et al., 2010).
For example, the failure of the FISR service caused, for instance, by a telecommuni-
cations failure, incapacitate the Operator to take rapid remote actions while trying
to restructure the grid.
Capodieci et al. describes that the MICIE project was able to identify the inter-
connected networks that support the FISR service, namely, the SCADA system,
the telecommunication network and the power distribution grid. This identification
was made in terms of topologies, functionalities, performances, rerouting and failure
behaviours, interconnections at physical, geographical and logical layers (Capodieci
et al., 2010). Different techniques and tools are used to represent the reference sce-
nario. Bertoni et al. describes in detail the application of such techniques and tools
within the MICIE project (Bertoni et al., 2010a).
In this context, some QoS indicators depend upon failure and behaviour in case of
necessary repair of network elements. Examples of such QoS indicators are connec-
tivity and availability. According to (Capodieci, 2011), these indicators are com-
puted using analytical methods and from the integration of the different topologies
using the Mixed Holistic Reductionist (MHR) approach.
Detailed information presenting the results achieved by MICIE, regarding CI mod-
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elling activities integrated in the work package “Interdependency Analysis and Mod-
elling”, is available in the project documentation (Bertoni et al., 2010a). It is de-
scribed how the modelling efforts were able to, completely or partially, represent the
reference scenario defined for the project.
The MICIE CI modelling approach also considered the ICT security analysis for each
CI. The core critical assets were identified and their level of potential vulnerability
has been evaluated also considering the information they are associated with. The
security risk is estimated by judging the impact the core critical assets may have in
a single CI and also the impact that they may cause on (inter)dependent CIs. In
such a complex system as a Critical Infrastructure, it is also essential to establish a
tolerable level of risk and to select those risks on which it will be necessary to act
upon and control.
The results from the ICT security analysis that are integrated into the MICIE
Alerting System, can be summarily enumerated as a set of security requisites and
respective related risks, as first described in (Lev et al., 2009) and further detailed
in (Bertoni et al., 2010b) and (Bertoni et al., 2010a):
• Reliability and integrity of information which feeds the MICIE alerting system;
• Security risks introduced by the CI ICT network and impact of those risks on
the MICIE alerting System;
• Interdependency model resilience;
• Security risk analysis, for the risks related with interdependency modelling;
• Non-repudiation of each peer.
The author of this thesis contributed to the work package responsible for modelling
activities tasks (WP2000 - Interdependency Analysis and Modelling), by proposing
solutions for modelling ICT security attacks. In particular the main idea is to evalu-
ate and use the CI ICT security risks as one of the information sources of the general
CI model. In this context, some ICT Monitoring Components (ICT-MCs) were pro-
posed to be added to the MICIE framework (Lev et al., 2009). ICT-MC includes a
Monitoring System and a set of Intrusion Detection Systems covering the corporate
ICT network and, when possible, the SCADA network. It is mostly focused on CI
ICT network monitoring (especially for intrusion detection, but also for detection of
other anomalies). This component was the author’s first contribution to the project
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and has evolved to the Managing System and to the Trust and Reputation System
that are described in further detail throughout this thesis.
Modelling ICT security inside a Critical Infrastructure is a demanding and complex
task mainly due to the size and complexity of the ICT networks and computer
systems implemented. Due to the complexity of the model that can be gathered
from a CI, the author of this thesis proposed a sort of “black box” model supported
by Bayesian Networks on which the main model is divided into several sub-models,
each one regarding an area of operation. This approach aims to simplify the task
of gathering the information required to build the Bayesian Network (in particular
the quantitative information).
This system – designated as Information and Communication Technology Moni-
toring Component allows to gather information from multiple Bayesian Networks,
called “Experts”, used to feed a top level Bayesian Network able, to infer using
multiple “Experts” information. In this scenario, each “Expert” can also make use
of Bayesian Learning. Figure 3.4 represents an example of a Bayesian Network for
the ICT-MC.
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Figure 3.4: ICT-MC Bayesian network example (Lev et al., 2009)
According to the proposed approach it is possible to have a set of IDSs in the
corporate network and also in the SCADA network. The ICT-MC system is meant
to work in an autonomous way while detecting intrusion anomalies and also, for
instance, detecting abuse on the CI defined security policy (for instance an access
control policy).
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The information generated on the ICT-MC system can be aggregated into the MICIE
system along with other types of CI monitoring information (e.g. SCADA systems
and legacy systems) thus helping to integrate ICT security into the MICIE CI model
(Figure 3.5). Furthermore it is possible to use the ICT-MC as an independent
system inside each CI in order to provide the network administrator with valuable
information concerning ICT security.
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Figure 3.5: ICT Monitoring Component (ICT-MC) overview.
Even though the ICT-MC component hasn’t been integrated in the final implemen-
tation of the MICIE project, this contribution led to several important discussions
within the MICIE Consortium about security and CI modelling. Among others,
these fruitful discussions raised multiple concerns that had not been covered by the
MICIE project. Some of these concerns are now being studied and developed un-
der a new European project - Project CockpitCI (Cybersecurity on SCADA: risk
prediction, analysis and reaction tools for Critical Infrastructures), which aims to
improve the resilience and dependability of Critical Infrastructures through the au-
tomatic detection of cyber-threats and the sharing of real-time information about
attacks among CI Owners (CockpitCI, 2013). This project is also making use of
some MICIE results and, as stated, is focusing in the detection of cyber-threats and
attacks that can affect CIs.
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3.4 Online Risk Prediction Tool
The design of the Prediction Tool, and the inference rules used to calculate the
risk prediction from the information about the status of each CI, including the
interdependent CIs, are just briefly presented in this section. More information
regarding the results achieved in this area is available from the MICIE work package
3000 – Risk prediction system design documentation and from several publications
describing in detail this subject (Ciancamerla et al., 2010a; De Porcellinis et al.,
2009; Gasparri et al., 2009; Oliva et al., 2010; Panzieri et al., 2010; Simo˜es et al.,
2010).
One problems one must solve while defining a centralised state estimator is related
to the fact that complete knowledge about the status of every infrastructure and
their components must be achieved. From the discussion above, it is clear that such
a prerequisite is not easily satisfied, mainly due to the vast amount of data that
has to be considered and because of the security aspects that can arise in case of
disclosure of this critical information (Capodieci et al., 2010).
Capodieci et al. refers to the application of a more realistic approach based in a
decentralised scenario able to synchronise with external scenarios. In this approach,
each control centre should include a global model representing all existent systems
(Figure 3.6) (Capodieci et al., 2010) . Each infrastructure has a tool that receives
information originated from inside the infrastructure. As the different tools must be
interconnected in order to achieve a global prediction, it is important to maintain
them synchronised. An example of how to achieve model synchronisation has been
presented by Gasparri et al. for the case of linear distributed interdependency
estimators with complete information sharing (Gasparri et al., 2009).
According to Capodieci et al., the easiest method that allows to maintain the con-
sistency of the overall state, estimated by the independent dispersed tool, is to use
a common general model in every system, although each specific system just needs
to receive a specific subset of the inputs available (Capodieci et al., 2010).
On the proposed framework for the MICIE project, all of the existent prediction tools
have the same overall model. The Mixed Holistic Reductionist approach has been
adopted along with the CISIA (De Porcellinis et al., 2008) simulation framework.
CISIA allows to manage multiple heterogeneous models into a single framework,
with the desired level of granularity (Capodieci et al., 2010).
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Figure 3.6: Decentralized risk prediction tool (Capodieci et al., 2010).
The Prediction Tool design and the inference rules, used to evaluate the risk predic-
tion based on the gathered information about the status of interdependent CIs, is out
of the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless the author of this thesis contributed to this
work package focusing on the use of ontologies to represent the model’s metadata
considering also the planned exchange of this metadata among multiple CIs.
In order to allow metadata exchange among CIs, in a simple approach, it is possible
to identify two main entities that must be described using ontologies. These entities
are Remote SMGWs and MICIE Risk Alerts. Remote SMGWs must be represented
due to the fact that it is mandatory to maintain information about the system
partners, mainly for security reasons. MICIE Risk Alerts represent the information
that is to be exchanged among CIs as the result of the risk prediction algorithms.
Figure 3.7 presents a simplified view for the proposed ontology (Panzieri et al., 2010;
Simo˜es et al., 2009).
The presented approach for data representation has been applied in the MICIE
project supporting the existent MICIE data and metadata database (Panzieri et al.,
2010; Simo˜es et al., 2009).
3.5 MICIE Secure Mediation Gateway
The identification and modelling of interdependencies can be very useful in order
to limit the effects of a failure in a CI and even to prevent cascading effects. In
particular, if a CI Operator has the opportunity to be informed of the status of the
existing interdependencies, he can then evaluate predictions on the status of the
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Figure 3.7: Basic ontology for the MICIE data repository (Simo˜es et al., 2009)
delivered QoS level of its services. He also can undertake specific actions in order
to prevent the failure of the CI if failures occur in interdependent CIs. To reach
this goal, the need of a communication system interconnecting different CIs, was
identified and defined as the Secure Mediation Gateway (SMGW).
The MICIE SMGW is the key element of the existent communication infrastructure
that is composed by a set of SMGWs (one for each CI in the system).
The MICIE SMGW architecture, represented in Figure 3.8, is able to interact with
four main entities through the following interfaces (Caldeira et al., 2010a; Castrucci
et al., 2010b, 2012):
• to the local CI monitoring system through the SMGW-Adaptor Standard in-
terface;
• to the local Prediction Tool through the SMGW-PT interface;
• to other remote SMGWs through the SMGW-SMGW interface;
• to the system administrator through the SMGW control interface.
Within the MICIE system, the main tasks performed by the SMGW are briefly
described as: (i) collecting information about the local CI (i.e. the CI where the
SMGW is located); (ii) retrieving information about the other interdependent CIs in
the system; (iii) sending information about the local CI to remote CIs; (iv) providing
all the collected information to the Prediction Tool.
Figure 3.9 illustrates how the MICIE system can be interfaced with the CI where
the SMGW is located.
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Figure 3.8: SMGW Architecture (Castrucci et al., 2012).
In order to implement the main SMGW functionalities proposed in the architecture,
five independent entities were developed, namely, the Data/Metadata Database, the
Information Discovery Framework, the Communication Engine, the SMGW Man-
ager and the Auditing Engine (Caldeira et al., 2010a; Castrucci et al., 2010b, 2012).
In the following, each existent entity is described. The SMGW Manager will be de-
scribed in a independent section (Section 3.6) in order to highlight the contributions
proposed and implemented by the author of this thesis.
Data/Metadata DB
This entity acts as the overall MICIE information database and an instance must
exist in each participant CI. The information stored in the database includes local
information aggregated by the Prediction Tool and raw information retrieved by the
local adaptors from the field. The stored metadata also includes information able to
determine which information aggregated by the Prediction Tool can be exchanged
or made available for other remote Prediction Tools. This metadata should include
confidentiality as well usability requirements in order to allow the peer PTs to work
properly.
Existing PTs are able to exchange the information they need to use in order to
perform the risk prediction. With access granted to all available information (with
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Figure 3.9: MICIE system in use on a CI (Capodieci et al., 2010)
restrictions ensured by defined confidentiality aspects), each PT is able to evaluate
the future state of the system and provide such information to its peers CIs, to the
CI Operators and to the Stakeholders.
One problem that arouse is the fact that, typically, the participant CIs are heteroge-
neous. The existence of multiple types of monitoring systems collecting a wide range
of heterogeneous information implies the application of an interoperation strategy,
that allows the system to work properly thus allowing the on-line PTs to perform
risk prediction.
The implementation of the interoperation strategy was the introduction of a com-
mon semantic for the shared information. A common semantic is fundamental in
order to guarantee a successful interoperation among different CIs. It allows the
information to be automatically processed by a distributed system formed by inde-
pendent autonomous systems that are able to communicate with each other without
ambiguity.
Heterogeneous raw data collected by the different monitoring systems is described
using the same ontology that represents the MICIE information format (using a
standard format described by using ontology language (OWL) (Castrucci et al.,
2010b). The component responsible for making the information adaptation was
implemented, named the Adaptor. Basically, the adaptation is achieved by a trans-
lation from the CI particular raw data format, to the specified data/metadata on-
tological format.
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In order to enforce privacy constraints on data stored in the database, the disclo-
sure level for data exchange is defined depending on the information contained in
that data. The information stored in the SMGW is organised and partitioned into
subsets. Each subset manually associated to a specific disclosure level, defined on
the basis of rules and policies decided by the CI Operator, that determines which
SMGW can have access to specific data (Caldeira et al., 2010a; Castrucci et al.,
2012).
Information sharing framework
The Prediction Tool component requires actual information gathered from the CI.
The gathering process if achieved with the discovery process that performs all func-
tionalities related to the discovery and composition of information. The discovery
process works together with the composition process in order to combine information
arriving from interdependent CIs. The composition allow to enhance the monitoring
capabilities of the existent PT deployed in each local CI. During the process, the
available local information is combined with remote information provided by inter-
dependent CIs using the defined ontology. It is also possible to perform semantic
inference on the newly created ontology. Local ontologies in the SMGWs follow a
composition process in order to discover new relationships among entities linked in
the ontology.
The SMGW is able to provide the PT with all the information for which the PT
subscribed. To achieve this goal the SMGW needs to be able to discover it within
the MICIE system. This process includes searching in the internal resources (local
storage system and databases) and also in remote resources (interdependent CI).
The SMGW must request permission from the system manager in order to search
internally to see if the information is available. In order to search for information
across the MICIE system, the local SMGW cooperates with external SMGWs al-
lowing it to discover needed information. Once discovered, a pointer linking to the
information is sent to the requester. The prediction capabilities of a single PT are
enhanced by the use of combined information that had been discovered across mul-
tiple CIs. The discovery process can occur on-demand when requests are launched
from a PT to collect information both from local and remote CIs, for local process-
ing. The process can also occur in trigger mode, during which, the occurrence of
specific events and changes on status variables within one CI are automatically prop-
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agated to both local and remote PTs across the SMGW protected communication
infrastructure (Caldeira et al., 2010a; Castrucci et al., 2012).
Auditing engine
The Auditing Engine performs log management to collect information in order to
support forensic analysis regarding the SMGW. A set of operational modes are
defined in the SMGW Manager in order to achieve this operation. Actions triggered
by specific management policies initiate these operational modes.
When a specific security event is detected, a management policy, able to deal with
that particular event, is triggered leading to the execution by the SMGW Manager
of relevant policy related to that particular event. The triggered policy can adjust
a dedicated auditing engine to work on a specific mode, which is more appropriate
to the type of the detected event.
The SMGW Manager has a specific interface that is used to control the auditing
engine and to retrieve information stored in the auditing log.
The auditing engine has the following four distinct operational modes that allow
forensic analysis activities. (1) The Normal usage mode is the default mode and
is applied during the regular system usage, providing basic log collection function-
alities such as monitoring of processor, memory and network events logging. (2)
The Authentication Process triggered when an authentication process takes place
(e.g. inter-CI communication or CI Operator interventions). It supports forensic
analysis in case of attacks focused on the authentication processes (e.g. imperson-
alization techniques, authentication exploitation attempts, etc.). (3) The Tamper-
ing/Injection Attempts mode executes in case of detection of any kind of evidence
of tampering or injection attacks existent in the communication network. The Net-
work services subversion executes upon the detection of anomalies in the network
traffic, or when the system resources usage levels reach a predefined value. In this
case, forensic analysis regarding network services exploitation is triggered (Castrucci
et al., 2010b, 2012).
Communication engine
Information security is one important aspect considered in MICIE. Being a dis-
tributed system, the communication security support is one of the main security
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aspects that need proper attention. The Communication engine should enforce se-
curity policies in order to control all the communications from and to the MICIE
system.
The information shared among MICIE participants comprises specific data related
to each of them (for example status, quality of service, etc.). It is fundamental to
consider this data as being extremely sensitive in terms of security, as it’s eventual
disclosure could affect the operative status of one or multiple CIs. In the case of
problems in the communication link between two or more SMGWs, for instance, if
the conveyed information is disclosed or modified, the status of one or various CIs
could become unreachable or even modified in order to cause damage to the peers.
In such a scenario, the alerting system becomes unusable and transforms itself to a
new point of failure in the CI security protection system.
The communication security problem is also critical, as MICIE foresees, the commu-
nications might also be based on an untrusted network such as the Internet. In such
an environment, the MICIE consortium proposed a security framework for the com-
munication system. In this context, a data exchange policy was defined. This policy
allows defining rules, considering the type of data flow and data exchange modality
used in the MICIE framework. Two methodologies for data flow were defined. The
first method allows all MICIE information to be shared among all existent SMGW.
This method allows for redundancy while raising serious problems concerning data
and communication management, as all participants will receive the same informa-
tion. The second method only shares relevant information for each neighbour or
dependent CI, avoiding transmitting unnecessary information and simplifying the
management.
The data exchange is achieved either by broadcasting or by sending information
on demand. Due to safety or commercial reasons and the existence of different
data non-disclosure policies, the second solution is the better approach. The main
security features of data exchange was defined to ensure data availability, integrity
and confidentiality, and also non-repudiation and accountability.
To ensure the defined security specifications, a security risk assessment has been
made including the dedicated interfaces of two linked SMGWs and the untrusted
network link. The risk assessment consisted of listing the threats that can occur in
the system and in proposing the security objectives to reach a secure communication
(Castrucci et al., 2010b), (Castrucci et al., 2012).
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3.6 SMGW Management
In the MICIE project, the SMGW is one of the key element present in the MICIE
overall system architecture, as it is the network element that allows the exchange of
information among different and heterogeneous CIs.
Information exchanged among different SMGWs is extremely sensitive, as it is re-
lated to the Critical Infrastructures, their status, and their services. It is clear that
non-authorised third parties should not be able to acquire the information exchanged
among CIs and, at the same time, it should not be possible for non-authorized third
parties to send information to the SMGWs.
Considering the important role that SMGWs play in the system, the problem of how
to manage the system has been addressed. Management strategies were developed
that address security aspects while permitting an easy definition of security rules by
the system administrators.
Currently, several efforts are made to mitigate the increasing complexity in network
management, by using different management paradigms and approaches. The Policy
Based Management approach aims to be the result of the change from the actual
configuration mechanisms, to an integrated management system. In this context,
the development of a Policy Based Management Architecture was proposed, allowing
an easy and flexible manner to manage all security and operation aspects related to
the SMGW (Caldeira et al., 2010a,c,d; Castrucci et al., 2010a,b, 2012; Ciancamerla
et al., 2009; Inzerilli et al., 2009; Lev et al., 2009, 2011, 2010b; Neri, 2010; Panzieri
et al., 2010)
SMGW management is able to handle all SMGW administration, including testing
and alarming. Also included are the functions of intrusion prevention and intrusion
detection. These functions involve the online monitoring of the SMGW operation
as well, as the online configuration of the security policies applicable to the com-
munication engine. The SMGW management process supports the use of policies
implemented in the form of a Policy Based Management Tool. This tool handles
authorisation, authentication and accounting functions. Specific policies are able to
define all aspects of the existent relations among SMGWs, including the definition
of how each particular CI can connect, access control to alert information and the
enforcement of intrusion detection policies.
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Another important element of the MICIE system architecture is the Adaptor, which
is used to interface the MICIE system with the CI monitoring systems located in
the field. Management strategies were also developed in order to allow an easy
management of the Adaptors hence allowing the Operator to configure them. For
instance, configuring settings in the communication protocol, data filtering rules and
output data format.
3.6.1 SMGW Policy Based Management
The proposed approach offers the CI Operator a management tool where it is possible
to define, in a high level manner, the intended behaviour of the system. Traditional
approaches are mainly oriented to the management of individual components, not
completely considering the system structure as a whole. In this proposal the concepts
of Policy Decision Point - the SMGW Manager - and Policy Enforcement Point -
the entities that must enforce policies, are applied. For instance the Communication
Engine and the Subscription Filter. Figure 3.10 represents the SMGW Manager
within the SMGW architecture. In this Figure the proposed PDP and the existing
PEP are represented. In particular, the one intended to enforce policies related to
data subscription and the other enforcing policies related to the remote connections
in the Communication Engine. It is also possible to deploy PEP acting outside the
SMGW, able to manage, for instance, communication aspects that are not visible
within the SMGW. The SMGW Manager includes the PDP, all defined policies, the
Managed Objects and also a Trust and Reputation System (described in Chapter 4).
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Figure 3.10: MICIE SMGW detailed architecture (Caldeira et al., 2010b).
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The CI Operator is able to define policies that will address the relations among the
local, and foreign SMGWs. Policies include forms of defining how each particular CI
must connect and also include data access policies. The SMGW Manager Graphical
User Interface (GUI) allows to browse existent information and also define actions
that the remote SMGWs can perform (e.g. write or read risk information). All data
access controls are implemented with a high level of granularity thus maintaining
simplicity.
The use of Policies will supports writing, verification and deployment of security
policies related to the information gathered by the MICIE system. For example,
these policies allow to (Caldeira et al., 2010c):
• define how and to whom each particular piece of information can be sent;
• define trust relations between different CIs through the use of the Trust and
Reputation System (detailed in Chapter 4);
• enforce different communications protocols/technologies in each particular con-
text;
• enforce Service Level Agreement or Service Level Specification between CIs
acceptable at the Communication Engine;
• decide how received events will be managed by the SMGW.
The CI Operator defines policies by means of the defined policy specification lan-
guage by using the provided GUI. This GUI displays the representation of all
managed entities allowing the CI Operator to easily define relations among them
(policies).
The defined policies are represented using a policy specification language and stored
in a policy repository. The SMGW Manager interacts with other entities on the
SMGW through a dedicated API implemented on a Web Service. The SMGW
Manager is based on the PONDER2 Toolkit (Ponder, 2010; Twidle et al., 2009)
on which each SMGW entity is represented through the PONDER2 concept of
Managed Object. The complete set of SMGW entities will form a PONDER2 Self
Managed Cell. The policy makes use of PONDER2 Authorisation Policies and
Event-Condition-Action concepts.
Apart from the existing PONDER2 communication modes, a dedicated API was
developed in order to manage all communication aspects between the SMGW com-
ponents and the SMGW Manager. This API provides the possibility to, for example:
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• Change state (attributes) of the Managed Objects (e.g. change the connection
type allowed for a remote SMGW): Handled as an Event-Condition-Action in
PONDER2 context;
• Authorisation requests: Handled as authorisation Policies in PONDER2 con-
text (e.g. enforce new authorisation policies on the PEPs).
The SMGW SMC comprises the representation of all system’s Managed Objects.
In a simplified approach it is possible to identify two main types of Managed Ob-
jects: Connections to the SMGW are represented by Remote SMGW Managed
Objects (RsmgwMOs) and the Alerts information is represented by the defined
Alert Parameters Managed Objects (AlertParMOs).
RsmgwMOs represent and maintain information related to the remote SMGWs that
are participating in the MICIE system. Each Remote SMGW (RSMGW) includes all
the necessary attributes that allow to describe itself along with its actual connection
attributes. For instance, it is possible to have among the RSMGW attributes: the
RSMGW name, the SLA parameters defined to allow connections, the IP addresses
used to connect, the trust level, encryption type, etc.
The AlertParMOs maintains information regarding all Alert parameters that then
SMGW is able to exchange with peers RSMGWs. Among the AlertParMO at-
tributes are, for example, the attribute name and value as well all information
needed to interpret that parameters.
The Managed Objects are created and instantiated by directly using the PonderTalk
language (Ponder, 2010) or through the Java API developed on top of PONDER2.
An example of an object creation using PonderTalk is presented in Figure 3.11. In
this example, a new RsmgwMO named smgw1 is created under the rsmgw object,
with the attributes trust and secure respectively assigned with the values 4 and 1.
Upon creation, the newly created object is inserted in the object domain rsmgw.
//Instantiate a RsmgwMO (remote SMGW Managed Object) object with trust 4
smgw1 := factory createname: "smgw1"  trust: 4  secure: 1  path: "/rsmgw/smgw1" 
// Insert the created object in the domain :/rsmgw
root/rsmgw at: "smgw1" put: smgw1
Figure 3.11: RsmgwMO manipulation example.
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In order to allow access control, multiple policies might be applied to objects or
object domains. For example, it is possible to define a policy allowing the remote
SMGW X to read Alert parameter Y. Also, a connection request event can en-
force changes on the firewall configuration regarding the access of one particular
RSMGW. Figure 3.12 presents a simplified approach to the existent MICIE SMGW
Self Managed Cell.
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Figure 3.12: SMGW Manager SMC simplified approach.
The SMGW Manager Server Application (PDP) accepts connections from one or
more policy enforcement points and speaks to Ponder2 directly. The server appli-
cation has the following main functionalities:
• Enables the Operator to have an overview of all the objects in the domain;
• Store changes made from the SMGW Manager GUI: save/retrieve Managed
Objects and their attributes; save/retrieve authorisation policies with condi-
tions; save/retrieve event policies conditions;
• Authenticate CIs that request a Managed Object through the web service;
• Provide attributes from Managed Objects requested from the web service by
authorised CIs;
• Define new attributes when the current number of attributes is no longer
sufficient;
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• Creating policies that can use attributes from both source and target objects.
The Managed Objects are stored as XML files. Every time an object changes (e.g. it
is created, deleted, updated) the appropriate XML file is updated. When the server
initiates, it looks for these XML files, analyses them and creates the objects in both
Java and PONDER2. This type of persistence has others advantages, for instance,
the XML files can easily be copied to another location as a matter of backup. In case
of a hardware crash (or any other failure) the server can be booted from another
system with the backup XML files. Another advantage of the use of XML files,
to save the objects is that the communication among the PEPs and the PDP, is
performed using the exact same XML structure. The architecture for the described
framework is represented in Figure 3.13.
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Figure 3.13: SMGW Manager simplified architecture.
An example of how a Managed Object is represented in XML is visible in Figure
3.14. It is a simple and common XML representation containing the path (location)
of the object inside the domain and, in this example, the following attribute-value
pairs: level = 10, trust = 5 and value = 2.
The communication among the PDP and the PEPs is carried through XML mes-
sages. In all cases, the root-node of these XML messages is < transaction > and
each transaction might possess one or more sub nodes. These sub nodes are then
considered as actions. With this approach, by exchanging just one XML message it
is possible for the server to execute more than one action. Figure 3.15 presents an
example of a transaction representation in XML. In this example, the first action re-
quests to perform the action editObject for the object in path = /domain1/object1.
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1 <ob j e c t>
2 <path>/domain1/ ob j e c t1</path>
3 <a t t r i b u t e s>
4 <a t t r i b u t e>
5 <name> l e v e l</name>
6 <value>10</ value>
7 </ a t t r i b u t e>
8 <a t t r i b u t e>
9 <name>t r u s t</name>
10 <value>5</ value>
11 </ a t t r i b u t e>
12 <a t t r i b u t e>
13 <name>value</name>
14 <value>2</ value>
15 </ a t t r i b u t e>
16 </ a t t r i b u t e s>
17 </ ob j e c t>
Figure 3.14: Example of a Managed Object represented in XML
In this case new attribute-value information is inserted in this object. The second
action included in this example, is getAll that instructs the PDP to send, all existing
objects available to that PEP, to the requester in order to enable it to refresh it’s
domain view.
The use of XML messages gives further advantages to communication. Firstly, it
is easily read by humans, so if someone desires to create a different and more user
friendly GUI, to manage the system, all one has to do is to respect the defined XLM
structure. A second advantage, is that the data, or only the entire string can be
easily secured by using encryption mechanisms. Table 3.1 presents a list with all
supported actions.
The SMGW Manager architecture has been proposed by the author of this thesis
and has been integrated in the existent MICIE SMGW as explained by Castrucci
et al. while describing the design and implementation approach used for the SMGW
development (Castrucci et al., 2010b, 2012).
The author of this thesis has developed the SMGW Manager comprising of three
main modules, namely, the Server GUI, the Manager GUI and the Migration Tool.
The Policy Server is an application with a simple GUI on which the status of the
system and possible errors are displayed. It is the system’s main component as it
is responsible for making the bridge among the XML files, the Java API and the
PONDER2, toolkit, where policies are evaluated. Implemented using Java language,
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1 <t r a n s a c t i o n>
2 <ac t i on type=” ed i tObjec t ”>
3 <ob j e c t>
4 <path>/domain1/ ob j e c t1</path>
5 <a t t r i b u t e s>
6 <a t t r i b u t e>
7 <name>r i s k</name>
8 <value>2</ value>
9 </ a t t r i b u t e>
10 <a t t r i b u t e>
11 <name> l e v e l</name>
12 <value>10</ value>
13 </ a t t r i b u t e>
14 <a t t r i b u t e>
15 <name>value</name>
16 <value>2</ value>
17 </ a t t r i b u t e>
18 </ a t t r i b u t e s>
19 </ ob j e c t>
20 </ ac t i on>
21 <ac t i on type=” ge tA l l ”></ ac t i on>
22 </ t r a n s a c t i o n>
Figure 3.15: Example of a transaction represented in XML
Table 3.1: Actions supported on the PDP
Action Type Actions
Policy Manipulation
createPolicy
getPolicies
deleteAuthPolicy
changePolicy
activateDeactivePolicy
Object Manipulation
createObject
getObjects
editObject
deleteObject
Domain Manipulation createDomain
Event Policy Manipulation
createEventPolicy
changeEventPolicy
deleteEventPolicy
getEventPolicies
Other
getAll
getAttribute
it incorporates the main web service that allows communication from the Operator
GUI and also from clients (PEPs).
The SMGW Manager GUI allows the CI Operator to define the behaviour it planned
for the system. It allows creating, modifying and deleting the Domains, the Managed
Objects and Policies. It has drag and drop functionalities, allowing a simple use of
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the existent attributes. It is also possible, in this tool, to have an overview of
all Managed Objects. An important aspect that was implemented refers to policy
testing. The Operator is able to specify and simulate particular requests made by a
PEP and verify the results, according to the defined policies. With this functionality,
the Operator is able to verify with detail if the defined policies are able to enforce
the defined security requirements. Figure 3.16 displays an overview on the existent
SMGW Manager GUI.
Figure 3.16: MICIE SMGW Manager GUI.
The developed Migration Tool allows the migration of the existent data in the
SMGW Database to the Policy Server (for example, remote CI names, risk data
names). Basically, it is possible to migrate and map to the SMGW Manager, all the
existent database tables with their respective attributes. An overview of the Mi-
gration tools application is displayed in Figure 3.17. This application was of great
importance during the testing phase of the system. A test client was also developed
in order to simulate the requests arriving from the PEPs.
Regarding the sensitive nature of the exchanged information, the MICIE project
has dedicated special attention to the security requirements, such as confidential-
ity, integrity, availability, non repudiation and auditability/traceability. In order
to contribute to the security requirements, the author of this thesis proposed the
evaluation and usage of Trust and Reputation indicators in the SMGW Manager,
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Figure 3.17: MICIE SMGW Manager Migration Tool.
allowing also these indicators to become available to the Prediction Tool. The main
goal of these indicators is to contribute on the accuracy improvement of the exis-
tent information, to help the SMGW Manager to protect each CI from receiving
and using inconsistent information and to gather Trust and Reputation information
regarding the behaviour of each involved CI.
The TRS evaluates information exchanged among CIs in order to infer a trust level
for each transaction. This service incorporates a level of trust in the data received
from each partner, allowing those trust levels to be incorporated in risk assessments,
as a mean of improving its accuracy and its resilience to inconsistent information.
It is possible, for instance, to give more weight to highly trusted data or to ignore
data provided by low-trust partners. The proposed framework employed will be
described in Chapter 4.
3.7 Validation Activities
MICIE project carried out a work package dedicated to the validation activities
foreseen for the project – WP6000 - Validation. In this context, several validation
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activities were accomplished with the contribution of the Israel Electric Corporation
(Lev et al., 2010a).
Most of the validation activities took place in the IEC labs in Haifa, Israel, and
considered the IEC premises based on: the Simulation Test Bench (STB) that ag-
gregates real CIs equipment, simulated equipment, historical real data and working
procedures (Lev et al., 2011, 2010a,b).
The demo system (represented in Figure 3.18) aimed to validate the MICIE tool by
running the validation scenarios. It includes a STB which simulates a “real life”
operational CI with a few, partially built and partially simulated pseudo CIs (Lev
et al., 2011). All the MICIE components, in particular the SMGW (including the
SMGW Manager), the Prediction Tool and the multiple Adaptors), were tested in
the scope of the corresponding development groups, before integrating into the demo
system (Lev et al., 2010b).
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Figure 3.18: MICIE Demo System Configuration (Lev et al., 2011).
Figure 3.18 represents the demo system implemented in a IEC test lab in Haifa,
Israel. It simulates the usage of the MICIE system within a Communication CI,
Medium Voltage CI and an ICT CI and includes all of MICIE’s main components.
Some real field equipment was also included in the validation scenario (Lev et al.,
2010b).
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The MICIE validation and demonstration plan has been achieved following three
phases (Lev et al., 2011). First of all the involved CIs were operated according
to the real working procedures without introducing any external events. This step
allowed to gather the information produced during normal operation. In the second
phase, external events were induced within the scenarios and again the information
from this operation was gathered. The third phase was carried out with the MICIE
system already installed in order to validate and demonstrate the possibilities of the
MICIE project for supporting the decision making process of the CI Operator while
acting within situations of uncertainty (Lev et al., 2011). The SMGW Manager,
incorporating the Policy Based Management approach, contributed by the author
of this thesis, was validated within the SMGW validation activities. The results
from these activities revealed that the system was properly managed within the
project expectations.
Based on the test and validation activities performed at the IEC labs it is possible
to state, that the MICIE system is a powerful tool. It is able to assist the CI
Operator in reducing the risk of failure in a network suffering from events induced
by interconnected CIs. It was also inferred from the tests that the MICIE system
is able to help reduce the outage time in the electric distribution network (in case
of fault events) by about 2%. The MICIE system also provides the Operators with
a wider perspective on the status of the overall system. It takes advantage of a
prediction of the availability of most relevant services in short, medium and long
term. This last fact is important as the CI Operator rapidly becomes aware of the
status of the services allowing more efficient response (Lev et al., 2011).
According to the MICIE validation and demonstration results the MICIE system
can be usefull, among other applications, to: protect energy and communication
CIs; decrease uncertainty while operating the CI; reduce time of service restoration;
support on-line decision making to predict cascade failure; SLA improvement based
on analysis of highly risk potential outages of the CI (Lev et al., 2011).
3.8 Summary
The MICIE system acts on a distributed environment composed of multiple het-
erogeneous CIs, that might depend on one or more services provided externally by
others CIs. Considering that the CIs are willing to cooperate, in order to improve
the provided quality-of-service, the MICIE system introduces mechanisms allowing
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CIs to be able to predict and exchange risk information across trusted or untrusted
network infrastructures (e.g. Internet).
MICIE project was discussed in depth due to the fact that most of the research
challenges that led to this thesis were first discussed and applied within this project.
This chapter allows the reader to see an overview of the project with particular
emphasis on the components in which the author of this thesis has been actively
involved. In particular it is possible to highlight the author’s involvement in the work
related to the MICIE work package 4000 (WP4000) - Mediation System Design.
The MICIE project’s main goals were discussed, as well as the proposals that were
presented to achieve them. The modelling activities that took place within the
project were discussed including the author’s contribution to them – ICT-MC. The
risk prediction work package was also addressed in the chapter. The architecture of
the system was described along with their main components.
The author’s proposal for the SMGW management was also addressed and discussed
in this chapter. The validation activities that took place in the IEC facilities in Israel
were presented, in order to demonstrate the project’s success while dealing with such
a complex problem. In this chapter the use of Trust and Reputation indicators was
also addressed, in order to improve the SMGW management and also the results from
the Prediction Tool. A detailed description of such a framework will be presented
in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
A Framework for Trust and
Reputation Management in
Critical Infrastructures
As discussed in previous chapters, there are several models that provide different
approaches in order to understand the (inter)dependencies occurring among hetero-
geneous CIs. The MICIE project highlighted the relevance of a system, able to use
these models, to provide specific instruments to CI owners, in order to reduce the
risk of service unprovisioning. For instance, in the MICIE project, risks evaluated in
each member CI, are possible and intended to be shared among other CIs in order
for them to better evaluate their own risk while considering the existent risks in
each (inter)dependent service. The design and implementation of such a system - a
real-time risk level dissemination and alerting system – has been successfully tested
within the MICIE project.
Current research in CI Protection is mostly focused on understanding and modelling
(inter)dependencies among CIs and the use of these models in allowing the develop-
ment of risk prediction tools. In order to properly evaluate CI risks, these prediction
tools receive inputs from several sources, such as, monitoring and control equipment,
Operator information and risk information provided by (inter)dependent CIs. Con-
sidering the MICIE project as an example, a secure communication system, allowing
the secure exchange of risk information, has been deployed allowing the participant
CIs to share relevant information that can feed their own risk prediction tools.
Although the existing risk evaluation methodologies or prediction tools are able to
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safely merge risk information arriving from multiple sources (sources available in the
local CI or external sources). The lack of mechanisms allowing to observe and reason
about the confidence one can have in the information collected from these sources
was identified. Also, it is important to understand the behaviour of the information
sources in order for it to become possible to infer trust information regarding that
behaviour.
In short, it is intended to answer, at least, one main question that remains open -
“How can information used for risk calculation be evaluated for correctness?” This
chapter describes the proposed Trust and Reputation framework aiming to allow
the incorporation of Trust and Reputation indicators on the information exchanged
among Critical Infrastructures and also on information coming from monitoring
equipment. The application scenario within the MICIE project (Bertoni et al.,
2010a) and the approach used for the Trust and Reputation framework are described
before presenting validation work.
Although the Trust and Reputation framework was initially focused on the MICIE
project, the proposed framework can be considered a general framework and thus
can be applicable within different models and scenarios (discussed in Chapter 5).
Contributing to the improvement of risk estimate and sharing mechanisms within a
Critical Infrastructure.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 describes the proposed general Trust
and Reputation Model while Section 4.2 describes the methodology employed for
its application. Section 4.3 presents some examples of the resulting work. The tools
developed to proof the concept are described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 summarises
the issues addressed throughout the chapter.
4.1 Trust and Reputation Model
Usually, a scenario on which multiple CIs are willing to exchange risk information,
in order to improve their risk prediction accuracy, is considered as being a closed
and protected system. That is, all the participants assume that the information
is securely shared among them and, it is assumed that all participants trust each
other, assuming that they are integrating the system with good will. In fact, this
should be the correct assumption for such a scenario. However, and not denying the
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fact that all participant CIs should have honest intentions, this assumption might
not be exactly accurate as several problems can occur.
Although a system able to exchange CI risks must enforce multiple security mecha-
nisms that allow for information security, typically those mechanisms are focused on
the communication and not on the exchanged data itself. It is always possible for a
participant CI to provide inaccurate information thus affecting the dependent CIs.
This can happen either, maliciously (e.g. if the system is somehow compromised)
or due to the existence of faulty components in the CI monitoring frameworks.
In such a context, it is important to introduce mechanisms able to allow reasoning
on the exchanged information quality and also about the context on which the
information is being exchanged.
From the above, the need for a Trust and Reputation System, employed in each CI,
able to maintain real-time trust information concerning (inter)dependent CIs and
CI services, was identified. This system is able to monitor information exchanged
among CIs or among CI services and also to monitor their behaviour in order to
gather a trust level for each CI service and to infer CI reputation (Bertoni et al.,
2010a; Caldeira et al., 2010b,c,d; Castrucci et al., 2012).
The proposed framework aims to evaluate the information received from a depen-
dency based on the previous observations made on that dependency and also to
understand the behaviour of the participant CIs within the partnership. Depending
on the outcome of such an evaluation, a CI Operator can decide to what extent the
information received from the dependency will be incorporated in the CI risk eval-
uation. The proposed evaluation can be achieved by building a trust relationship
between CIs or CI services through a TRS and by the use of gathered trust level
indicators to evaluate the correctness of the received CI information. A shortcoming
of applying Trust and Reputation Systems to the domain of CIs is related to the
variety of CIs that may exist. Each infrastructure can have different information
being compared and evaluated. Building a Trust and Reputation System taking
into account several dependencies within different contexts, can be a fairly complex
task to which the proposed framework makes a significant contribution, as it allows
a methodical and simple approach to the process.
It is important to clarify that, in this context, dependency or interdependency, does
not only refer to relations among different CIs but may also refer to relations among
services existent within one CI. From the TRS point of view, such a distinction is
not relevant for its usage. Due the fact that the presented framework was primarily
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intended to be applied in scenarios on which CIs share risk information related to the
interdependencies existing among them, this chapter will describe the TRS within
such a scenario.
There are two main areas where the proposed Trust and Reputation Model is able
to be applied (see Figure 4.1). First, to a trust indicator concerning the informa-
tion received from (inter)dependent CIs (risk alerts). It is possible to evaluate this
indicator from two distinctive perspectives: for each available service, evaluating
each service provided by a remote CI, thus reflecting the trust on the risk alerts
received from each dependent service (Risk Alerts Trust); for each CI, evaluating an
indicator for each interconnected CI, representing the reputation of that particular
CI. Second, the Trust and Reputation System is also capable of understanding the
(inter)dependent CIs’ behaviour, for instance, in terms of ICT security (Behaviour
Trust). In this case, the evaluation is made on multiple entities, each one represent-
ing one particular aspect of the CI or CI service. The aggregation of the behaviour
evaluation, from multiple entities belonging to the same CI or CI service, represent
the Reputation of that CI or CI service.
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Figure 4.1: Trust and reputation model
In a situation where CIs are sharing sensitive information - risk information, it is as-
sumed that a monitoring system is employed. For instance, the interactions among
participant CIs should be observed and must obey the defined security policies.
Also, the CI Operator must know the normal behaviour of the managed system, not
only regarding the security aspects, but also aspects related to the proper operation
of the system. Aspects, such as, acceptable value ranges, time intervals on which
information must be gathered, unexpected comportments of sensor, are some ex-
amples of information the CI Operator should know. All this types of information
must be collected in order to gather intelligence about the partnership. Thus if
90
A FRAMEWORK FOR TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT IN CIS
one CI behaves incorrectly according to the defined security policies and expected
behaviour, for example, trying to repeatedly retrieve private information, this can
be seen as an ICT incident. This type of information is included in the evaluation
of the Behaviour Trust indicator. Figure 4.1 represents the main indicators able to
be gathered within the proposed model.
The proposed model exemplified in Figure 4.1, evaluates information exchanged
among CIs, in order to infer and associate a trust level for each transaction (risk
information received from a peer CI or CI service). This allows to incorporate
trust indicators in CI risk assessments as a means of improving its accuracy and its
resilience to inconsistent information. It will be possible, for instance, to give more
weight to highly trusted risk alerts or to ignore risk alerts provided by low-trust CIs
or services (Caldeira et al., 2010b).
Within the proposed approach, it is possible to evaluate Trust and Reputation in-
dicators gathering and evaluating information received from multiple and heteroge-
neous sources. The fact that the information sources are heterogeneous is particu-
larly relevant while evaluating a CI or a service behaviour. On the described Trust
and Reputation Model, it is possible to identify three main information sources: The
past data provided by the (inter)dependent CI services, the information gathered
regarding the behaviour of a CI or CI service and also the CI Operator trust on each
CI or CI service (Caldeira et al., 2010b,c,d).
The historical data provided by the (inter)dependent CI services is one of the major
information sources used in the model. This data is analysed in order to compare,
for each service, the service risk alerts received over time, against the actual QoS
level of each service. To achieve this analysis, it is mandatory to have available,
at each moment, the QoS level measurement for each service based on which it is
planned to evaluate trust.
In the cases on which the received risk alerts and the QoS level are represented
using different value ranges, they must be normalised in order to allow to compare
them. For instance, if the received risk alerts are defined within the discrete interval
[1..5] and the QoS is measured as a percentage of the service availability, then
it is easily converted to the same range as the risk alerts. For different types of
QoS measurements one must find a function or normalisation table that allows to
normalise the information.
The results from the analysis of the historical data against the service QoS is then
used to infer the degree of trust of actual and future received risk alerts. For example,
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if a CI service keeps informing the highest risk alert level and the measurements of
the service QoS never indicated a service failure, it is natural to infer that this
particular risk alert has low credibility. This source of information is represented
in Figure 4.1 on the Trust – Received Alerts block. A representation of a possible
integration of the Trust Model, within a CI risk sharing system, is presented in
Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Trust model application example.
The analysis of (inter)dependent CI or CI service behaviour is supported by the
knowledge gathered from the security entities existent in the CI and on the knowl-
edge gathered by analysing the existing deviations from normal behaviour that may
exist, for instance, among CIs, services or CI components. As an example, it is
possible to analyse the CI behaviour in terms of ICT security. For instance, if the
(inter)dependent CI behaves abnormally (for example, it is not sending information
within the expected time frame) the level of trust associated with that CI should be
downgraded, as this fact could indicate that the CI control centre is faulty or does
not have good intentions. Figure 4.1 illustrates this source of information on the
Trust – Behaviour block.
A human factor is also included in the model. Although one can rightly argue, that
the information provided by humans can be subjective, the human factor intends to
reflect the perception of the CI Operator of each (inter)dependent CI / service on
the evaluated trust indicators. Among other aspects, it is relevant to integrate this
factor in the assessment as the CI Operator or Operators have significant expertise
on some highly specialised area.
Furthermore, it is possible for the CI Operator to have access to information re-
garding each (inter)dependent CI / service and may desire to incorporate it in the
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Trust and Reputation assessments. For instance, it is possible to conceive the re-
alistic situation of which the CI Operator is aware (he could had been personally
informed) that some CI has operated with faulty equipment during a determined
period of time. In this situation, it is likely that, during that period of time, the
calculated trust indicator decreases. In this case, the CI Operator must be able to
act by incorporating his own information. For instance, by raising the CI Operator’s
confidence parameter in one particular CI and consequently preventing a decrease
of the global trust value.
The human factor or the Operator opinion (as represented in Figure 4.1 is applied
in all the evaluated indicators. That is, the CI Operator can include his opinion on
different levels, for instance, reflecting his trust on one particular service received
by a peer CI or reflecting his trust in a peer CI.
In the following section, the methodology used for implementing the proposed model,
is described in detail.
4.2 Trust and Reputation System
The following presented Trust and Reputation System, implements the described
trust model. It is presented also focusing on its application within the MICIE
system.
Figure 4.3 represents the TRS architecture which is composed of four main compo-
nents: Two Agents (the Risk Alerts Trust Agent and the Behaviour Trust Agent)
aiming to gather all the necessary information; the TRS Discovery Tool that com-
putes the information received from the Agents and the Queries Service/Operator
GUI that allows the TRS to interact with the CI Operator and also to publish the
obtained results.
The information required to evaluate the proposed indicators is gathered from the
system using two types of Agents.
The first type, the Risk Alerts Trust Agents, are continuously observing the QoS
of each service and are kept informed of all risk alerts received from peer CIs or CI
services. According to this real-time information, these Agents are able to detect
and evaluate an accuracy value for each risk alert event. The concept of event will
be detailed later in this section. In a simplified perspective, a risk alert event is a
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Figure 4.3: Trust and Reputation System (Caldeira et al., 2010b)
situation in which the received risk is different from normal or the monitored service
QoS decreased or both.
The second type, the Behaviour Trust Agents, are intended to receive and normalise
all the behaviour events. A behaviour event can be any kind of abnormal situation
as observed by the Security Entities. Each of the agents send the discovered events
to the TRS Discovery Tool, aiming to compute in real-time all the Trust and Rep-
utation indicators. The computed indicators are provided to external entities, for
example, in the MICIE system, both CI SMGW Manager and the CI Prediction
Tool are able to make use of these indicators. A graphical interface provides the
CI Operator with an overall view of Trust and Reputation indicators while allowing
the CI Operator to also update his opinion.
4.2.1 TRS Agents
As stated, the Trust and Reputation System (TRS) architecture employs two agents
for gathering the required information for trust evaluation on both risk alerts and
CI/service behaviour. In the following, each of the agents are described.
Risk Alerts Trust Agents
Within a scenario of interconnected CIs willing to cooperate by exchanging proper
risk information, each CI is able to subscribe risk alert information regarding de-
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pendent services and use it, in particular, to compute its own risk level.
In order to be able to evaluate trust aspects related to the received risk alerts, the
first goal is to define an accuracy value for each received risk alert. This is the goal
of the Risk Alerts Trust Agent. Figure 4.4 represents an overview of the process
handled by this agent. As it is noted, each observed service has its own Risk Alerts
Trust Agent. This happens, as the information gathered from the services is usually
heterogeneous, thus each one needs a proper information normalisation process.
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Figure 4.4: Risk Alerts Trust Agents example.
The Risk Alerts Trust Agent receives from the CI Monitoring System, the QoS
measurement from the service which the agent is observing. It also receives, from
the responsible component (e.g. in the MICIE system the SMGW is responsible to
receive the risk information and to provide it internally), the risk alert information
as received from the dependent service. It then allows to compare the risk alert in-
formation received for the dependent services with the measured QoS of the service.
For this purpose, the concept of Risk Alert Event has been introduced.
Within such a complex systems as CIs, it is possible to have different modes of
receiving risk alerts and also different approaches to the service QoS measurement.
In order to be able to compare both information, a simple normalisation process is
required. For instance, if the received risk alert is within the discrete range [1..5],
the measured QoS indicator should be mapped to the same value range. This can be
achieved directly within the Monitoring Systems or processed by each Risk Alerts
Trust Agent. In both cases, in this example, if the service QoS is represented using
the range [0..100], a mapping table, equal or similar to the one presented in Table
4.1, can be used. In this normalisation it is necessary to have a good definition
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for the obtained values in order to be able to compare and interpret them. In this
case, the received risk alert of 1 means no risk and 5 means high risk. For the
measured service QoS, value 5 means that the service is within the lowest QoS
range admitted for the service. A value of 1 means that the service QoS is within
the optimum values. It should be highlighted that this is just an example and that
these normalisation tables, if existent, need to be defined by a CI expert.
Table 4.1: Example of a service QoS normalisation table.
Measured service QoS Normalised measured QoS
[0-20] 5
]21-40] 4
]41-60] 3
]61-80] 2
]81-100] 1
In Figure 4.5, the Risk Alerts Trust Agent is monitoring, in real-time, the received
risk alerts levels (Rlt) and the current service levels (service QoS (Slt) in order to
detect events. In this example, both indicators, Rlt and Slt, belong to the [0..100]
range. In this case, Rlt = 0 means no risk and a value of Slt = 0 means that the
service QoS reached is minimum level or even that the service is not being provided
anymore.
A Risk Alert Event is detected upon the occurrence of one of the following situations
(Figure 4.5):
• The Quality of Service of a dependent service decreases bellow the defined
threshold (in this case, the event ends when the QoS exceeds the threshold or,
if in the meantime, an alert different from 0 is received, the event ends when
the alert goes back to 0);
• After the reception of a risk alert message indicating a risk alert greater than
0 (this event ends when both indicators return to normal values).
Depending of the underlying system, the alerts may just be received when a change
occurs in the indicator. In this case, the last received alert is considered actual and
active until the next value arrives. In this scenario, a value of risk alert is always
relevant within the Risk Alerts Trust Agent. The same can happen with the mea-
sured service level. If it is updated on a regular basis (a defined time interval), the
last measured value is used for the evaluation. These assumptions can be seen as
dangerous while evaluating trust for the received risk alerts by using out-dated in-
formation. Per se, this is certainly a drawback, as the following evaluated indicators
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Figure 4.5: Event characterisation example
will not reflect the actual situation. This identified consequence is minimised with
the use of the Behaviour Trust indicators as it will become apparent throughout this
section.
For each event A(Eventn), the accuracy is defined as the average of all comparisons
made during the event (value T ), between the observed service level (Slt) and the
received risk level (Rlt), as defined in Equation 4.1. As the function f(Slt, Rlt)
is a discrete function, a sample rate, regarding the time factor, needs to be used.
This sample rate can be different on each service and depends on the information
available on the system. It is natural that a smaller sample rate yields more realistc
observations.
A(Eventn) =
∑T
t=1 (f(Slt, Rlt))
T
, (4.1)
where f(Slt, Rlt) = |Slt−Rlt|κ , κ ∈ R+. The value k was introduced with the intent
to penalise the larger differences or the small differences and should be assigned
considering the degree of importance of each service. For instance, during an event,
if the measured QoS of a service is always above the defined threshold (normal
situation), it will make more sense to penalise more the risk alerts as Rlt = 100%
than the ones that refer a Rlt = 5%. By defining a value k < 1, it means that
the TRS is willing to trust, even in the cases where large differences (|Slt − Rlt|)
are observed. Applying a value k > 1 the biggest differences will suffer a higher
penalisation. In this approach, the duration of an event is not considered as the
agent is only focusing on the accuracy of each received risk alert.
The satisfaction degree for each event is expressed by A(Eventn) which results
in a value within the [0..1] range. It is possible to interpret this value and, for
example, to say that one particular alert was very satisfactory (1.0), satisfactory
(0.6), unsatisfactory (0.2), or very unsatisfactory (0). Each A(Eventn) value is sent
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by the agent to the TRS Discovery Tool in order to be incorporated within the
CI/service Trust and Reputation indicators, as explained in Section 4.2.2.
Behaviour Trust Agents
An aspect that was particularly focused on throughout this thesis is the security
issues that arise from a system with multiple CIs aiming to collaborate. Consid-
ering the MICIE project as an example of such a system, it is possible to denote
the existence of several security entities composing the system. For instance, as
presented throughout Chapter 3, the MICIE SMGW through the SMGW Manager
is aware of possible security faults. Within the MICIE system, the SMGW is able
to provide the collection and analysis of data related to security aspects, that can
be useful in order to infer a trust indicator for each peer/service behaviour.
In this context, the possibility to use, among other, the information gathered from
several security entities, was identified, in order to better understand the behaviour
of the partnership. Also, an important aspect, to infer a more complete indicator
aiming to improve the trust indicator related to the received risk alerts.
The information available in order to evaluate Trust and Reputation indicators
regarding the behaviour of an external CI or dependent service, is firstly evaluated,
within the Behaviour Trust Agents. As represented in Figure 4.6 it is possible to have
one or more Behaviour Trust Agent within the TRS. The Behaviour Trust Agent’s
main goal, is to gather all types of information available, that might characterise the
behaviour of a CI/service. In the TRS approach, all kind of information can be used
to characterise the behaviour. This is achieved by designing a flexible approach for
the existent agents. Indeed, the TRS is, in this case, focused on receiving behaviour
events. Behaviour events are defined as being a type of abnormal event that is
occurring in the system and is able to help characterise a service or a CI. Each
behaviour event sent to the TRS, is composed of its origin and the respective trust
level.
As mentioned, a behaviour event can be almost anything that is able to characterise
the behaviour of a CI or a service, in one or multiple particular aspects. Figure 4.6
highlights some representative entities from which it is possible to gather behaviour
information. One particular entity represented in the Figure 4.6 is the Behaviour
Security Model. This virtual entity, that in fact, is integrated into each Behaviour
Trust Agent, contains a representation of how the normal behaviour of the system
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Figure 4.6: Behaviour Trust Agents example.
should be and also, a set of identified abnormal behaviours. Furthermore, it contains
quantitative information, defined by an expert. This information defines how much
one should trust a CI or a service, in case of the presence of a particular, previously
identified, abnormal behaviour.
As an example of information that might be used to trigger behaviour events, it is
relevant to explain why the service measured QoS and the received risk alerts are
sent to the Behaviour Trust Agents. One should remember that this information
is also gathered and evaluated by the Risk Alerts Trust Agents in order to infer
the accuracy of each risk alert event. In the behaviour analysis, this information is
analysed from a different perspective. In this case, aspects such as the quality or
quantity of data may be analysed.
For example, suppose that it is established that one must receive a new risk alert
message within every five minutes. If a risk alert is received within this time in-
terval there is no abnormal behaviour. However, if no risk alert is received within
the specified interval, the expert can, for instance, state that this fact indicates a
decrease of 10% in the trust of behaviour of that alert. If no alert is received within
one hour, the decrease can be greater.
The same approach can be applied to the service measured QoS from which it is
also possible to apply behaviour observations. For example, a measurement of the
service QoS must remain within the range of possible values previously defined.
Receiving a value that is out off-range is seen an as abnormal event. These are just
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some examples among the multiple abnormal situations that can be defined by the
CI expert, for the behaviour of the received alerts and for the service measured QoS.
Examples of other entities from which data can be collected are represented in
Figure 4.6. Among these entities, the IDS can detect, for instance, an intrusion
originated on a peer CI. This is clearly a behaviour event that must be evaluated
in the trust one has on that peer behaviour. The firewall is also able to detect
behaviour events, for instance, by identifying attempted connections to internal
services. In particular, and from the example of MICIE project, the management
system employed to manage the information sharing among participants, should be
the primary source of information for the Behaviour Trust Agent. Due to the fact
that it is assumed that this entity should aggregate, among others, all the system’s
security information. An example of such an entity is the MICIE SMGW, on which
it is possible to evaluate trust on each CI behaviour, by considering, among other
possibilities, all the interactions among peer CIs in terms of ICT security (internal or
external). For instance, the events can be Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) alerts,
failed connection attempts, attempts to read/write information without permission.
As expected, the available data is gathered from heterogeneous sources, thus, it
is anticipated that this data is received in multiple different formats and repre-
sentations. Normalising and evaluating the received information, according to the
behaviour security model that identifies relevant behaviour patterns, resolves this
problem. The behaviour security model implements a simple but powerful and scal-
able approach. It consists of a set of tables, each one mapping the possible received
values (or value ranges) and the correspondent Behaviour Trust, assigned by the
expert, to that received value. One or multiple mapping tables are implemented in
each specialised Behaviour Trust Agent.
For instance, according to a behaviour security model, it is possible to define that
the existence of four failed authentication attempts within a system, occurred within
a minute, will produce a confidence level of twenty on the behaviour security model
(as exemplified in Table 4.2). Apart from being able to represent and to quan-
tify foreseen behaviours, this model also acts as an adaptor between heterogeneous
sources and the trust estimator algorithm. By employing these adaptors it is possi-
ble to infer trust indicators, as all security events are possible to be quantified and
then used in a common calculation.
Each Behaviour Trust Agent collects proper behaviour information from the defined
entities. Upon applying the relevant adaptor table, as defined in the Behaviour
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Table 4.2: Behaviour Trust Agent - Adaptor Table Example
Failed Authentication Attempts/Minute
Trust Indicator Level Description Received Values
100 No Failures 0
80 One/Three Failures 1-3
20 Four/Ten Failures > 3 and < 10
0 More that 10 Failures >= 10
security model, the resulting normalised trust value (behaviour event) is sent to the
TRS Discovery Tool in order to be incorporated in the global Trust and Reputation
indicators.
4.2.2 TRS Discovery Tool
The TRS Discovery Tool is responsible for the calculation, in real-time, of the Trust
and Reputation indicators, as represented in Figure 4.3. For each main type of
indicator (Risk Alerts and Behaviour Trust), the TRS Discovery Tool maintains and
evaluates all the information received from the Agents. In particular, all current and
past calculated indicators are stored in a database in order to provide them to the
CI Operator. These indicators are also provided to the proper entities in order to
enable accurate risk prediction. For instance, if applied to the MICIE project, the
TRS Discovery Tool would provide this data to both the SMGW Manager and the
Prediction Tool. In the following, the methodology used for Trust and Reputation
evaluation, within the TRS Discovery Tool, is presented.
Trust and reputation indicators on received risk alerts
As represented in Figure 4.3, the TRS is able to evaluate two main Trust and
Reputation indicators allowing one to reason about the confidence on the received
risk alerts. The first indicator (Risk Alerts Trust) represents the confidence one has
in the received risks related to one particular dependent service. This is, excluding
the event accuracy, the most specific indicator evaluated. Second, an indicator is
evaluated in order to describe the confidence one may have on the risk alerts received
from one particular CI (Risk Alerts Reputation). This indicator incorporates the
trust, related to all the services provided by each particular CI. Both indicators are
able to incorporate the CI Operator’s opinion as mentioned in Section 4.1.
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In a simple approach, the trust that CI A has on the risk alerts received for the
dependent service X, provided by CI B, is represented by T(A,B,X) and can be cal-
culated by the average of the accuracy of each past event between those two CIs,
regarding that particular service (Equation 4.2).
T(A,B,X) =
∑N
i=1A(Eventi)
N
. (4.2)
As stated in previous work (Aime and Lioy, 2005; Spitz and Tuchelmann, 2009),
this solution has already some identified weaknesses. For instance, it is possible for
a situation to occur during which, one peer can behave correctly during a series
of events and then capitalise the gained trust in order to send false alarms. These
problems occur mainly due to the fact that the trust value will change slowly as
it depends equally on all the past transactions. This weakness must be minimised.
One approach to minimise it, is the introduction of the ageing concept. Essentially,
the ageing concept, allows the evaluation to give different weights to older and recent
events (Spitz and Tuchelmann, 2009). In this context, the TRS employs a discount
factor D, allowing it to give more weight to the recent received events. The ageing
factor should always depend on the context and should be assigned by an expert
while considering the specific characteristics of each service. Within the TRS, it is
required to define the ageing factor on a per peer/service basis.
In this context, the Equation 4.2 can be improved and the trust that CI A has on
service X provided by CI B, T ′(A,B,X), is computed for the Nth event as presented in
Equation 4.3:
T ′(A,B,X) =
(D ∗ (N − 1) ∗ T(A,B,X)) + A(EventN)
D ∗ (N − 1) + 1 . (4.3)
The ageing factor D is defined with a value belonging to the [0..1] interval. In
this evaluation, a small value of D causes the importance of the recent events to
increase, while a value of D close to one, provides less ageing to the oldest events
and consequently increases their contribution to the evaluation. By increasing the
ageing factor, the previous identified problems that led to the introduction of this
factor, are reintroduced. There are several approaches for selecting the adequate
ageing factor D. For instance, it is possible to use a fixed value defined by the CI
expert. It is also possible to make the factor D decay exponentially, for instance
by using a D = f(t) = xt (0 < x < 1, t = 1..N). Another approach could be, for
102
A FRAMEWORK FOR TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT IN CIS
instance, to use a methodology similar to the one presented by Aime and Lioy, and
use the observation on the partner behaviour instability and focus on more recent
alerts, when observed behaviour reveals strong time correlation (Aime and Lioy,
2005). In the actual implementations of the presented TRS, it is possible to define
a fixed value for D.
In Figure 4.7 it is possible to observe the influence value D has on the calculation. In
the plot represented in the Figure, a set of events are evaluated using three different
D values in order to calculate trust. The previously stated comportment induced
to the trust indicator by the ageing value D, is clearly visible while comparing the
results obtained with D = 1 and D = 0.1. It is noticeable that the indicator that
uses the smallest D value, has a quicker reaction to changes within the risk alert
events values.
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Figure 4.7: Example of the ageing factor (D) influence
As discussed in Section 4.1, the TRS is able to incorporate a human factor in the
trust evaluation. In the context of this thesis it is expected that this human factor
or opinion relates to the CI Operator opinion. The CI Operator’s opinion can be
introduced in two situations: to initialise the trust indicator when there are no past
observations available or at any moment, reflecting the CI Operator opinion and
contribution to the trust calculations. In the second case the weight this contribution
has on the calculation, needs to be specified. Considering the human factor, the final
trust value for a specific CI service is defined in the Equation 4.4.
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T (final)(A,B,X) = (1− α)(T(A,B,X)) + α(TO(A,B,X)) , (0 < α < 1) . (4.4)
For the Equation 4.4, the α factor is assigned by the CI Operator depending on the
confidence he has in the value (TO(A,B,X)) that represents his trust on service X. The
resultant value, T (final)(A,B,X), represents the TRS confidence in the received alerts
for each service individually, taking into account also the CI Operator perspective.
In order to better understand how all evaluated indicators evolve over time, and
also to allow defining a relation among them, a time value is associated with each
evaluated T (final).
After evaluating the alert trust for each service, the reputation of each involved CI
can be computed. To allow the evaluation of this indicator, it is necessary to assign
a weight to each service. This weight is assigned by the CI Operator and should
represent the relevance each service has within the set of services provided by each
CI. This information should be defined on the existent CI models on which, each
(inter)dependent service should have been analysed and weighted.
Upon the services weighing, the reputation of each CI is evaluated by applying
Equation 4.5. In this evaluation, GT ′(A,B,t) represents the reputation that CI A has
about CI B at time t. GT(A,B) represents the last evaluated indicator. S represents
the number of services that A receives from B and Wi is the weight associated to
each i service provided by CI B. T (final)(A,B,i) represents the last service risk alert
indicator, available for service i. N is the number of evaluations already accom-
plished. D is the ageing factor defined for each individual CI reputation indicator.
The reputation indicator, as defined in Equation 4.5 is evaluated every time a service
risk alert indicator changes.
GT ′(A,B,t) =
(D ∗ (N − 1) ∗GT(A,B)) +
∑S
i=1
(T (final)(A,B,i)∗Wi)∑S
i=1
Wi
)
D ∗ (N − 1) + 1 . (4.5)
As represented in Figure 4.3, the CI Operator is also able to contribute to the
reputation indicator evaluation, by integrating a value representing his opinion.
Equation 4.6 evaluates the final indicator (GT (final)(A,B,t)) with the inclusion of
the CI Operator’s opinion regarding each specific CI. In Equation 4.6, θ is assigned
by the CI Operator and denotes the confidence he has regarding the subjective
reputation value TOA,B that he includes in the indicator.
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GT (final)(A,B,t) = θ(TOA,B) + (1− θ)(GT(A,B)) , (0 < θ < 1) . (4.6)
It is important to note that it is not mandatory for the CI Operator to incorporate
his opinion within the Trust and Reputation indicators evaluation. If this opinion
is not intended to be incorporated, the Equations 4.4 and 4.6 must be configured
with a value of 0 for the parameters that represent the weight assigned to the CI
Operator’s opinion.
Trust and reputation indicators on peers behaviour
According to the representation in Figure 4.3, the TRS is also capable of evaluating
two main Trust and Reputation indicators, expressing the confidence one may have
on CI’s or service’s behaviour . The first indicator (Behaviour Trust) represents the
trust one CI has on the behaviour of one particular dependent service. Second, an
indicator is evaluated in order to describe the Behaviour Trust one may have on the
behaviour observed from one particular CI (Behaviour Reputation). This indicator
incorporates the perceived behaviour of all the services provided by each particular
CI and also other possible observations, related to the CI, that are independent from
the services (e.g. ICT security observations). Both indicators are able to incorporate
the CI Operator’s opinion as mentioned in Section 4.1.
Although the evaluation method used to evaluate Risk Alerts Trust and Behaviour
Trust is very similar, a major difference exists in the type of data used to evaluate
trust. As presented in the previous section, the behaviour of a CI or dependent
service can be evaluated using all information existent in the defined Behaviour
Security Model. As described, adaptor tables exist in order to help the agents to
translate one specific situation to a behaviour event, with a trust value associated.
In this context, behaviour events and risk alert events are similar, as the respective
agents, detect or are informed of an event, evaluate the event accuracy and send this
value to the TRS, in order to aggregate it in the Trust and Reputation indicators.
Indeed, the major encountered difference arises from the fact that, if something or
someone is behaving as expected, it is not probable that someone will complain about
that circumstance. In fact, most of the entities that are able to help understand the
system behaviour, might just raise events when they detect some uncharacteristic
behaviour.
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Considering the possible existent entities used to gather behaviour information (Fig-
ure 4.6) and in particular, the security management and monitoring systems, it is
expected to receive behaviour events, only when misbehaviour is detected. For
instance, the existent network IDS usually just triggers an alert/event when an
intrusion or tentative of intrusion is detected. The same happens within the man-
agement systems. It is unusual for an authentication request, accepted on the first,
to be logged as a security issue.
The fact that, it is anticipated to receive behaviour information mostly when mis-
behaviour is detected, leads to a situation in which the received events are almost
all adverse to the trust in the behaviour. By considering only these events on a
simple statistical evaluation, it is anticipated that the results of such an evaluation,
in the majority of the cases, will indicate a low Behaviour Trust value, thus not
representing the complete peer behaviour. In this case, the atypical behaviour is
always considered while the normal behaviour is ignored if the entity does not notify
it.
It is possible to reconfigure all entities present in the system, enabling them to no-
tify all types of behaviour, including also the normal behaviour. However this would
imply a major change within the CI and thus, leading to a more difficult implemen-
tation. To overcome the problem while considering also the normal behaviour, the
concept of Inactivity was introduced.
Within the concept of Inactivity, it is assumed that a scenario on which, no behaviour
events were received during a certain period of time - Inactivity - indicates that,
during this period of time, the behaviour of the observed entity was appropriate.
In a simple way, it is assumed that if the TRS does not receive any behaviour
information during a specified period of time, it will assume that the behaviour was
normal and considers, for the trust evaluation, the trust value defined for the normal
behaviour in the respective adaptor table.
In order to consider the existence of inactivity periods, the time is divided into a set
of time slots (Spitz and Tuchelmann, 2009), each slot with ∆t duration. If inactivity
exists during one slot, it is assigned the proper normal behaviour value to that slot.
If some event is received during one slot, the slot value is assigned with the average
of all events received during that slot. The Behaviour Trust value for each time slot,
Event(Slot s), is calculated from Equation 4.7 on which NEvents(Slot s) and N both
represent the number of events observed on a particular entity, within the duration
of the Slot s.
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Event(Slot s) =

100, if NEvents(Slot s) = 0
∑N
i=1
Eventi
N
, if N = NEvents(Slot s) > 0
. (4.7)
Figure 4.8 represents seven time slots with each respective event value as evaluated
using Equation 4.7. On each slot are also represented each individual events that
were received within the slot period.
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Figure 4.8: Time slots example
The duration of each time slot, ∆t, needs to be defined by a CI expert, according
to the specificities of each security entity (e.g. firewall, IDS, specified period during
which it is expected to receive risk alerts, etc.) and it is possible to allow it to
represent a period of only a few seconds or even hours. A larger ∆t value, implies
slow changes to the trust indicator, this is more evident when only a few events are
received over time. In that case it will be better to choose a small value for ∆t.
Examples of how the chosen ∆t value can affect the obtained results can be observed
in Figure 4.9. In this Figure, the two graphs on top display one observation with
more values over time than the one observed on both graphs at the bottom.
For the time slot s, the trust on the behaviour of the entity E related to CI B or to
a particular service provided from CI B, (T ′(E,B,s)), is calculated using Equation 4.8
on which, D is the ageing factor (similarly employed as described for the risk alerts
trust), T(E,B) is the indicator evaluated for the previous slot (s−1) and Event(Slot s)
is the event trust value for the slot s. All the evaluated indicators are stored in the
TRS database on which the time they were evaluated is also associated to each one.
T ′(E,B,s) =
(D ∗ (s− 1) ∗ T(E,B)) + Event(Slot s))
D ∗ (s− 1) + 1 . (4.8)
As described, it is also possible, although not mandatory, to include the CI Opera-
tor’s trust on the behaviour observed at each entity. This human factor is important
while evaluating the behaviour of the system as it allows the CI Operator to, at each
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Figure 4.9: Example of the influence of the time interval duration (∆t)
moment, fine tune the final Behaviour Trust indicator. This fine tuning might be
needed, for instance, if the CI Operator is aware of the occurrence of some particular
behaviour that lowers the trust indicator, however due to his knowledge his aware
of the fact that it should not be used to lower the confidence in the CI or service.
Equation 4.9 allows to include the CI Operator’s trust in CI B / service behaviour
concerning security entity E. The α factor is assigned by the CI Operator repre-
senting the confidence in his subjective trust (TO(E,B)).
T (Final)(E,B) = α(TO(E,B)) + (1− α)(T(E,B)) , (0 < α < 1) . (4.9)
As the event values are normalised (according to the description in Section 4.2.1), it
is also possible to evaluate an indicator encompassing all types of behaviour events
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related to one particular CI or service. This indicator characterises the Behaviour
Reputation.
A weight must be assigned for each entity from which the behaviour is inferred.
Each weight should represent the relevance each entity has to the global behaviour
of the analysed CI or service. For simplicity reasons, in Figure 4.3, the reputation
is just represented for each CI, although the behaviour reputation can be evaluated
for each CI or / and for each dependent service.
The behaviour reputation is evaluated by applying Equation 4.10. In this Equa-
tion, TBehaviour′(B,t) represents the reputation of CI B (or one particular ser-
vice) behaviour at time t. Wi is the weight associated to each security entity i.
TBehaviour′(B) represents the last evaluated reputation indicator for the evaluated
CI or service. The assigned weight should be defined along with the definition of
the Behaviour Security Model, representing the relevance of each entity in main-
taining security in the three considered main aspects, confidentiality, integrity and
availability. An ageing factor D is also included in the evaluation.
TBehaviour′(B,t) =
(D ∗ (t− 1) ∗ TBehaviour(B)) +
∑E
i=1
(T (Final)(i)∗Wi)∑E
i=1
Wi
)
D ∗ (t− 1) + 1 . (4.10)
The CI Operator is also able, if necessary, to contribute to the indicator with his
knowledge about the global behaviour of one particular CI or service. In a similar
manner as the previously described indicators, this is achieved by using Equation
4.11, in which the θ factor is assigned by the CI Operator, representing the confidence
on his subjective trust indication (TO(B,t)) at time t.
TBehaviour(Final)(B,t) = θ(TO(B,t)) + (1− θ)(TBehaviour(B,t)) , (0 < θ < 1); .
(4.11)
Both indicators, the Risk Alerts Trust and the Behaviour Trust, can be composed
in a global indicator, representing the trust one has on the received risk alerts
and in the behaviour of a service. This can also be achieved for the Reputation
indicators. Combining both indicators is achieved by applying Equation 4.12. The
CI expert needs to assign the weight each indicator has in the global indicator
((0 < θ < 1), (0 < α < 1)).
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TGlobal(B,t) = θ(TBehaviour(Final)(B,t)) + α(GT (final)(A,B,t)) . (4.12)
The described Trust and Reputation System has been initially defined for applica-
tion within the MICIE system. In order to verify the TRS’s contribution to the
SMGW Manager and to the MICIE Prediction Tool, several simulations intended
to validate the approach were carried out. In the following, some validation results
are described.
4.3 Validation
The validation work presented in this section was carried out within the scope of
the MICIE project. As stated, the author of this thesis has actively contributed to
the development of MICIE’s management system, namely, the SMGW Manager. In
this context, the TRS was introduced in order to improve the system’s management
with the introduction of trust and reputation indicators. These indicators allow
gathering a deeper knowledge of the data exchanged among MICIE’s participants
and also of the behaviour of the peers during the communication process.
The TRS was not initially foreseen in the MICIE project and it was proposed as
an add-on within the SMGW Manager. In order to validate the TRS’s applicability
to the MICIE system, several validations were carried out by simulating possible
scenarios supported by the architecture presented in Figure 4.10, in which is distin-
guished the TRS. In the following examples, the interactions among two Critical
Infrastructures with one dependent service among them are simulated.
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Figure 4.10: MICIE overall system and SMGW architecture
110
A FRAMEWORK FOR TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT IN CIS
The simulations were firstly conducted using the statistical simulation tool R (R
Development Core Team, 2009). The results obtained from the simulations were
also helpful while validating the Java based applications that implement the TRS.
Several simulation scenarios were developed and tested (Bertoni et al., 2010a; Caldeira
et al., 2010b,d). One subset of those scenarios is described in Table 4.3, representing
the following situations:
• (S1) The system behaves as expected with only small discrepancies observed
between the received risk alert and the service measured level. In this situation,
the accuracy of each event is always above 60% and mainly between 90% and
100%;
• (S2) The system is not accurate but can still be trustworthy, as evaluated
event accuracy is always above 40%;
• (S3) According to the measured service level, the received alerts are not as
expected. In this case, 60% of the events have an accuracy lower than 20%,
while in the remaining events, an accuracy value higher than 60% is never
observed;
• (S4) The system is not trustworthy as 90% of the events have an accuracy
lower than 20%.
Table 4.3: Simulation Scenario (average of the differences between measured service
level and received risk alerts)
Event Interval
Scenarios
S1 S2 S3 S4
[0-10] 0 0 40 80
]10-20] 0 0 20 10
]20-30] 0 0 10 5
]30-40] 0 0 10 5
]40-50] 0 10 10 0
]50-60] 0 10 10 0
]60-70] 5 10 0 0
]70-80] 5 10 0 0
]80-90] 10 20 0 0
]90-100] 80 40 0 0
%
of
o
cc
u
re
n
ce
111
A FRAMEWORK FOR TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT IN CIS
Trust in Received Risk Alerts
In order to simulate the Risk Alerts Trust indicator, the event’s accuracy was gen-
erated from random numbers produced in R (R Development Core Team, 2009), in
accordance to the conditions defined for each scenario, as described in Table 4.3.
According to the presented TRS framework, the following parameters are used for
the simulation: penalisation factor k = 2; ageing factor D = 0.3; a threshold of 10%
meaning that the observed differences between received risk alerts and measured
service level are considered correct when within the threshold.
Figures 4.11 present the Risk Alerts Trust indicators obtained from simulating the
existence of 1000 events generated respectively according to the defined scenarios 1
to 4. It is clear that, for each scenario, the Risk Alerts Trust indicator will tend to
the value corresponding to the average of the accuracy of the generated events. It
is important to note that in the considered worst scenarios (S3 and S4), the trust
indicator drops below the average of the events accuracy. This fact highlights the
relevance of the chosen value for the penalisation factor (k = 2). In these scenarios
(S3 and S4), as the difference between measured service level and received risk alerts
is higher, these events are heavily penalised due to the chosen k.
The first presented simulation exemplifies a simple scenario, on which a possible
fault within the CI providing the service, exists. In this scenario, the accuracy of
each event is high (S1) for most of the simulation period, with exception of one small
period on which the accuracy of the received risk alerts is the lowest defined within
the proposed situations on Table 4.3 (S4).
For this first simulation, two slightly different scenarios are described in order to
validate that the framework acts as expected, independently of the amount of events
received. In this context, the one simulation considers 5000 events, while the other
considers just 50 events. It is relevant to test the framework for such a different
number of events, because in a real life situation with two CIs cooperating in order
to provide better services to its clients, it is not expected to receive a large number
of different risk alerts, except within exceptional conditions.
Figure 4.12(A), represents the results obtained for the Risk Alerts Trust indicator
for the first presented simulation. In this case, the first observed 2000 events (Fig-
ure 4.12(A)) were generated according to scenario (S1). In these first events, the
indicator, as denoted also by Figure 4.11, tend to approximate to average value
of the used scenario. Following this, the next 1000 events represent a substantial
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Figure 4.11: Risk Alerts Trust indicator for the scenarios 1 to 4
degradation of the event’s accuracy (S4). During this period of 1000 events, it is
perceptible that the indicator rapidly decreases due to the influence of the newer
situation. In this case, the trust one has on the received alerts is below the mean
value and would allow the CI Operator to assign less weight to those alerts in its
own risk evaluation. After the event 3000, the indicator starts to grow gradually as,
from this point to the end of the simulation, the event’s accuracy is again within
scenario (S1).
The simulation observed in Figure 4.12(B) intends to demonstrate the applicability
of the indicator even with a small number of observed events. In this case it is
possible to observe that with just 50 events the observed indicator has basically
the same results as with 5000 events. In this example, the incorporation of the CI
Operator is illustrated. Assuming that the CI Operator received reliable information
that the fault affecting the supplier CI has been solved, he acts by assigning a value
for his trust as being 90% and by defining the weight of his contribution to the final
indicator, equal to 0.8. With this contribution (human factor), the CI Operator is
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Figure 4.12: Simulation 1 - Trust on Received Alerts. (A) 5000 events / (B) 50
events
able to rapidly regain the trust in a CI or service, as represented in Figure 4.12(B),
by the existent indicator after the event indicated by the existent arrow.
A second simulation is presented (Figure 4.13) in order to allow the observation of
the evaluation for the Risk Alerts Trust indicator during a situation on which the
accuracy on the received events is changing frequently.
The second simulation (Figure 4.13(A)) represents a situation on which the events
generated according to Table 4.3 change after each 100 events. In this simulation,
on the first 100 events, the accuracy of the events is defined according the scenario
(S1) and then abruptly changes to the worst scenario (S4) during the succeeding
100 events. It is visible that this change is almost immediately incorporated in
the trust indicator as expected. After the 100 events obtained from scenario (S4),
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Figure 4.13: Simulation 2 - Trust on Received Alerts. (A) 500 events / (B) 50 events
the trust indicator clearly indicates that one should not trust the received alerts
for this particular service. After 200 events the received risk alerts become, again,
reliable. As the ageing factor is used, the trust indicator rapidly incorporates the
new scenario. From the 300th to the 400th event, the scenario changes to (S3), thus
decreasing the trust indicator (in this case the indicator decreases more slowly that
in the last case). This simulation highlights the ability that the trust indicator has,
to rapidly react when the scenario changes. It is also clear that even in case of an
abrupt change of the event’s accuracy, the indicator changes gradually due to the
ageing factor.
In the simulation presented in Figure 4.13(B)), less events are used than in the
previous simulation (Figure 4.13(A)), showing that the TRS is still accurate even
with a small number of received events. In this simulation, the received alerts are
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unreliable between the 20th and the 30th event. This leads to a very low trust value
that gradually starts to grow after the 30th event (grows gradually as the received
events are based on scenario (S2)). As previously explained, the CI Operator can
incorporate his opinion on the indicator. In this case, the CI Operator assigned
a value for his trust equal to 90% and defined a contribution of 0.8 to the trust
indicator. Although the indicator continues to incorporate changes from the events,
the final value will be higher. It should be noted that it is important for the CI
Operator to know the consequences of this action as his contribution to the indicator
continues to be applied until it is updated or removed.
As discussed, the Risk Alerts Reputation indicator incorporates the trust evaluated
for each service provided by one particular CI. This enable us to understand the
confidence one may have in the alerts received from one CI. Although the Risk
Alerts Trust indicator should be more useful for improving risk prediction, as this
is a more detailed indicator, the reputation on the received alerts is of more use
within the system management. For instance, in the MICIE SMGW Manager, one
can define security policies that are triggered in case of a decrease in the Risk Alerts
Reputation of a CI.
Figure 4.14, presents the results obtained in the third simulation, on which two
services provided by the same CI are evaluated, as well as the reputation indicator.
The simulation was implemented using information observed from two separate ser-
vices, each service receiving an average of 5 events per hour. As the main goal of
this simulation is to highlight the Risk Alerts Reputation indicator, the events gen-
erated to simulate each service, were obtained from a combination of the scenarios
presented in Table 4.3. In order to evaluate reputation, the CI Operator assigned a
weight of 0.7 to service 2 and 0.3 to service 1. A value of D = 1 was used for the
ageing parameter. From the simulation results, it is perceptible, as expected, that
when the most weighted service becomes unreliable, the CI reputation decays, even
when the other service is trustworthy.
Trust on Peers Behaviour
In order to formulate scenarios which are able to simulate a CI or service behaviour,
it is important to know the distribution over time of the simulated behaviour events.
For the following described simulation, the arrival time for the events is generated
from random numbers produced in R (R Development Core Team, 2009). The
function developed in R, generates random values representing an average of x events
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Figure 4.14: Simulation 3 - Risk Alerts Reputation
per hour. The values assigned to each simulated event are generated based on the
scenarios expressed in Table 4.3.
The following described simulations are intended to evaluate the Behaviour Trust
indicator for a single provided CI/service. The TRS parameters for the Behaviour
Trust are common to all the simulations and are as follows: time slot size ∆t = 10,
ageing factor D = 0.05 and a simulation total time of 24 hours (1440 minutes).
As it is not supposed, in normal circumstances, to receive behaviour events, it is
important to choose a small ageing factor as the one chosen, in order to allow the
indicator to rapidly incorporate the situations.
In Figure 4.15(A), the behaviour events were generated according to the scenario
(S3) defined in Table 4.3. These events occur with an average frequency of 5 events
each hour. As the events occur at a relatively low frequency, the trust indicator
begins with no defined tendency. In this scenario, as the events arrive at an averaged
constant frequency, each one with a value from (S3), the value will tend, gradually,
to around 50%. It is possible to denote that even with some detected incorrect
behaviour, the indicator raises in the periods without events due to the introduction
of the inactivity concept.
In the simulation presented in Figure4.15(B), the first half (first 12 hours) of the
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Figure 4.15: Behaviour Trust - Simulation 1
events are valued according to the scenario (S2) and the last half (last 12 hours)
according to scenario (S3) (from scenarios presented in Table 4.3). The arrival rate
for the generated events is 5 events/hour. The results achieved with this simulation
allow us to observe that, due to the ageing value, each half of the simulation seems
independent from the other, demonstrating that the Behaviour Trust indicator is
able to rapidly incorporate the changes happening in the CI/service behaviour.
In the following simulation (Figure 4.16(A)) , the events are generated at a rate
of 1 event per 60 minutes. The value assigned to each of the events is computed
from within multiple scenarios available in Table 4.3, namely, scenarios (S1), (S3)
and (S4). In this case, as just a few events are simulated, the Behaviour Trust
indicator does not drop below 60%. This is due to the influence of the slots on
which the system is behaving normally. This simulation aims to demonstrate the
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importance of the value assigned for the time slot. In this case, a wider time slot
would lead to a lower Behaviour Trust indicator. It is also important for the CI
Operator to know how the defined parameter influence the TRS, in order to allow an
improved understanding of the received indicators and in order to properly configure
the system.
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Figure 4.16: Behaviour Trust - Simulation 2
The results obtained when aiming to simulate a situation with two possible induced
attacks or misbehaviours is presented in Figure 4.16(B). In this simulation, on the
first 300 simulated minutes, events generated according to scenario (1) occur at
a rate of 1 each 60 minutes. Following this, during a period of 100 minutes, the
scenario changes to (S1) (the worst scenario), and the events occur more frequently
with an event rate of 5 events/60 minutes. When the scenario changes it is noted
that the Behaviour Trust indicator rapidly decays below 50%, thus clearly indicating
that something is wrong. Next, the behaviour events are simulated according to (S2)
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and with a lower frequency allowing the indicator to increase. Between the 800th
and 1100th minutes, the scenario changes to (S4). During this period, the events
occur at a rate of 1/60 minutes. It is noticeable that, even with the occurrence of just
a few events, the CI Operator would be able to infer that the CI/service behaviour
is not normal. For instance, according to this indicator, a management system (e.g.
the MICIE SMGW Manager) could act by, for instance, blocking system access for
that particular CI. The final simulated period represents events generated according
to the scenario (S1), occurring at a rate of 1 event/60 minutes. In this scenario, with
a lower event rate, the Behaviour Trust indicator clearly indicates the resolution of
the past situations.
According to the presented results, it is clear that the indicators gathered within
the TRSs are within the expectations, allowing to enhance CIs risk prediction by
incorporating a trust value on each received risk alert. Also, the behaviour of a peer
CI or service is able to be monitored allowing to contribute to the evaluation of trust
in received risk alerts and also to evaluate an indicator regarding multiple types of
observations on CIs/services.
4.4 TRS proof of concept applications
The described TRS is implemented within two different approaches. First, a proof
of concept application was developed within the MICIE project and the second
implements the TRS within with the CI Security Model as described in Section 2.3.
The first TRS’s implementation aimed to allow integration within the MICIE SMGW
Manager. It implements the TRS as defined in Figure 4.3. All application modules
are written in Java and communicate by exchanging XML messages through Web
Services. Both the Risk Alerts Trust Agent and the Behaviour Trust Agent, are
able to receive XML messages containing the needed data to evaluate events. They
are able to work in push or pull mode, by also retrieving information from a Web
Service when they need it.
In this implementation, the TRS Discovery Tool is implemented as a service, re-
ceiving events from the agents and evaluating the TRS indicators in real-time. For
instance, the time slots in the Behaviour Trust are automatically evaluated within
the TRS. The Discovery Tool implements a Web Service able to provide current or
past indicators to a client. In this case, possible clients are the MICIE Prediction
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Tool, the MICIE SMGW Manager or the CI Operator GUI. Figure 4.17 repre-
sents several screenshots of the TRS application. In the picture an overview of the
Operator GUI, two agents and a generated graph are visible.
Figure 4.17: MICIE TRS implemented tools.
The Operator GUI retrieves data from the TRS Discovery Tool (refreshed manually
or in defined intervals) and displays all information within a simple interface. It
allows the CI Operator to: configure all the TRS parameters, insert, update or
delete CIs, services or entities, among other operations. Although it is possible to
have a global vision of all the indicators, the developed GUI is also able to draw
graphs of the available indicators (Figure 4.17).
One interesting aspect of this implementation is that it was also designed with the
aim to function as a simulation tool. It is possible to load values (with timestamps)
from XML files into the agents in order to simulate the existence of events. The
developed tool is then able to integrate a system like MICIE and also to serve as a
powerful simulation tool in order to evaluate Trust and Reputation among CIs.
The second TRS tool is a Java application developed as a proof of concept, imple-
menting the framework described throughout this section within different purposes.
In particular, this tool is intended to allow the use of the TRS along with the CI
Security Model described in Section 2.3. The tool is able to represent a scenario
using the CI Security Model as illustrated in Figure 4.18 and to evaluate the Risk
Alerts Trust and the Behaviour Trust indicators. The tool is also able to receive
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real time data from CIs through the use of Web Services or to act as a simulator by
reading data records from XML files.
Figure 4.18: TRS implementation tool for the CI Security Model.
This last tool supports the application of the TRS to the CI Security Model as
it is described in the following Chapter 5. Figure 4.18 presents a screenshot of
the developed tools on which are visible the main CI Security Model components,
namely, the service, base measurements, behaviour entities and external services.
The application GUI has been developed aiming an improved usability, incorporating
drag and drop possibilities and an easy way of updating all the TRS’s and Model’s
parameters. It is also possible from this tool, to export the evaluated results in XML
format and also in graphical format.
4.5 Summary
In a context in which Critical Infrastructures are combining efforts in order to achieve
improved risk estimations, by exchanging risk information to their dependent CIs,
allowing them to incorporate the received risks within each local risk evaluation
tool, several aspects need to be addressed. Among these aspects, the information
exchange security needs to be assured. Assuming that each CI employs proper
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security mechanisms, service QoS measurement equipment and also proper risk pre-
diction and evaluation tools, the CIs through the CI Operators face a new challenge.
This challenge is how to answer questions such as: “How can information used for
risk calculation be evaluated for correctness?”, “How are the existing measurement
tools behaving?”, “How is one peer CI acting in terms of ICT security?”.
In this chapter, a Trust and Reputation framework was introduced aiming to allow
the incorporation of Trust and Reputation indicators on the information exchanged
among Critical Infrastructures and also on information coming from heterogeneous
monitoring equipment. Although the presented framework is independent from the
MICIE project, as it can be applied in multiple contexts, the MICIE application
scenario for the framework was described.
The framework implementation (Trust and Reputation System) was described, in-
cluding the description of the existent components, namely, the Risk Alerts Trust
Agent, the Behaviour Trust Agent and the Discovery Tool. An example of inte-
gration of this system within CIs has been shown. The indicators obtained from
the introduction of the TRS are presented. In particular, the indicators gathered
according to the received risk alerts and the measured QoS (Risk Alerts Trust and
Risk Alerts Reputation). In order to complement the risk alerts indicators and to
enable the estimation of the system behaviour (related to one particular CI or CI
service), the TRS is also able to infer trust regarding the behaviour of multiple
entities present on the system, including the behaviour of the received risk alerts.
These indicators (Behaviour Trust and Behaviour Reputation) were introduced and
discussed throughout the chapter.
Upon the TRS’s description, the evaluation of the TRS by simulation was presented,
in different possible scenarios. It showed that the TRS produced correct indicators
for Trust and Reputation, within the simulated situations. The developed tools that
implemented the TRS were also presented in this chapter.
The presented TRS showed the ability to improve a system’s and theCI Operator’s
capacity to deal with uncertainty, and to fulfil its mission, in a timely manner, for
instance, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents. The TRS might be applied
in multiple scenarios within Critical Infrastructures. Examples of such scenarios, for
which the TRS was adapted in order to contribute to the risk estimate mechanisms
improvement within a Critical Infrastructure, are detailed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Application Scenarios and
Validation
The Trust and Reputation System (TRS) presented in Chapter 4 has been proposed
and implemented within the MICIE projects and validated using simulation. Al-
though this system was out of the MICIE scope, the TRS has been proposed as an
add-on to the project validation activities (Lev et al., 2011).
Throughout this work, one of the faced drawbacks was the lack of information to
properly validate the TRS. In the MICIE project it was not possible to have access
to information exchanged over time, as the validation activities were focused on the
accuracy of the models, the Prediction Tool and on the proper operation of the
SMGW and its components. Another aspect that is intended to be validated is
the applicability of the TRS within different application scenarios and supported by
different CI modelling approaches.
To better validate the TRS, a joint work has been carried out with Thomas Sch-
aberreiter, author of the CI Security Model presented in Section 2.3. The main goal
was to be able to improve both works, validating the TRS while enhancing and ex-
tending the CI Security Model. This was achieved by adding Trust and Reputation
components as a means to improving its accuracy and its resilience to inconsistent
information provided by dependent CIs and allowing to evaluate the correctness of
information received from those dependencies.
In this chapter three application and validation scenarios are presented for the Trust
and Reputation System, supported by the CI Security Model proposed by Thomas
Schaberreiter.
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The first described scenario, incorporates a new information source (trust) in the
original CI Security Model in order to allow a dynamic adjustment of the weight
that the risk levels received from dependencies have on the evaluated risk within the
CI Security Model.
The second scenario, combines the CI Security Model assurance levels with trust
indicators. Originally, the CI Security Model assurance levels were defined by an
expert and are not intended to dynamically change. In this second scenario, the trust
indicators are used to evaluate the behaviour of the entities on which the assurance
levels are assigned in order to adjust the global service assurance level indicator.
The third scenario, incorporates the concepts introduced in the first two scenarios
and validates the proposed approaches within a more realistic test-bed application
scenario - The Grid 5000 project.
The first two application scenarios were validated using simulation. The last appli-
cation scenario uses real data and intends to prove the applicability of both contri-
butions (TRS and the CI Security Model) to a real test-bed application scenario –
The Grid 5000 project.
The following contributions were published respectively in (Caldeira et al., 2011),
(Schaberreiter et al., 2011b) and (Caldeira et al., 2013).
For the following application scenarios and validation, the author of this thesis
contributed with the work on Trust and Reputation Systems while Thomas Sch-
aberreiter contributed with his work on the CI Security Model.
The adaptation of the Risk Alerts Trust indicator and the Behaviour Trust indicator
from the TRS (proposed by the author of this thesis) as well as the adaptation
of the CI Security Model (proposed by Thomas Schaberreiter) both need to be
seen as equal contributions to the validation work. They have resulted from many
discussions enabling the combining of the CI Security Model and the Trust and
Reputation System.
Also, the evaluation of how CI service risk alerts, received from dependencies, can
be evaluated for correctness and how Risk Alerts Trust and Behaviour Trust can
be adapted for this purpose, are seen as an equal contribution by the author of this
thesis and Thomas Schaberreiter.
The TRS was adapted by the author of this thesis, for each application scenario as
well as to be included in the CI Security Model. Another contribution of the author
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was the definition of the evaluation and validation possibilities within the Grid’5000
project. The author of this thesis carried out all the experiments for the case studies
including simulation, data adaptation and the development/implementation of the
tools used in this work.
5.1 Trust based dependency weighting
The work on CI security modelling, presented in Section 2.3, establishes a CI model
based on the risk that enables on-line risk monitoring in interdependent CIs. As
mentioned, the motivation of this model is to decompose the complexity of CIs into
smaller and abstract entities, to be able to compare dependent CIs and incorporate
them in the risk estimation. In this model, special attention is given to information
sharing between dependent CIs that can belong to different providers.
Modelling techniques used in Critical Infrastructures in order to infer risks, usually
rely on information received from sensors in the field and on information shared
among dependent services. Thus, a scenario where that information is missing or
incorrect, leads to wrong assumptions about risk. In this context, it is important
to use mechanisms able to evaluate the correctness of the information used for risk
calculation. As the originally proposed CI Security Model has no reasoning mecha-
nism about the exchanged information, the following question remains unanswered
“How can shared information be evaluated for correctness?”. In order to answer this
question, the Trust and Reputation System was introduced allowing to improve the
CI Security Model and also validate the applicability of the TRS.
In this first scenario, it is proposed to evaluate the information received from a de-
pendency, based on observations about that dependency. Depending on the outcome
of such an evaluation, a CI Operator can decide to what extent the information re-
ceived from the dependency will be incorporated into the CI risk evaluation. A way
to carry out evaluation is to build a trust relationship between CI services through
the Trust and Reputation System and use the trust level to evaluate the correct-
ness of received CI information. A shortcoming of applying Trust and Reputation
Systems to the domain of CIs is the variety of CIs. Each infrastructure can have
different information to compare and evaluate. Building a Trust and Reputation
system, taking into account several dependencies can be a quite complex task.
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Merging both CI Security Model and Trust and Reputation System, allows the intro-
duction of a way of building a trust relationship among CIs, based on the common
abstract information they share. In the next section, the method of gathering in-
formation used in the CI Security Model is presented. The method of calculating
trust that is used in the CI Security Model to dynamically re-evaluate the impact
of a risk level received from a dependency has on the modelled risk in a CI, is also
presented.
The following describes how the Risk Alerts Trust indicator (presented in Section
4.2) can be integrated into the CI Security Model. The information sources that
can be used by the Risk Alerts Trust Agents to collect information are different
for each CI sector and therefore, each CI has to be evaluated separately to gather
this information. In the CI Security Model such information is represented in an
abstract and uniform way (C,I,A) that is the same for each CI. In this context, it
is presented how abstract and uniform information about CI risks can be gathered
using the CI Security Model and how Risk Alerts Trust can be calculated using this
information.
5.1.1 Risk alert events
In order to be able to evaluate the trust that each CI has on received risk alerts
(Risk Alerts Trust), an entity has to be found that can be compared with each
risk alert for the evaluation of its correctness. In the example seen in Figure 5.1,
a service of a telecommunication provider (“server room”) receives risk alerts from
a service of a dependent CI (“Low Voltage distribution service”). If a high risk
alert is received regarding the energy supply, the telecommunication provider needs
to evaluate the correctness of this value. From the infrastructure decomposition in
the risk assessment step of the CI Security Model, a service can be defined by the
telecommunication provider (“Main power supply level”) that allows to monitor the
current energy level using the telecommunication provider equipment (e.g. voltage
meter). Gathering this information, local risk indicators can be aggregated, which
can be compared with the received risk alert. It is important to note that the
example in Figure 5.1 indicates that the same approach of risk information gathering,
can also be applied between two dependent services of the same CI (“server room air
conditioning” and “server room”, “room temperature” used to evaluate correctness
of risk alerts) and between a service and a sub-service (“UPS” and “server room”,
“UPS energy supply level” used to evaluate correctness of risk alerts).
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Figure 5.1: Risk alert indicators (Caldeira et al., 2011)
In order to evaluate trust aspects correlated to the received risk alerts, the primary
goal is to define an accuracy value for each received risk alert. For this purpose, the
concept of Risk Alert Event introduced in Section 4.2.1 is used - An event starts
when one or both risk indicators (received risk alert and measured risk levels) are
different from one (no risk). The event ends when both indicators drop to one.
The Risk Alerts Trust Agent is monitoring the risk alert levels (Rlt) and the current
measured risk levels (Mlt) in order to detect events. Rlt and Mlt belong to the
[1..5] range. The accuracy of each event A(Eventn) is defined as the average of all
comparisons made during the event (value T ), between the measured risk level and
the received risk alert level (Equation 5.1). As described in Section 4.2.1, function
f(Mlt, Rlt) is a discrete function so a sample rate for the time factor is needed. This
sample rate can be different for each service and will depend on the information
available on the system.
A(Eventn) = 100−
(∑T
t=1 f(Mlt, Rlt)
T
∗ 100
)
, (5.1)
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where f(Mlt, Rlt) =| Mlt−Rlt4 |k, k ∈ R+. The value k allows to penalise the larger
differences or the small differences. The duration of an event is not considered, only
focusing on the received risk alert accuracy is necessary.
As detailed in Section 4.2.2, the trust that CIA has in risk alerts received for service
X provided by CIB is represented by T(A,B,X) and is calculated by the average of
the accuracy of each past event between those two CIs for that particular service
(Equation 5.2). The concept of ageing is used, applying a discount factor D, to
give more weight onto recent events. The ageing factor should always depend on
the context. In this scenario, the ageing factor needs to be defined on a per CI
peer/service basis. In this example, T ′(A,B,X) is computed for the Nth event as:
T ′(A,B,X) =
(D ∗ (N − 1) ∗ T(A,B,X)) + A(EventN)
D ∗ (N − 1) + 1 . (5.2)
D is a value in the [0..1] interval and a small value of D will raise the importance
of the last events while a value of D near 1 will provide less ageing for the oldest
events.
A human factor reflecting the CI Operator opinion and contribution to the trust
calculation is also considered in trust evaluation (Equation 5.3).
T (final)(A,B,X,t) = α(T(A,B,X)) + (1− α)(TO(A,B,X)) (5.3)
The factor α is in the range [0..1] and assigned by the CI Operator depending on the
confidence he has in (TO(A,B,X)). T (final)(A,B,X,t) represents the TRS confidence
in risk alerts while also taking into account the CI Operator perspective. In order
to understand how the Risk Alerts Trust indicators evolve over time, and to define
a relation among them, a time value is associated with each T (final).
5.1.2 Incorporating Trust in the Security model
As stated, the introduction of the TRS allows the overtaking of one shortcoming of
the CI Security Model where, in is first definition, the weights for dependencies and
sub-services are manually assigned by CI experts and are thus prone to human errors.
The approach of trust based weighting, allows to calculate trust for the risk alerts
received from each (inter)dependent CI or CI service and to combine the calculated
trust with the initial weights assigned by experts. This result is a more precise
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estimate of the influence one service has to another. In this application example, the
Risk Alerts Trust derived for a received dependent service risk is utilised (T (final))
as the trust indicator for a dependent service x (T (x)) (Caldeira et al., 2011).
In order to associate T (x) with the dependency weight, the meaning of the weights
had to be changed when compared with the original CI Security Model. In the
original approach a weight assigned by an expert, represented the influence of a
dependency to a service. This value has to be as accurate as possible. In the context
of the TRS this weight now has to represent the maximum assumed influence a
dependent service can have to a service. According to the current Risk Alerts Trust
provided by the dependent service, this initial weight can be lowered accordingly.
This is represented by Equation 5.4, where ω(x) is the newly calculated weight
for the dependency x, ωE is the original weight assigned by an expert and T is
the Risk Alerts Trust for the dependency or sub-service x. The expected result
of this calculation is a dependency weight ω in the range ]0..100]. Note that 0
was excluded from the range. The presumably rare events where no trust in the
correctness of the received risk levels (T (x) = 0) would produce a weight ω(x) = 0
have to be treated separately, for example by excluding the risk alerts received from
this particular dependent service from risk level aggregation. Allowing the existence
of a dependency weight of 0 could cause problems in the risk level aggregation of
the CI Security Model and possibly result in a division through 0 (Aubert et al.,
2010a).
ω(x) =
ωE(x) ∗ T (x)
100
, ωE(x), T (x) ∈ [0..100] . (5.4)
5.1.3 Validation Results
As already described, the Trust and Reputation System presented in this work has
already been submitted to some evaluation tests using simulation (Caldeira et al.,
2010b). In this example, the same simulation tools are used in order to validate the
applicability of the TRS to the CI Security Model.
The presented simulation focuses on the two scenarios described in Table 5.1. The
simulated scenarios pretend to represent the following situations: (S1) The system
behaves as expected with only small errors with the average of the differences be-
tween measured risks and received risk alerts mainly between 0 and 1; (S2) The
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system is inaccurate as the received risk alerts and the measured risk differences are
mainly between 3 and 4.
Table 5.1: Simulation Scenario (average of the differences between measured and
received risks )
Scenarios
(Mlt −Rlt)/Event
[0..1] ]1..2] ]2..3] ]3..4]
S1 90 5 5 0
S2 0 5 5 90
For the following simulation, the events represented in Figure 5.2 were generated as
random numbers in R (R Development Core Team, 2009). The following parameters
are used for the TRS: penalisation factor k = 1.25; ageing factor D = 0.3.
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Figure 5.2: A(Eventn) values
The simulated events presented in Figure 5.3, aim to represent a faulty component
situation. As observable in Figure 5.3, the first 20 events belong to S1. Next,
the received risk alerts become inaccurate (S2) during 10 events returning to its
normal behaviour after that (S1). It is visible that the Risk Alerts Trust indicator
decreases rapidly and the next starts to grow gradually. Figure 5.4 describes how
the Risk Alerts Trust indicator contributes to the weight that the received risk
alert will have in the CI Security Model. In this case, the expert has given a
maximum weight of 80% to this risk. With the application of Equation 5.4, the
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final weight (expert*trust) value will change gradually depending on the Risk Alerts
Trust indicator.
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Figure 5.3: Risk Alerts Trust indicator
In Figure 5.5 is represented the contribution that the Risk Alerts Trust indicator
and the expert weight have on the final weighted risk level. For the simulation the
received risk alert was fixed to 5 and the measured risk level was varying leading to
the Risk Alerts Trust indicator presented in Figure 5.3. In this scenario, receiving
only a risk alert of 5, the weighted risk changes according to the expert opinion. In
this case never reaching or exceeding 80% of the received risk alert, depending on
the initial expert weight and the current trust. When the Risk Alerts Trust lowers,
less importance to the received risk alert is given, maintaining a low risk level.
It might not seem perceptive that the weighted risk level in Figure 5.5 decreases
when the Risk Alerts Trust decreases. The weight represents the impact a risk alert
received from a dependency has to the aggregated risk of a service. A low trust
in the correctness of risk alert values received from a dependency, means that its
importance to the service should be lower. Therefore, high-risk alerts received from
this dependency represent only a low risk for the service.
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5.1.4 Discussion
Within this application scenario, an enhancement to the original CI Security Model
was added, allowing to validate the application of the TRS to a different scenario.
In order to be able to evaluate the correctness of information received from depen-
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dencies, a trust based approach has been introduced. It evaluates the trust in risk
alerts received from (inter)dependent CIs or CI services, based on the differences
between observations about the dependency and the information received from the
dependency.
One of the advantages of integrating a TRS in the CI Security Model, is that trust
can be calculated from aggregated risk parameters, not accessing actual infrastruc-
ture information. Hence, the Trust and Reputation calculation is simplified and can
be applied without modification to any CI that is using the CI Security Model.
The presented approach allows a more accurate evaluation of service risk, since
the influence of dependent service risk is dynamically re-evaluated and the impact
of incorrect information received from dependencies is reduced based on the trust
indicator for the dependency.
One drawback of the proposed trust based dependency weighting approach, is the
case on which the trust in one service dependencies and sub-services drops to a
considerably low value, the aggregated service risk will be 1. Although, this be-
haviour is intended, the Operator needs to be aware of why a low risk is shown. The
solution found within the CI Security Model is based on the concept of assurance
levels originally presented in Aubert et al. (2010b) and is used in the next presented
application scenario.
In the next section, a new validation scenario is described on which assurance levels
and trust indicators are combined in order to evaluate accuracy of on-line risks in
Critical Infrastructures.
5.2 Combining assurance levels and trust indica-
tors
In the previous application scenario, trust indicators were used in order to answer
one key question that was not answered in the originally proposed CI Security Model:
“How can estimated service risk be validated?”. In order to be able to evaluate the
trust that each CI has on a received or locally evaluated risk alert, an entity able
to measure the actual service level, has been introduced in the model in order to
be compared with each calculated or received risk alert for the evaluation of its
correctness.
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In the CI Security Model, the accuracy of each service risk relies on the correctness
of the subjacent base measurements, as well on their dynamic behaviour during op-
eration. For example, due to some change in environmental conditions, the accuracy
of the base measurements can be affected and consequently affect the accuracy of
the estimated CI service risk. Assurance levels are part of the CI Security Model as
presented in (Aubert et al., 2010b) and (Schaberreiter et al., 2011a).
In the CI Security Model, the correctness of the calculated risk is evaluated by means
of assurance indicators, aiming to gather evidence from the underlying systems
allowing to categorise each system’s assurance into 5 classes (class 1 meaning low
confidence in the system, class 5 meaning high confidence). For the next presented
scenario, the concept of risk based security assurance and trust-based indicators
were combined and adapted, in order to derive assurance indicators that can be
used to reason about the accuracy of each calculated CI service risk.
5.2.1 CI service risk assurance indicators
The scenario defined for the application scenario is presented in Figure 5.6. In this
Figure two main indicators are represented, namely, the Service Risk and the Ser-
vice Assurance Level. These two indicators denote the calculated service risk (based
on the base measurement information) and our confidence in the correctness of that
service risk (Service Assurance Level). In order to estimate the correctness of the CI
service risk, the following assurance indicators were defined: the accuracy of each
base measurement (base measurement assurance); the evaluation of the dynamic
behaviour of the base measurements by employing a trust-based approach to cap-
ture the dynamically changing accuracies (Risk Alerts Trust) and by evaluating the
dynamically changing behaviour of the system and base measurements (Behaviour
Trust).
As the CI security modelling and the Trust and Reputation System are already
described in this document, respectively in Section 2.3 and Chapter 4, this section
will focus on the contributions and improvements that were introduced.
In order to better understand the proposed model, three main indicators are de-
scribed: the Base Measurement Assurance, the Risk Alerts Trust and the Behaviour
Trust, as illustrated in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: System overview (Schaberreiter et al., 2011b)
Base measurement assurance
Based on the original CI Security Model, each service uses base measurements in
order to evaluate his aggregated risk level. In this context, the notion of assurance
can be defined as the confidence one has in those aggregated risk levels of a service.
It is possible to say that a service assurance level represents the accuracy of an
aggregated risk level (Aubert et al., 2010b).
Each base measurement has is own associated assurance level. The information to
define this assurance level is collected for each base measurement by CI domain
experts. This task should be completed during the model definition, in particular,
during the off-line risk assessment step of the CI Security Model. The expert should
gather evidence about the correctness of each base measurement. For instance, the
expert can have an opinion regarding the capabilities of one particular equipment
(that provides base measurements) he understands. Also, it is common to classify the
measuring equipment reflecting its accuracy. For example, a thermometer usually
has its accuracy defined by the manufacturer. In this particular illustration, the
manufacturer can say that the error margin is 1◦C. This information, when available,
can also be used as evidence and help define the accuracy of the base measurements.
The assurance level for each base measurement becomes the combination of the
expert subjective opinion about that base measurement and the evidences collected
for the base measurement (Schaberreiter et al., 2011b).
The assurance level is represented by an integer number in the range [1..5]. The
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reasons that lead to the adoption of this representation are described by Schaber-
reiter et al. as a trade-off between accuracy and interpretability by an Operator in
a stress situation (Schaberreiter et al., 2011b). Also, the assignment of assurance
levels to base measurements by a domain expert is manageable in this way. Sch-
aberreiter et al. also claims that the expert needs to have a sufficient amount of
different choices, but at the same time the choice needs to be limited in order to
have a meaningful comparison between the values (Schaberreiter et al., 2011b).
Once each base measurement has is assurance level defined, those assurance levels
are combined using an average weighted sum, in order to represent the confidence
in the accuracy of the corresponding service level. An aggregation process is also
used to obtain the service risk level, where each weight represents the relevance a
base measurement has to the service risk. In this context, the same weights can be
used to aggregate service risk and service assurance levels.
In the original CI Security Model, service assurance levels are not supposed to change
often, as the expert is the only one that can alter them. An expert revaluation on the
base measurements could happen, for instance after an equipment change or after
detecting erroneous assumptions made during the off-line risk assessment phase.
As an example to calculate service assurance level, let us suppose the existence of a
service measured using four base measurements (µ). If the expert confidence is high
in one base measurement, medium in one base measurement and low in two base
measurements (ALµ = {5, 3, 1, 1}) and the importance that the base measurements
have to the service are respectively (Wµ = {0.9, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1}) from where is noted
that the service in which the expert has more confidence is the one with major
importance to the service.
Using the CI Security Model methodology, the aggregated service assurance level
(ALS) is calculated as described in Equation 5.5.
ALS =
⌊∑n
i=1(ALµi ∗Wµi)∑n
i=1Wµi
⌋
=
⌊
5 ∗ 0.9 + 3 ∗ 0.3 + 1 ∗ 0.1 + 1 ∗ 0.1
0.9 + 0.3 + 0.1 + 0.1
⌋
= 4 . (5.5)
It can be seen that the aggregated service assurance level is relatively high, due to
the fact that the base measurement with the highest confidence is assumed to be
the one most relevant to the service.
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Risk Alerts Trust
As already presented, Risk Alerts Trust is seen as the trust in the correctness of
the calculated service risk. The idea behind the concept of Risk Alerts Trust is to
compare the service risk Rlt to the actually measured service level (Mlt) as a measure
of the Quality-of-Service. For example, if a power generation service has a high risk
of availability degradation and the measured service level does not indicate that
degradation, the trust in the accuracy of that service risk level should be lowered.
The measured service level must be collected using measurement equipment that
must be independent from the service itself. After collecting the accuracy value for
each calculated service risk, the Trust and Reputation System is able to determine
the trust as detailed in Section 4.2.
Behaviour Trust
As stated, in the original CI Security Model, each base measurement assurance
level is basically static if not manually changed by the expert. In the Trust and
Reputation System, Behaviour Trust refers to the trust in the correct behaviour of
an entity (for example a service or a single component). As presented in Figure 5.6,
the behaviour of the base measurements is examined in order to incorporate that
behaviour and use it to reason about the assurance one may have in the service risk
calculated based on the information those base measurements provided.
The main goal is to understand and quantify the behaviour of each monitored entity
considering what should be its normal behaviour. When a deviation from normal
behaviour is detected, an event is triggered in order to incorporate this event in the
Behaviour Trust indicator. The events used to evaluate trust in service behaviour
can include all the monitored interactions among services (internal or external). For
instance, the events can be Intrusion Detection System’s alerts, failed connection
attempts, attempts to read/write information without permission or the fact that
some entity does not update risk information for a long period of time.
In the presented scenario, the main sources of information used to evaluate the
Behaviour Trust are the base measurement entities. As it can be simple to describe
the normal behaviour of those entities (usually simple measurement equipment) it is
possible to generate a security event when an abnormal behaviour is detected. For
instance, although the normal temperature of an equipment can range from -10◦C
to 70◦C, in some cases, it can be considered abnormal if the sensor reads 20◦C and
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one second later reads 70◦C and continues in this cycle. This fact demonstrates an
abnormal behaviour of the sensor. Another and rather common case of abnormal
behaviour is the when the sensor does not reports values. If a normal situation
as defined by an expert, is one in which the temperature sensor should inform the
temperature at least every 60 seconds, it is possible to say that the behaviour is
abnormal if that has not been accomplished.
In order to evaluate and measure behaviour events, it is mandatory to quantify the
defined abnormal events. Essentially, it is important to know and quantify “how
much” the behaviour differs from the expected.
As presented in Section 4.2, behaviour information is normalised based on a security
model that identifies relevant behaviour patterns. Tables representing possible ob-
served values and correspondent Behaviour Trust event values compose this security
model. This model acts as an adaptor between multiple heterogeneous sources and
the TRS allowing it to evaluate the Behaviour Trust indicators, as all entities are
quantified and can be used in a common evaluation.
For this application scenario, the security model includes Table 5.2. This Table,
defines the trust indicator level associated to the time on which each information is
received from the sensor. For instance, as represented in Table 5.2, if a reading from
the sensor is made 50 seconds after the last reading, a trust indicator level of 2 is
used for Behaviour Trust evaluation. The range [1..5] used in Table 5.2 to represent
the trust indicator level as been chosen in order to allow a better integration with
the CI Security Model.
Table 5.2: Normalisation Table Example
Received information from sensor X
Trust Indicator Level Seconds since last value
1 <= 30
2 > 30 and < 60
3 >= 60 and < 120
4 >= 120 and < 180
5 >= 180
As presented in Chapter 4 one may expect to receive behaviour alerts only when
misbehaviour is detected, leading to a situation where almost only “bad behaviour”
events are received and used in the evaluation. If not treated, this situation would
generate low Behaviour Trust over time. In order to evaluate an accurate indicator,
the time factor and the management of inactivity periods were added. Time is
divided into a set of time slots and if there is inactivity in one slot, it means that
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the entity behaviour indicators should have the maximum value for that period
(normal expected behaviour). If information is received during one slot, the value
for that slot becomes the average of all values received during that slot. Besides this,
it is also possible to include “normal behaviour” in the tables representing possible
observed values and correspondent Behaviour Trust event values. For example, in
Table 5.2, the trust indicator level is 1 (best value = normal behaviour) when no
failures are detected.
Using the methodology described in Section 4.2, for the time slot s, the trust in
entity E (T ′(B,s)) is calculated using Equation 5.6, where D is the ageing factor, T(E)
is the indicator evaluated for the slot (s− 1) and Event(Slot s) is the event value of
the slot s.
T ′(E,s) =
(D ∗ (s− 1) ∗ T(E)) + Event(Slot s))
D ∗ (s− 1) + 1 . (5.6)
5.2.2 Validation Results
The use of a combination of assurance levels and trust indicators, has enable the
evaluation of a more precise indicator (service assurance level), allowing inferring on
the service risk accuracy. The uses of these indicators were validated by the use of
simulation and the outcome is promising as the simulation results are in-line with
the main goals. Also it became clear that the trust model is flexible and adaptable
to multiple scenarios where it is necessary to reason about the reliability of some
indicators.
This section presents an example in order to demonstrate the proposed approach
and to help understand the influence of trust indicators in the service assurance level
and the contribution of the TRS to the CI risk evaluation. The simulations were
achieved using R (R Development Core Team, 2009) and also using the developed
simulators presented in Section 4.4.
The scenario used for this example is represented in Figure 5.6. A simple scenario
is presented as the CI Security Model allows the simplification of a CI model by
representing each of the services that compose the CI. This simple scenario is
composed of one single service collecting information from five base measurements
(derived from sensors).
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For simplicity reasons it is assumed that the service present in the scenario does
not depend on other services. However, as already understood, if a dependet service
exists, the risk information received from the dependent service would be used in the
service risk evaluation and also in the Risk Alerts Trust evaluation, as demonstrated
by the previous validation scenario. For the simulation, the following assumptions
are made:
• The base measurements are retrieved and evaluated once per minute;
• The simulation total time is 50 minutes;
• In order to evaluate service risk and base measurement assurance, the con-
tribution that each base measurement has to the service has been defined as
follows: S1− 10% ; S2− 10%; S3− 30%; S4− 20%; S5− 10%;
• The service risk RS is aggregated using the previously defined average weighted
sum method1;
• The measured service level MS is aggregated using a similar setup of 5 inde-
pendent sensors;
• The confidence in the correctness of all the base measurements is high and
results in a base measurement assurance level of 5;
• The service trust is derived from the Risk Alerts Trust and from the Behaviour
Trust using the following weights: 0.5 for the Risk Alerts Trust and 0.5 for the
Behaviour Trust;
• The service assurance level is derived from the service trust and the base mea-
surement assurance using the following weights: 0.4 for the service assurance
level and 0.6 for the service trust;
• All indicators are defined using a scale of 1 to 5. In the case of the base
measurements, for the trust indicators and for the assurance levels, 5 represent
the best situation and 1 represents the worst. For the service risk level, 5
represents the highest risk and 1 represents the lowest risk;
• When a base measurement sensor does not update its status, the last received
value for that sensor is used to evaluate the service risk.
1For simplicity reasons, only one risk indicator is taken into account for simulation. Whenever
RS is mentioned, it represents either C,I or A risk indicator.
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In order to implement a credible scenario for the simulation, the following situations
were generate: for the first 20 minutes all sensors that support base measurements
are reporting the value 5 (maximum value) leading to a low risk level RS = 1. In
the same period, the independent sensors used to aggregate the measured service
level are also equal to 5 producing a service level MS = 5. Also, during the first
20 minutes, it was possible to gather information from the base measurements once
a minute. This means that the Behaviour Trust in base measurements has the
maximum value. As the Risk Alerts Trust and the Behaviour Trust have both the
maximum value, the composed indicator service trust will also have the maximum
value.
After the first 20 minutes, and for a duration of 10 minutes, sensors 1 and 3 of RS
(sensors that support the base measurements) become unreliable but continue to
report a value as presented in Figure 5.7. During this period those sensors always
report value 5, while the information arriving from sensors 1 and 3 of MS (measured
service level) are generated using the following criteria: The difference between the
sensor outputs of RS and MS is 1,2,3,4 respectively in 0%, 5%, 5%, 90% of the cases.
After t = 30 minutes, the difference between the sensor outputs returns to 0. In
Figure 5.8 the Risk Alerts Trust indicator displays this comportment. The indicator
drops when the values become unreliable and gradually starts to grow when the
situation reverts to normal.
0 10 20 30 40 50
1
2
3
4
5
Time / Minutes
Le
ve
l
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
Figure 5.7: Sensor Output for measured service level
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Figure 5.8: Assurance Indicators
As explained, the Behaviour Trust indicator can be evaluated based on informa-
tion gathered from multiple sources available on the CI that should represent the
behaviour of the system. In this example, the behaviour of the sensors is simu-
lated regarding their ability to send periodic information. For this simulation, the
normalised values presented in Table 5.2 are used in order to represent a situation
where the sensors are not able to send well-timed information as expected.
In order to show the impact that Behaviour Trust has in adapting the service as-
surance level according to what is observed in the system, it is implemented in the
simulation the fact that after 25 minutes of the simulation time, two of the base
measurement sensors stop sending periodic information.
As described, for the service risk aggregation, the last information received from
the sensors will be used. By looking at Figure 5.7 it is not possible to detect
that information is not being received as it should. It becomes clear that only the
observation of the system behaviour through the Behaviour Trust reveals that the
comportment of the system is not as it should be. This fact can be observed in
Figure 5.8 where it is shown that the Behaviour Trust indicator changes rapidly, as
a result of the inconstant updates by the sensors.
During all the simulation, the calculated service risk had always the value 1, meaning
that there is no risk in the service. This fact is explained by the fact that the
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base measurement sensors always gives the value 5 (maximum value). By observing
Figure 5.9 it can be seen that, although the service risk always indicates no risk (value
1), the service assurance level indicates that our confidence in the risk estimation
changed based on the dynamic behaviour observed by the Risk Alerts Trust indicator
and the Behaviour Trust indicator. The static base measurement assurance indicator
presented in the original CI Security Model would not have captured this behaviour.
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Figure 5.9: Service Risk / Service Assurance Level
5.2.3 Discussion
With this application scenario it was possible to introduce and discuss indicators that
can be used to evaluate the correctness of aggregated CI service risk (Schaberreiter
et al., 2011b).
The scenario presented in this section uses the CI Security Model, that represents
risk on the level of provided CI services and the risk of the services they depend
on. Three assurance indicators were identified and presented – the service assurance
level, representing the confidence in the correctness of the measurements that are
used to evaluate the CI service risk; the Risk Alerts Trust indicator, evaluating the
inconsistency that may happen between calculated or received service risk and actual
observed/measured service level – the Behaviour Trust indicator able to evaluate the
dynamic behaviour of the base measurements.
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This application scenario allows the demonstration of the applicability of the Trust
and Reputation System in different scenarios where its contribution can clearly
improve the risk estimate mechanisms within a Critical Infrastructure (Schaberreiter
et al., 2011b).
The next section describes the work and the results achieved while exploring a new
application scenario. During most of this work, it always felt necessary to test the
main achievements on a realistic CI scenario allowing to build a CI Security Model as
well as access to dynamic data of CI behaviour (in normal operation as well as during
security incidents). One drawback was the lack of CIs willing to share data in order
to test the proposals. Fortunately, with the support of Sebastien Varrette from the
University of Luxembourg, it was possible to obtain data from the Grid’5000 project
(Grid5000, 2013) and implement a different scenario (supported by real data). The
next section briefly describes the Grid’5000 project, the implemented scenario and
highlights the obtained results.
5.3 Trust based interdependency weighting - The
Grig’5000 case study
Previous application scenarios already introduced CI security modelling to enable
on-line risk monitoring in, for instance, CIs that depend on each other by exchanging
risk alerts expressed in terms of a breach of Confidentiality, a breach of Integrity
and degrading Availability (C,I,A). While generally providing a solid basis for risk
monitoring, there was no way of evaluating if a risk alert received from an external
CI is accurate.
In this application scenario the applicability of the proposed solution to this problem
is demonstrated by adding a trust based component to the CI Security Model in
order to improve its accuracy and resilience to inconsistent or inaccurate risk alerts
provided by (inter)dependent CIs. Hence allowing to evaluate the correctness of the
received alerts. Although the approach has been already presented and validated
using simulations, the need of further testing, that should be performed in real
scenario with the use of real data, was identified.
In this section the applicability of the proposed approach is validated by simulating
a use case scenario taking advantage of information from a real-world infrastructure,
namely the Grid’5000 (Bolze et al., 2006; Grid5000, 2013) platform.
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The Grid’5000 project supports an academic computing grid with clusters dis-
tributed at numerous locations, such as France and Luxembourg, with the objective
to help performing large-scale experiments that involve considerable amount of pro-
cessing power, storage or both.
This scenario focuses on evaluating a dependency between the computing grid and
the telecommunication infrastructure used to interconnect each site of the infras-
tructure. The trust is evaluated based on a dataset of measurements gathered by
the available monitoring tools.
5.3.1 Trust and the CI Security Model
In this example the focus is on a dependency between the computing grid and the
telecommunication infrastructure used to interconnect each sites of the infrastruc-
ture. In this case, services belong to different Critical Infrastructures as presented
in Figure 5.10.
This section describes how the Risk Alerts Trust and Behaviour Trust are integrated
with the CI Security Model allowing the evaluation of the correctness of the CI
service risk as received from dependencies. The methodology used in this scenario
is illustrated in Figure 5.10.
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Risk Alerts Trust Agent Behaviour Trust Agent
Received risk
CI Bquality-of-service
Figure 5.10: Trust based dependency weighting (Caldeira et al., 2013).
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Risk Alerts Trust
From the CI Security Model, the received CI service risk is intended to be abstract
information and it is supposed that the receiving CI usually neither knows how the
risk received from a dependent service was derived, nor if the risk value is correct.
The introduction of mechanisms allowing the CI Operator to reason on the received
information can help increase the confidence among CI providers.
In this context, the use of Risk Alerts Trust is a way of reasoning about the received
risk values by comparing it to the experienced Quality-of-Service. For example, in
Figure 5.10, Service A depends on the services provided by Service B. If Service B
continuously sends a low risk value, however Service A is suffering a degradation
in the agreed service level, it becomes clear that the trust that CI A has on the
accuracy of the risk level received from Service B in CI B, should be reduced. As
described in Chapter 4, in order to evaluate trust aspects related to the received
risks, it is required to define an accuracy value for each received risk alert. Also,
in this scenario, a Risk Alerts Event is defined as one of the following situations:
An event starts when one or both risk indicators (received risk from Service B and
Service B Quality-of-Service measured by CI A) are different from one (no risk).
The event ends when both indicators assume again the value one.
As represented in Figure 5.10, in order to identify events, the Risk Alerts Trust
Agent is constantly observing the received risks (Rlt) and the current quality of the
service (Mlt) provided by CI B. According to the information used in the CI Security
Model, both Rlt and Mlt are expressed using the [1..5] range. From the Trust and
Reputation System described in Chapter 4, each event A(Eventn) is defined as the
average of all comparisons made during the event (value T ), between the measured
risk level and the Quality-of-Service level (see Equation 5.1).
A(Eventn) = 100−
(∑T
t=1 f(Mlt, Rlt)
T
∗ 100
)
, (5.7)
where f(Mlt, Rlt) =| Mlt−Rlt4 |k, k ∈ R+. The factor k allows to penalise the larger
differences or the small differences. In this approach, the duration of an event is
not reflected, as the main objective is to discover the accuracy of each received risk
alert.
According to the model described in Chapter 4, the trust that CIA has in the
received risk alerts related to Service X provided by CIB is represented by T(A,B,X)
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and is calculated by the average of the accuracy of each past events between those
two CIs for that particular service (see Equation 4.5). In order to better interpret
the T(A,B,X), the time at which each indicator was evaluated is also included. By
including time, the indicator T(A,B,X,t), represents the trust that CIA has in Service
X provided by CIB at time t.
Behaviour Trust
As explained, Behaviour Trust allows to evaluate and understand an indicator, re-
flecting the trust one can have in the comportment associated with the exchange of
risk information with a dependency. For example, it is expected that Service B in
Figure 5.10 must update and send the service risk in a fixed time interval. If this
expected behaviour fails for a determined period of time it is possible to assume that
something is wrong with the service or with a component involved in the communi-
cation. In this case, during that unusual behaviour, the trust one may have in the
received service risk should decrease, at least due to the fact that the last received
value is outdated.
As explained in previous examples, the information sources that are suitable to
estimate the trust regarding the behaviour of an external CI or dependent service,
are in fact the interactions among CI/services in terms of security, either internal or
external. For instance, the events can be IDS’s alerts, failed connection attempts,
attempts to read/write information without permission or the lack of information
when expected, etc.
By applying the methodology presented in Chapter 4 for the Behaviour Trust eval-
uation, it is possible to evaluate an indicator encompassing all types of defined
security/behaviour events. Using a weight factor for each entity, the behaviour rep-
utation for each CI (or group of services) can be computed, considering also the
Operator information. This indicator, TBehaviour′(B,t), represents the reputation
of the behaviour of CIB including all its services at time t and is computed using
Equations 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 described in detail in Chapter 4.
Improved Trust Based Dependency Weighting
As already stated, one identified weakness, of the original CI Security Model (de-
scribed in Section 2.3), is the dependency weights used to integrate received service
149
APPLICATION SCENARIOS AND VALIDATION
risks into the risk evaluation are manually assigned by experts and consequently
prone to human errors or inaccuracies. Also, as already stated, those weights are
not supposed to change dynamically during system operation. In this scenario, the
author of this thesis and Thomas Schaberreiter, author of the CI Security Model,
improved the methodology presented in Section 5.1 for the trust based dependency
weighting, as illustrated in Figure 5.10, by using all available indicators. Namely,
the Risk Alerts Trust, the Behaviour Trust and the initial expert, all gave weight to
evaluate the influence a service risk received from a dependency has on the depen-
dent service risk estimation.
For example, in the CI A, represented in Figure 5.10, the use of the trust based
dependency weighting, will allow to obtain a more precise service risk estimate for
Service A since the weight that Service B has for Service A risk evaluation can be
lowered, when it is considered that the support information or behaviour cannot be
trusted.
The global trust indicator used by Service A can be acquired by the aggregating
of both defined trust indicators (Risk Alerts Trust and Behaviour Trust), this indi-
cator is described in Chapter 4 and obtaining from the use of Equation 5.8, where
TRiskAlert(A,B,X, t) represents the trust that CIA has in ServiceX of CIB at time
t, TBehaviour(E,B, t) expresses the trust that CIA has on entity E from CIB on the
same time t and β denotes the weight that each indicator has on the service trust
indicator.
T (A,B,X, t) = β ∗TRiskAlert(A,B,X, t) + (1− β) ∗TBehaviour(E,B, t), (0 < β < 1) .
(5.8)
In a similar manner as described in Section 5.1.2, in order to allow association of the
indicator T (A,B,X, t) with the dependency weight for the services, the meaning of
the weights has been changed in comparison with the original CI Security Model.
In the original approach, an expert weight represents the influence of a dependency
on a service. In the actual context, with the use of the TRS, the expert weight de-
scribes the maximum influence that a dependent service can have on the service risk
evaluation. Those weights are now continuously adjusted according to T (A,B,X, t)
as exemplified by Equation 5.9. In this Equation, ω(A,B,X, t) is the trust based de-
pendency weight used by CIA when including information from Service X of CIB on
its own service risk evaluation. ωE(A,B,X) is the originally defined expert weight
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and T (A,B,X, t) corresponds to the service trust indicator for the dependency X.
ω is computed in the range ]0..100] and 0 is not a possible value as in the case
that the trust on one dependency is 0, one should act accordingly and remove this
dependency from the service risk evaluation. This problem is inherent to the CI
Security Model and has been identified in (Aubert et al., 2010a).
ω(A,B,X, t) =
ωE(A,B,X) ∗ T (A,B,X, t)
100
, ωE(A,B,X), T (A,B,X, t) ∈ [0..100] .
(5.9)
5.3.2 Case study: the Grid’5000 project
In order to confirm the applicability of the presented approach, the validation is
supported by a case study based on a realistic scenario. More specifically, the
validation work described in the following section was based on the CI Security
Model and data collected from the Grid’5000 grid platform (Bolze et al., 2006;
Grid5000, 2013).
Grid’5000 aims to provide the users with a fully customisable testbed able to perform
advanced experiments in all areas of computer science related to parallel, large-scale
or distributed computing and networking. The project web site defines Grid’5000 as
“a research effort developing a large-scale nation wide infrastructure for large-scale
parallel and distributed computing research” (Grid5000, 2013).
The first prototype of what Grid’5000 is now has began developing in France in
2003 and has been open for users since 2005. Actually, the infrastructure covers
a set of eleven geographical sites composing Grid’5000 – ten in France (Bordeaux,
Grenoble, Lille, Lyon, Paris/Orsay, Nancy, Reims, Rennes, Sophia, Toulouse) and
one in Luxembourg. Furthermore, the infrastructure has been expanded beyond
France and Luxembourg, with the deployment of extra international connections to
Brazil, Japan and the Netherlands. Those international connections are provided
via the site of Grenoble (Grid5000, 2013).
According to the project web site (Grid5000, 2013), the support backbone for the
Grid’5000 sites in France is based on 10Gbit/s dark fibres providing also IP connec-
tivity to all overseas sites. The backbone is also interconnected with the GEANT
high bandwidth pan-European research and education network (Ge´ant, 2013), the
SFINX global Internet exchange point (SFinx, 2013), the DAS-3 - The Next Gener-
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ation Grid Infrastructure in The Netherlands and with the NAREGI Grid in Japan
(NAREGI, 2013). According to (Grid5000, 2013), the introduction of a dark fibre
infrastructure now allows to allocate dedicated 10Gbit/s links for specific research
projects. The overall IP network of the Grid’5000 is presented in Figure 5.11 avail-
able on the project Web Site.
Figure 5.11: Grid5000 IP Network (Grid5000, 2013).
Although one can argue that this type of infrastructure is not critical due, for in-
stance, to the fact that no human lives depend on Grid’5000 services (at least in
the short and medium term), as a research facility, Grid’5000 fits the critical sectors
defined by the European Commission presented in Table 2.1. Grid’5000 is already
a large infrastructure shared among multiple users and supported by internal ser-
vices (sites) and by external services (telecommunication services). Apart from the
definitions it is the author’s opinion that Grid’5000 can be considered a Critical In-
frastructure involving several crucial security components, for instance, as described
by Se´bastien Varrette (Caldeira et al., 2013):
• the Puppet infrastructure (Puppet, 2013), responsible for the configuration of
all grid services within Grid’5000;
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• the Chef and Kadeploy infrastructure, which pilots the deployment of the com-
puting nodes of the platform;
• OAR (Capit et al., 2005), the resource manager of Grid’5000;
• the network backbone, operated by independent providers, namely Renater (Re-
nater, 2013) in France and Restena (Restena, 2013) in Luxembourg.
As mentioned above, these components, considered critical for the Grid operation,
are dispersed among all the sites (mainly in France and in Luxembourg - interna-
tional connections to Brazil, Japan and the Netherlands are operated via the site of
Grenoble) that compose the Grid’5000 infrastructures.
According to Se´bastien Varrette (Caldeira et al., 2013), the Grid’5000 platform is
managed and monitored by a technical committee formed by two engineering work
groups, specifically: 1) the support staff: whose main functions are to coordinate
the platform administration; the development of specific administration tools and
to provide user support. 2) the development team: mainly responsible for the
design and development of the fundamental tools used during the platform operation.
These groups also develop and maintain the Grid’5000 API that, as described in
(Grid5000, 2013), is divided into six main areas, namely: the Metrology API –
provides multiple metrics of the existent nodes, for example, memory, CPU usage,
byte in, bytes out, among others; the Monitoring API – provides the status of the
nodes; Jobs API – allow user to submit jobs on the grid sites; Deployments API –
allows do deploy specific environment configurations on a grid node; Users API –
offers mechanisms for user account management; Reference API – provides general
information about the grid such as, list of sites, nodes, installed environments, etc.
An example from an application developed on top of the Grid’5000 API is shown
in Figure 5.12. This Figure is a snapshot of the Grid’5000 dashboard, available for
the Grid users from where they can visualise, in real time, the status of all sites
composing the Grid.
Among the multiple critical components present in the described infrastructure,
this case study focuses on the existent dependencies among services. In particular,
focuses on the dependency between the Grid’5000 sites and the network (telecom-
munications) infrastructure. This example provides a scenario where it is possible
to highlight a dependency between two independently operated and managed CIs.
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Figure 5.12: Grid5000 Dashboard (from (Grid5000, 2013)).
Application scenario
The general representation of the case study is presented in Figure 5.13. The net-
work infrastructure provided by Renater is visible in the Figure, that comprises 13
network segments, each one indicating a connection between two GRID’5000 sites.
As indicated in Figure 5.11, most of these segments are implemented as dedicated
10 Gbits/s Ethernet lines, with an exception to the international connections from
Grenoble to Porto Alegre (Brazil), Naregi (Japan) and DAS3 (Netherlands) that are
served using VPN (virtual private network) connections.
In order to apply the CI Security Model to the presented scenario it is necessary to
locate the available information for each service (base measurements). This infor-
mation is then used to evaluate service risk. In this case, the state of each network
segment can be described by available base measurement information and used, in
this particular example, to evaluate the risk of degrading Availability.
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Figure 5.13: Case study overview: illustration of the dependency between Grid’5000
and the network infrastructure (Caldeira et al., 2013).
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It is clear that each of the existing sites in the Grid infrastructure depend on the
services provided by the network provider, which allow communications to be es-
tablished and maintained across all sites. In order to estimate the risk for each site,
the site must receive risk information regarding the network segment on which it
depends and include this information in that risk estimation. Note that all sites
can communicate to each other via the shown network connections. For instance,
the site Luxembourg can communicate with the site Lyon via the network segments
Luxembourg-Nancy, Nancy-Paris and Paris-Lyon as represented in Figure 5.11. In
this case, the network connexion (Luxembourg-Lyon) should be characterised by the
three network segments involved.
In order to reduce the complexity while presenting the case study and also due
to constrains in the data that was available from the infrastructure, this scenario is
focused on the site Luxembourg that depends on the network segment Luxembourg-
Nancy as illustrated in Figure 5.14.
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Figure 5.14: Detailed view of the Luxembourg-Nancy network segment (Caldeira
et al., 2013).
Among the available raw data gathered from the measurement equipment, four base
measurements were identified in order to allow the representation of each segment
and in particular the segment Luxembourg-Nancy. The available base measure-
ments are described in Figure 5.14 and include network performance and traffic
measurements. In particular the observed base measurements are:
1. Latency: Measures how much time a packet requires to travel from source to
destination and then returned to its sender (measured in seconds).
2. Loss: The number of packets that are lost while measuring the latency.
3. In-Packets: The number of packets arriving into the segment (in packets/sec-
ond).
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4. Out-Packets: The number of packets leaving the segment (in packets/sec-
ond).
The available base measurements can be gathered and used by the CI Security
Model in order to compute Availability risk. To accomplish risk evaluation, a set of
weights, expressing the relevance each base measurement has to the service, must
be defined. After specifying the weights, the average weighted method described
for the CI Security Model is applied. Although information was obtained from the
presented four indicators, the quality of the data collected for each indicator differs
making it difficult to use them in a simulation. Also the integration of multiple
base measurements would not help explaining and interpreting the results. After
analysing all data available, it was decided to use only the latency base measurement
to characterise the service risk of the network segment Luxembourg-Nancy.
Grid’5000 uses the Smokeping (Smokeping, 2012) tool in order to collect the data
from the infrastructure and RDDTool (RDDTool, 2012) for data storage in a database.
The RDDTool stores data using a round-robin database, due to this fact, the recent
data is kept stored in a shorter time interval than older data, allowing the system
storage footprint to remain constant over time. The provided database contains
latency measurements for a time period of about one year (from June 2011 until
June 2012).
Figure 5.15 shows a graph representing the available data for the latency base mea-
surement gathered from the network segment Luxembourg-Nancy. The graph has
been planned in a way to allow the observation of the latency over time (x-axes).
Thus it becomes clear that, due to the fact that data is stored using a round-robin
database, the first periods of time have fewer information and occupy more space
(more spread over time) than the newer records that have more information for an
equal period of time.
In order to allow a proper visualisation of the simulation results, to reduce the
differences existing in the amount of data over time and also to show the data
evenly distributed, it was decided to use the provided information as (#Events) and
to remove the time/date information. In a real application of the proposed approach,
as the evaluation is to be made in real-time, it is expected to receive each Event
(latency value) on a regular time interval. Therefore, using the available information
as Events, allows simulating a real-time environment where the reporting interval
is not supposed to change. One problem that arises from the use of real latency
data gathered from a system as the Grid’5000, is that it was not possible to identify
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Figure 5.15: Latency dataset for network segment Luxembourg-Nancy.
any period in which the system could be with high availability risk. In particular,
during the measured period, the maximum observed latency is below 5ms. Through
a simple analysis of the latency values represented in Figure 5.15, it becomes obvious
that this latency should not pose any availability risk for a high-speed network
connection and that the availability risk should always be set to 1 (no risk).
Due to the described constraint related to the observed latency values, it is necessary
to change the way the measured latency values are interpreted in order for it to
become possible to design a meaningful example. In order to create a scenario with
circumstances that may lead to a risk situation, the boundary for what is considered
a risk situation is artificially lowered according to the intervals expressed in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Risk level / Latency measurement.
Risk level Latency in Seconds
1 >= 0 and < 0.00265
2 >= 0.00265 and < 0.0027
3 >= 0.0027 and < 0.0033
4 >= 0.0033 and < 0.005
5 >= 0.005
Based on the available latency information and applying the intervals defined in
Table 5.3, the service risk for the network segment Luxembourg-Nancy is calculated.
It is now assumed that this service risk is received from the network Operator. The
evaluated service risk is described by the graph represented in Figure 5.16. From
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observing Figure 5.15 it was already noticed that some values are missing. This fact
is now clearly noticeable by the analysis of Figure 5.16. The periods on which no
measured values are available for the latency, are highlighted with vertical dotted
lines in both Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16. As it will be described, those missing
observations will be employed to evaluate the Behaviour Trust.
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Figure 5.16: Service risk for network segment Luxembourg-Nancy.
Experimental set-up
As the objective of this case study is to prove the relevance of the Trust and Repu-
tation indicators in permitting to improve the confidence a CI has on each received
service risk, the CI Security Model and the TRS are put together in this case study.
The prepared experimental set-up is represented in Figure 5.17.
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Figure 5.17: Case study experimental set-up overview.
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In the presented set-up, two services from two different CIs, are defined. The service
Network segment Luxembourg-Nancy which is part of the Network Provider CI and
the service Site Luxembourg which is part of the Grid’5000 CI. This set-up allows the
demonstration of the application on a scenario on which two Critical Infrastructures
are willing to exchange risk information in order to improve security. In this scenario,
it is clear that the service Site Luxembourg depends on the service Network segment
Luxembourg-Nancy.
The service Network segment Luxembourg-Nancy evaluates the service risk for the
network segment and periodically sends this information to all services that depend
on this network. In this example, the service Site Luxembourg receives the service
risk from the service Network segment Luxembourg-Nancy and evaluates the Risk
Alerts Trust and the Behaviour Trust. The main goal is to combine these indicators,
together with the initial Expert weight to calculate the Weighted Service Risk from
the received service risk.
As already described, the Risk Alerts Trust is evaluated by comparing the received
service risk with an independent measure of the provided service. In this case, it
is mandatory to gather the Quality-of-Service measurement as experienced by the
service Site Luxembourg. This measurement is represent in Figure 5.17 and titled
Measured Network Provider Quality-of-Service. This measurement does not exists
in the actual Site Luxembourg and even if some measurement in the grid site was
deployed, it is expected that the measurements would not significantly differ from
the measurements made by the network provider. With this fact in mind, it was
necessary to emulate the measurement tools and generate values for the Measured
Network Provider Quality-of-Service.
The values generated to simulate the Measured Network Provider Quality-of-Service
pretends to create a scenario where the measured values normally represent a good
Quality-of-Service (value 1, means no risk), and in some period, the received and
measured values have some significant mismatch. To create such a data set, the
values are set to 1 and only in the period between 1000 and 2000 events, a significant
mismatch with the received risk level exists, on which the generated values are
varying between 3 and 5. In this period, the values were generated randomly, in R
(R Development Core Team, 2009), according to the following criteria: 30% of the
values are set to 5, 50% are set to 4 and 20% are set to 3. The generated values
representing the Measured Network Provider Quality-of-Service are shown in the
graph represented in Figure 5.18.
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Figure 5.18: Network provider Quality-of-service for network segment Luxembourg-
Nancy.
In an environment where CIs are exchanging service risk information, it is assumed
that a risk level has to be sent by the network provider at fixed and previously
defined time intervals. Although it is possible to define any time interval, changing
its value implies that this information must be passed to the site Operator allowing
him to reconfigure the TRS parameters according to the new used time interval.
As previously mentioned, the available data records for latency (Figure 5.15) has
some missing measurements or there are no measurements available during some
time periods. This fact is clearly visible on the data set as some records are stored
with the information NaN (Not a Number). It was impossible to find the reason for
this fact but it shows that it occurs in real systems and shall be treated appropriately.
The three longer time periods, containing more that 50 NaN values in a row, are
indicated in the charts using vertical dotted lines. In addition to NaN records that
appear sporadically, smaller intervals containing only NaN values, are also present.
These cases are not represented in Figure 5.15 as it would be difficult to do so while
preserving correct interpretation.
In previous examples, in the case that a risk value is not received within the defined
period, the last received value is used. This approach has shown that it is possible
to minimise the impact of this assumption when adding Behaviour Trust indicators.
On the other hand, if the CI Operator is just focusing on received service risk he
has no means of understanding that something incorrect is happening. In this case,
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even if he did not receive any value, he would see a straight line on the graph that
represents the risk of the service on which it depends. To avoid this situation, it is
defined that when a NaN value is received (or nothing is received) during a defined
time interval, the service risk assumes the value 1 (no risk) when the first missing
value is detected. If more sequential omitted values are identified, the received risk
is successively increased until it reaches 5 (maximum risk). Basically, when the
site does not receive information from the network provider, an increasing risk is
assumed, as demonstrated in Figure 5.19.
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Figure 5.19: Normalized service risk for network segment Luxembourg-Nancy.
It seems dangerous to assume the worst-case when no information is received from
the network provider. On first thought is seems that the site will raise its risk level
and consequently the Grid’5000 risk level will also increase. All this can happen
during normal operation leading to an unnecessary and unwanted risk increase.
These are normal thoughts and this would be the case without the contribution of
the Behaviour Trust indicator.
From the first analysis of the available data it is clear that the Behaviour Trust, in
this scenario, is to be evaluated based on the absence of information or if incorrect
information is received (incorrect information was not found in the data). As de-
scribed in Table 5.4, if an NaN value (or nothing, unknown or incorrect) is received
during the defined slot of time, this is perceived as anomalous behaviour and the
Behaviour Trust is reduced. The first NaN value that appears triggers a behaviour
event with a value of 80 (in a scale of 1..100). Next successive missing values trig-
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ger events with a value diminishing by 20 until it reaches 0. When a valid value
is received on time, a value of 100 is triggered. Consequently, the high-risk values
assumed during periods where no service risk is received, will have less influence on
the service risk estimation. In order to better understand this last statement, it is
important to recall that the goal of using trust indicators, is to make it possible to
dynamically adjust the influence (weight) a received service risk has on the receiver’s
risk evaluation.
Table 5.4: Normalisation table for service risk behaviour
Behaviour event value / Service risk
Behaviour Event Value Description
100 Valid value received on time
80
NaN (Not a Number) or invalid value received
or nothing received on time
[60..0]
Next successive missing, NaN or invalid values trigger
events with a value diminishing by 20 until it reaches 0
The Grid’5000 case study scenario has been simulated using both the R tool (R
Development Core Team, 2009) and the Java application described in Section 4.4. In
this section, all data used to perform the simulation has been identified. Specifically,
according to Figure 5.17 , following information and configuration parameters are
used to evaluate the intended indicators:
• Service Risk: Normalised service risk as presented in Figure 5.19;
• Quality-of-Service: Generated values represented in Figure 5.18;
• Risk Alerts Trust: Penalisation factor k = 1.25; ageing factor D = 0.3;
• Behaviour Trust: Time slot size ∆t = 2 and ageing factor D = 0.3;
• Service trust: Evaluated using the following weights: 60% to the Risk Alerts
Trust and 40% to the Behaviour Trust;
• Expert weight: ωE = 80%.
Results
In order to compute Risk Alerts Trust, the service risk received from the network
Operator (Figure 5.19) is evaluated against the site measured QoS (Figure 5.18) as
described in previous sections. The behaviour of the system is observed, measured
and normalised according to the available entities and previously defined security
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policies. In this case, the entity used is the observation and analysis of the received
service risk, according to the rules defined in Table 5.4.
For this case study, the results obtained for the Risk Alerts Trust and Behaviour
Trust indicators are represented in Figure 5.20.
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
# Events
Tr
u
st
 In
di
ca
to
r
Risk Alerts Trust 
Behaviour Trust
Figure 5.20: Trust indicators for network segment Luxembourg-Nancy.
From the indicators represented in Figure 5.20 the comportment of the Behaviour
Trust indicator is noticeable. That, as expected, immediately starts to decay during
the periods where no information is received from the service Operator and rapidly
returns to an high value when the system behaves as expected (receiving service risk
values on a regular basis). As described, the available data has some large blocks
of NaN record (marked in the graphs) and also has some isolated or small blocks
of NaN values. In these cases, a few missing values have a low influence on the
Behaviour Trust indicator leading just to a small decrease with a rapid return to
the original value. In this case, it can be affirmed that missing just a few values will
have a low influence on the confidence one has in the received service risk alert.
Observing the Risk Alerts Trust represented in 5.20, it is visible that it decays in two
different situations. During the interval from the 1000th to the 2000th event, the
indicators decreases although not in a linear form. This fact is related to the defined
measured risk (Quality-of-Service) observed by the site. As described, this measured
risk is defined as 1 except for interval [1000..2000] to which, an important discrepancy
between the measured service risk and the received service risk, was introduced.
This discrepancy causes the Risk Alerts Trust indicator to decline according to the
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differences in the observed values before starting to progressively raise. The second
situation in which the trust, in the received service risk, degrades, is when it is not
possible to evaluate it as usual, due to the lack of values. It should be remembered
that when a value is not received or in periods where no information is received,
it is assigned an increasing risk to the service risk used in the evaluation. With
this information, it becomes clear that a discrepancy between the values is also
encountered leading to a decrease in the Risk Alerts Trust during the periods where
no information is received.
From the original CI Security Model, each received risk information has a predefined
weight specified by a CI expert. In this example, the expert fixed the contribution
of the network segment Luxembourg-Nancy to the site Luxembourg as being 80%.
In this case, regardless of the other indicators, this is the maximum influence the re-
ceived risk can have on the risk indicator evaluated on Site Luxembourg. The main
objective for this case study is to allow the weight to vary based on the dynamically
evaluated confidence in the received service risk. Figure 5.21 describes how the ser-
vice trust indicator (comprising Risk Alerts Trust and Behaviour Trust) contributes
to the weight that the received risk alert has on the CI Security Model. With the
maximum value defined by the expert as 80%, the final weight (expert*service trust),
evaluated according to Equation 5.9, will change gradually in accordance with the
evaluated service trust indicator.
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Figure 5.21: Service risk weights for network segment Luxembourg-Nancy.
The information received from the network segment Luxembourg-Nancy, considered
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in this case study, is shown in Figure 5.19. This information, risk level for the
network segment as observed by the service provider, is incorporated into the Site
Luxembourg risk assessment with a contribution defined by the weights presented
in Figure 5.21 (expert*service trust). The result of this contribution is represented
in Figure 5.22 that illustrate the final weighted risk level (the ingress risk indicator
to Service A in Figure 5.10). It is visible that when the service trust decreases,
less weight is assumed for the received risk and consequently a low risk level is
maintained.
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
1
2
3
4
5
 
# Events
R
is
k 
Le
ve
l
Weighted risk
Figure 5.22: Weighted service risk for network segment Luxembourg-Nancy.
As mentioned in Section 5.1.3, in the CI Security Model, each weight denotes the
impact a risk alert received from a dependency has on the aggregated risk of a service.
In this context, the fact that one may have a low confidence on a received risk, the
importance of this received risk has to the service should be lowered. Consequently,
receiving high-risk alerts from one low trusted dependency will represent only a low
risk for the service.
Simulation results from the Java application
As described in Section 4.4, a Java application implementing the TRS discussed
in this thesis was developed as a proof of concept. With this tool it is possible to
describe a scenario represented with the CI Security Model and compute the Risk
Alerts Trust and Behaviour Trust indicators. The developed tool implements web
services that allows to receive real time data from Critical Infrastructures, or to act
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as a simulator by reading data records from XML files. As already stated, the trust
based dependency weighting presented in this section is fully implemented as well
as the approach where trust is used to evaluate assurance for the correctness of CI
service risks.
In Figure 5.23, a snapshot of the application interface simulating the Grid’5000
use case scenario, is presented. The simulation results for the Risk Alerts Trust
as well as the Behaviour Trust are shown. These indicators are identical to the
previously presented results with the exception that the Behaviour Trust indicator
was normalised to a scale of [1..5] to be compliant with the approach described in
Section 5.2.
Figure 5.23: Results obtained from the developed proof of concept application.
5.3.3 Discussion
To be able to test the TRS using real data was an exciting challenge despite the fact
that it was not possible to implement the presented approach (in real time) on the
site Luxembourg.
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For all the indicators, the set of performed simulations performed as expected and
proved that, by introducing trust indicators, it is possible to improve the accuracy
and the way the weighted risk levels are computed, thus allowing a more accurate
risk information to be used. This expected and wanted comportment allow a CI or
CI service not to raise risk level based on untrusted information as it is clear that
a CI should not raise it’s alert state (high risk) without a good reason (trust in the
information sources).
This case-study allowed also to test and validate the simulation tools, in particu-
lar the Java application by comparing the result with the original TRS tool, devel-
oped using the statistical R Project for Statistical Computing (R Development Core
Team, 2009).
5.4 Summary
This chapter presented the evaluation of the TRS when applied within the CI Se-
curity Model and evaluated it according to different aspects introduced in the three
described scenarios.
The CI Security Model can be seen as a simple, flexible nevertheless a powerful
CI modelling technique, allowing to enable risk evaluation on CIs that depend on
services provided by other CIs (or CI services) and on which risks or failures in
a dependency can cascade and cause service disruptions. The CI Security Model
addresses these issues and provides a methodology for risk based dependency mon-
itoring. However, as originally defined, the receiving CI service has no means of
evaluating the correctness of the received risk information. The described validation
works allowed evaluating the TRS on multiple scenarios based on the CI Security
Model, confirming and highlighting the TRS high level of flexibility and adaptabil-
ity. This work also contributed to the improvement of the CI Security Model by
addressing some of its shortcomings, namely the introduction of risk indicators that
allow the model to gather intelligence and act more independently from the CI ex-
pert thus providing better indicators to the CI Operator, in particular when used
in a real-time environment.
For the scenarios described in Sections 5.1 and 5.3, the method used to weigh each
CI/service dependency in the CI risk evaluation, was improved by applying the
method named trust based dependency weighting. In this case, the trust indicators,
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Risk Alerts Trust and Behaviour Trust were introduced in order to evaluate the cor-
rectness of information received from dependencies. These trust indicators are used
to define the importance of the risk information received from a dependency for risk
estimation within a CI. Essentially, trusted information receives higher importance
than untrusted information. The use of trust based dependency weighting can have
a large impact on a CI risk estimation, as the trust one has on the information
sources is now considered in the evaluation. This is the main objective of the pre-
sented approach as defined for the MICIE project, to reason about the exchanged
information.
Trust based dependency weighting has been simulated using only generated data and
also based on a real case study with information gathered over a period of one year.
Those two scenarios are similar to each other in the main objective - to evaluate the
correctness of information received from dependencies – but differ in some aspects
as for instance the use of the Behaviour trust or the approach followed to employ
missing values in the evaluation. The real case study describes a dependency between
Grid’5000, a distributed computing grid platform, with the network infrastructure
used to provide network communication among computing sites. Different providers
operate the computing grid and the network infrastructure. The results from the
simulations suggest that the approach works as expected and that discrepancies
between announced service risk and actually experienced Quality-of-Service, as well
as faulty behaviour, can be captured by the Risk Alerts Trust and Behaviour Trust
indicators.
In the second scenario, described in Section 5.2, the TRS is adapted for a different
use, which has not been initially foreseen. In this case, it is possible to observe and
reason about the received risk and also about the behaviour of the base measure-
ments used to evaluate service risk. This was not clearly the use that was in mind
when the TRS was first planned and allows highlighting it’s adaptability to new ap-
plications. In this scenario, the service assurance level, representing the confidence
in the correctness of the measurements that are used to evaluate the CI service risk,
has been evaluated from the Risk Alerts Trust indicator, the Behaviour Trust indi-
cator and from the base measurements assurance level defined by an expert. Also
in this simulation it was possible to demonstrate that the application of the TRS
can greatly improve a CI risk model by introducing new views over the information
used to reason about risks. The approach presented in this particular example can
be used in combination with the approach described in Sections 5.1 and 5.3 without
any further modification.
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The use of the developed Java application that allows simulating all the presented
scenarios was shown. This application has been validated successfully against the
initial TRS tool supported by the statistical R Project for Statistical Computing
tool (R Development Core Team, 2009). In addition to allowing the performance of
the described simulations, the tool is also capable of performing all the evaluations
in real time simply by receiving the necessary data on the available web services.
The presented application scenarios allowed to demonstrate the applicability of the
Trust and Reputation System in different scenarios, where the TRS contribution
can clearly improve the risk estimate mechanisms within a Critical Infrastructure.
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Conclusions
The main subject addressed within this thesis was the use of Trust and Reputation
Management aiming to improve Critical Infrastructure Protection. The main con-
clusions drawn from the work conducted and the issues to be addressed in future
work are presented in this chapter. Section 6.1 presents a synthesis of this thesis,
while Section 6.2 describes the contributions and the most relevant conclusions that
resulted from this work. Section 6.3 contains some issues that should be addressed
in future work.
6.1 Synthesis of the Thesis
In current days, Critical Infrastructures are complex systems on which modern soci-
ety depends. Infrastructures such as energy suppliers, telecommunications providers
or water distributors are common within advanced societies. Countries and their
citizens depend on services provided by CIs in order to fulfil their daily activities.
One actual major concern, resides in the way CIs are protected from external en-
vironments, that might cause, accidentally or intentionally, a quality decrease in
the services provided by CIs or even cause the disruption of those services. The
identified necessity to protect Critical Infrastructures has driven the development of
several frameworks, techniques and mechanisms in order to increase the resilience
of such important infrastructures.
The concept of Critical Infrastructure was first introduced in Chapter 2 while high-
lighting the problems that might arise in their operation. One risk already identified
within CIs protection is the existence of interdependencies among them. These in-
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terdependencies pose a serious risk in the CIs operation as a failure in one CI can
affect those who depend on it. This problem was discussed while describing some
relevant approaches that deal with this subject. Critical Infrastructure modelling,
simulation techniques and risk assessment frameworks have been addressed in order
to understand their main characteristics and the major problems they intend to
solve. The importance of the CI protection is highlighted by the description of three
selected European projects that have made major contributions in the area of CI
security and protection.
Moreover, throughout Chapter 2, some ICT specific aspects were discussed in order
to locate the contributions presented in this thesis in the state of the art. Namely,
existent work on Policy Based Management and methodologies to deal with Ontolo-
gies, were discussed. Furthermore, an overview of some existent Trust and Reputa-
tion models, focusing on their applicability to the context of Critical Infrastructures
protection and on the information exchange among Critical Infrastructures, were
also discussed.
The MICIE project was described in this thesis, as most of the research challenges
that led to this thesis, were revealed within the MICIE project. Chapter 3 presented
an overview of the MICIE project with particular emphasis on the components
in which the author of this thesis has been actively involved. In particular, the
Mediation System Design and the modelling activities, which includes the author’s
contribution (ICT-MC). It is also detailed, the SMGW Manager and a first approach
for the inclusion of trust indicators within the project, both were contributed by the
author of this thesis.
The MICIE system acts on a distributed environment composed of multiple het-
erogeneous CIs, that might depend on one or more services provided externally by
others CIs. MICIE’s main goals are to predict and to exchange risk information
among peer CIs, across trusted or untrusted network infrastructures (e.g. Internet).
During the research carried within the MICIE project, the lack of mechanisms which
allow to observe and reason about the confidence one can have in the information
received from peer CIs, was identified. Also, the relevance of observing and of con-
sidering the behaviour of the information sources, in order for it to become possible
to infer trust information regarding that behaviour, was identified. These facts led
to the contribution of the Trust and Reputation framework, described in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 introduces the Trust and Reputation framework, aiming to allow the
incorporation of Trust and Reputation indicators on the information exchanged
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among Critical Infrastructures and also on information coming from heterogeneous
monitoring equipment. Although, the presented framework is independent from the
MICIE project, since it can be applied in multiple contexts, the MICIE application
scenario was described.
In particular, the developed Trust and Reputation System was introduced along
with the description of the main components that make up the system, namely, the
Risk Alerts Trust Agent, the Behaviour Trust Agent and the Discovery Tool. The in-
dicators evaluated by the Trust and Reputation System were described, highlighting
their contribution to the improvement of CI risk prediction and to the management
of a risk alert sharing system.
The contribution of the proposed indicators was validated by simulation. The results
obtained within a representative set of performed simulations, was presented in
Chapter 4. The obtained results, highlight the Trust and Reputation indicator’s
ability to improve a system and CI Operator’s capacity to deal with uncertainty,
and to fulfil its mission, in a timely manner, for instance, in the presence of attacks,
failures, or accidents.
In order to demonstrate the flexibility and applicability of the Trust and Reputation
framework within different scenarios and by using different CI modelling method-
ologies, the TRS was applied in the CI Security Model (described in Section 2.3). In
Chapter 5, three applications and validation scenarios were presented for the Trust
and Reputation System, supported by the CI Security Model. The application
scenarios incorporated new information sources (trust) in the original CI Security
Model. The first two application scenarios were validated using simulation. The last
presented application scenario was validated using real data and allowed to prove
the applicability of both contributions (TRS and the CI Security Model) to a real
test-bed scenario – The Grid’5000 project.
6.2 Main contributions
This section describes the main contributions of this thesis. It is possible to identify
three main contributions that were described throughout this thesis. The first, con-
tributed to the analysis of problems resulting from CI risk exchange among Critical
Infrastructure. This analysis allowed to address, in an integrated manner, problems
that result from a scenario where CIs are willing to share risk information, related to
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services they provide, in order to improve the risk prediction within the dependent
Critical Infrastructures.
In this context, a Policy Based Management Architecture was proposed to improve
the management of the MICIE Secure Mediation Gateway, responsible for imple-
menting the risk exchange mechanisms. This contribution was integrated in the
MICIE project, in particular, in the SMGW Manager by the development of a Pol-
icy Management Tool.
Frameworks intended to allow and improve CI modelling, risk prediction and risk
exchange among Critical Infrastructures already exist, and are proved to be accurate
(e.g. MICIE project). Even though such frameworks exist, and are able to safely
merge risk information arriving from multiple sources, the lack of mechanisms al-
lowing to observe and reason about the confidence one can have in the information
collected from these sources, was identified. Also, it is important to understand the
behaviour of the information sources in order for it to become possible to infer trust
information regarding that behaviour.
The second contribution identified in this thesis is the conception of a Trust and
Reputation framework able to infer trust information on exchanged information
and also on the behaviour of the subjacent system. The proposed framework is able
to help the CI Operator to reason about the exchanged information and also to
dynamically include the risk assessment in the defined management policies. This
allows the improvement of the security of the existent secure mediation gateway
through, for instance, denying sending or receiving information from untrusted peers.
The validation activities carried out during this work allow the highlighting of the
relevance of introducing Trust and Reputation indicators to improve CI Protection.
The third contribution is to enable the integration of the Trust and Reputation
framework in CI risk models. This contribution is to introduce a way of building
a trust relationship among CIs. Based on the common abstract information they
share, describing how trust can be used in the model to dynamically re-evaluate the
impact a risk level received, from a dependency, has on the modelled risk in a CI.
Consequently, improving its accuracy and its resilience to inconsistent information
provided by dependent CIs. Specifically, the Trust and Reputation System is now
part of the CI Security Model and can be used to reason about the exchanged
information and also internally in one CI to reason about the information gathered
from the field.
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Within this work, three full functional prototypes were developed in order to imple-
ment the CI Policy Management Tool and the Trust and Reputation System. First,
the proposed Policy Management Tool, described in this thesis, was integrated and
delivered by the MICIE project. This tool is also able to integrate and reason, using
information coming from the Trust and Reputation System. Second, in order to fully
implement the Trust and Reputation System, two TRS prototypes were developed.
The first was developed as an add-on to the MICIE project, allowing to be inte-
grated within the MICIE Secure Mediation Gateway from where the necessary data
for the evaluation is gathered. The second, completely implements a modelling tool
which is able to, by using a simple graphical interface, model a CI as represented by
the CI Security Model existent entities. This tool allows evaluating risk and trust
indicators in real time, with data coming from the CI or by receiving previously
prepared data, in order to simulate a specific scenario. The described tools were
also used for the experimental work that allowed evaluating the proposals described
in this thesis.
6.3 Future Work
The problematic of Critical Infrastructure Security and Protection is still the subject
of an on-going effort in the research community. Although, the evaluation of the
proposals presented in this thesis has shown some interesting results on improving
the accuracy of risk prediction and the manageability and security of a system able to
exchange risk information among CIs, there are still open-ended issues that demand
further study.
An aspect that can be addressed in more detail, is the methodology used for the
Trust and Reputation evaluation. From the described state of the art in the Trust
and Reputation area, it is possible to note the existence of multiple approaches, each
one with its particularities. A further study on the presented Trust and Reputation
framework, should include different approaches on how to derive trust from the
collected evidence, for instance by using Bayesian Networks.
One particular aspect that could be addressed, is the improvement of the presented
Trust and Reputation System by diminishing the CI expert influence on the defini-
tion of the TRS parameters. For instance, one should evaluate the applicability of
dynamically defining the ageing factor for each CI or CI service, by incorporating
the results of the Behaviour Trust indicator into a new dynamic ageing factor.
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Another aspect that was kept open in this work is the possible use of shared reputa-
tion services, able to use the intelligence gathered from multiple CIs collectively, to
determine the reputation of a specific CI, based on the trust each (inter)dependent
CI has in each partner. This possibility was not evaluated in this work and needs
special attention to maintain information source confidentiality.
Moreover, an interesting work, although difficult to achieve due to the intricate
constrains, is the implementation of a test bed within a set of Critical Infrastructures,
on which the presented proposals would be validated during a larger period of time,
in a real scenario.
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